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It isn’t June yet, but computer networks are bustin’ out all over.
– J. C. R Licklider, 10 May 1967

Abstract
By means of a philosophical reading of Norbert Wiener, founder of cybernetics, this
thesis attempts to derive anew the concepts of internet and control. It develops upon
Wiener’s position that every age is reflected by a certain machine, arguing that the
internet is that which does so today. Grounded by a critical historiography of the
relation between the ColdWar and the internet’s invention in 1969 by the ‘network’ of
J. C. R. Licklider, it argues for an agonistic concept of internet derived fromWiener’s
disjunctive reading of figures including Claude Bernard, Walter Cannon, Benoît
Mandelbrot, John von Neumann and above all, his Neo-Kantian inflected reading
of Leibniz. It offers a counter-theory of the society of control to those grounded by
Spinoza’s ethology, notably that of Michael Hardt and Toni Negri, and attempts to
establish a single conceptual vocabulary for depicting the possible modes of conflict
through which an internet is determined.
v
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Introduction
‘I wish to turn my time over to William Burroughs, who is here today and I can never
waste a minute talking while we could be hearing Burroughs speak!’1 So stepped aside
from his joint-panel Michel Foucault, star guest of Semiotext(e)’s Schizo-Culture
colloquium at Columbia University in 1975, whose Surveiller et punir was already
being rushed through translation. The audience included not only Jean-François
Lyotard, Kathy Acker, R. D. Laing, John Rajchman, Arthur Danto and John Cage,
but a specialist on Proust and Sacher-Masoch named Gilles Deleuze who would
invoke the concept of a ‘rhizome’,2 and Félix Guattari, an ‘unknown quantity’ to
Americans but one whose encounter with the event’s organiser Sylvère Lotringer
proved the ‘trigger’ for its occasion – another Guattari effect.3 I begin my thesis in
the hall of this milestone event in the Anglophone reception – or rather production –
of ‘Post-’68 French Philosophy’, and specifically at the moment when Foucault gave
priority to an American contemporary’s paper which, Deleuze says, construed his
concept of a disciplinary dispositif to be of the past: succeeded by a new apparatus, a
‘new monster’ named ‘control’.4
Reading his paper ‘The Limits of Control’, Burroughs announces: ‘a cultural
revolution of unprecedented dimensions has taken place in America during the last
thirty years, and since America is now the model for the rest of theWestern world, this
revolution is worldwide.’5 Three decades of Cold War. Three decades of American
Empire. Three decades of cybernetics.
The guiding problematic of America’s ‘revolution’, Burroughs says, has been how
to exercise control by such covert means as to assure the continuity of power and its
interests. ‘Look at America. Who actually controls this country? It is very difficult
to say. Certainly the very wealthy are one of the most powerful control groups. …
However, it would not be to their advantage to set up or attempt to set up an overtly
1. Sylvère Lotringer and David Morris, eds., Schizo-Culture: The Event, 1975 (Los Angeles: Semio-
text(e), 2013), 23, 165.
2. Sylvère Lotringer, ed., Schizo-Culture: The Book, 1978 (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2013), 157.
3. Lotringer and Morris, Schizo-Culture: The Event, 1975, 11, 15.
4. Gilles Deleuze, ‘What is a dispositif?,’ in Michel Foucault, Philosopher, ed. François Ewald, trans.
Tim Armstrong (London: Harveser Wheatsheaf, 1992), 164; Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, trans. Martin
Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 174, 178.
5. William Burroughs, ‘The Limits of Control,’ in Lotringer, Schizo-Culture: The Book, 1978, 42.
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fascist government.’6 Since today the use of overt force would trigger resistance or
revolution, since overt force would ‘soon encounter the limits of control’ (as the paper’s
title suggests), the exercise of control principally occurs by covert communication.
‘Words are still the principle instruments of control.’7
The figure through which Burroughs depicts this dynamic is pertinent. He
portrays a lifeboat of ten persons, two of whom intend to murder their cohorts upon
nearing land, their motivations unclear. They need the others to row, to exercise their
labours, in order to reach their destination. So the pair must exercise caution. They
must convince the others of their cooperative enterprise and mutual goals, since if their
intentions were known they would be resisted and, being outnumbered, defeated.
So they avoid direct confrontation by developing ‘balance’ in their techniques of
‘psychological control’, constantly improving and refining their method. Learning.
And what role do the cunning pair perform on their vessel? ‘They have the compass’,
Burroughs tells us, ‘and they are contributing their navigational skills.’8 In other
words, they are they those the Greeks called kybernetes, the helmsmen who would
govern the course of a ship. They are those who, after Norbert Wiener, one calls
cyberneticians.9
Extending this analogy to the ship of State, Burroughs asks: who is in control of
the States of the world? Who is quietly steering their course? To impose total control
through overt fascism would be to beckon their demise, resistance; and anyway,
fascism implies military expansion but today ‘there is no longer anyplace to expand to
– after hundreds of years, colonialism is a thing of the past.’10 The cybernetic model
of power-by-word, control-by-communication, has become global.
Through this thesis I will turn to Deleuze’s famous ‘reading’ of Burroughs’ argument
occasionally, if at arms length, and not only for prioritising American writers. I am
wary of his arguments from ‘Postscript on Control Societies’ (1990) and ‘Control
and Becoming’ (1990)11 because, like What is Philosophy? (1991), these texts engage
6. Burroughs, ‘The Limits of Control,’ 41.
7. Ibid., 38.
8. Ibid., 40.
9. In CyberneticsWiener also accredits Walter Rosenblueth for coining the term from κυβερνήτης
in the summer of 1947. In The Human Use of Human Beings, he takes the credit for himself while
acknowledging that, unbeknown to him at the time, the transliteration had already been made by
André-Marie Ampère and a ‘Polish scientist’, albeit with distinct significations. Norbert Wiener,
Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1961), 12–13; Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society,
2nd ed. (London: Sphere Books, 1954), 17; André-Marie Ampère, Essai sur la philosophie des sciences: Ou
exposition analytique d’une classification naturelle de toutes les connaissances humaines, vol. 2 (Paris: Bachelier,
Libraire-Éditeur, 1843), 141–43.
10. Burroughs, ‘The Limits of Control,’ 41.
11. Both collected in Negotiations.
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a nexus of problematics and critiques which extend far beyond their immediate
arguments and deeply into Deleuze’s oeuvre, especially his works with Guattari, such
that to write anything of them which might escape superficiality would have been
beyond the remit of my question. For now I shall just say that if, following Burroughs,
Deleuze argues that power cannot extend through corralling new territory, if it
operates by means of ‘continuous control and instant communication’, then there
may be ‘a generalised crisis in relation to all the environments of enclosure’, a ‘crisis of
the institutions’ which constitutes the heterogeneous spaces of the disciplinary society,
for a new society of control.
Deleuze believed Foucault agreed with this, and perhaps evidence is to be found in
a reflection Foucault made after Burroughs’ paper. At the next morning’s round-table
discussion with R. D. Laing, Howie Harp and Judy Clark on prisons and psychiatry,
Foucault raises having just encountered ‘new techniques of torture’ in the prisons of
military-dictatorship Brazil – where, ‘of course, arrested also means tortured’.12 These
techniques, Foucault says, have been ‘developed and perfected to a considerable extent
with the help of American technicians.’ He proceeds to describe the administration
of torture involving a computer network. A torturer receives questions for a prisoner
on a computer terminal, sent, presumably, by a superior elsewhere. The torturer puts
the questions before the prisoner and applies torture ‘until the answer is obtained’.
Any answer is then ‘fed back into the computer to verify whether it is consistent
with information already obtained.’ Until the prisoner’s answer is accepted by the
computer terminal – which is not to say reflective of any truth – the feedback loop of
questions, torture and answers continues. Not only is the ultimate source of power in
this new networked technique hidden, but it could be anywhere on the planet.
Where does this leave the prison? Could this be a description of an end to the
nineteenth century site of enclosure? Of the society of control?
I wish to show how control over an internet operates. The nature of the secrecy
which Burroughs and Foucault depict with respect to power. Why these are essential
to cybernetics and its age. Why the internet does not tend towards a harmony of
humankind. Never did, never could. What the specific nature of strategy in this
new network is. This thesis derives from my sense of confusion as to the extent of
the surveillance that Edward Snowden revealed. Why does the State acquire and
apparently need such intricate detail about people’s lives today? What does it mean
for the possibility of resistance that it does? It derives from a sense that the last major
progressive movement to seriously challenge the state of things globally since the
12. R. D. Laing et al., ‘Roundtable on Prisons and Psychiatry,’ in Lotringer and Morris, Schizo-Culture:
The Event, 1975, 172–173.
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collapse of Communism, which I consider to be the Alter-globalisation movement,
thought of itself in the image of the internet. That its major theorists, Michael Hardt
and Toni Negri, who based their works on an interpretation of Deleuze’s ‘Postscript
on Control Societies’, were acutely mistaken in their understanding of the nature of
power in networks. The movement faltered well over a decade ago and since then
such fascist powers such as Trump and Brexit have become, on the whole, more adept
at organising according to the logic of the internet. This is an attempt to understand
what an internet is in order to think what it would mean to assert the control through
which society is today formed. It attempts to present a new, fundamentally agonistic
reading of the internet and its society, attempting to show that such agonism is
essential to cybernetics.
Rhetorically, its framing follows the productive encounters of several American
writers with (especially though not only) Francophones, while ceding priority, as
Foucault did, to the former. It is to generally stress Burroughs’ Schizo-Culture
paper ‘The Limits of Control’ over Deleuze’s ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, Walter
Cannon’s broadened theory of homeostasis over Claude Bernard’s, von Neumann
and Oskar Morgenstern’s theory of games over Benoît Mandelbrot and Lévi-Strauss’.
Most of all, Norbert Wiener’s encounter with the ‘intellectual ancestor’ of cybernetics
itself, G. W. Leibniz13 (who wrote mostly in French). I hold that a theory of the
society of control is best found in America because that is where it was invented
and deployed, the hypocentre of the ‘information bomb’ which Einstein wrote of
(from America) in the 1950s, and Paul Virilio after him.14 The effects are now global,
of course, but among American writers one finds its genealogy, nucleus and, as in
Burroughs’ paper, the most direct and immediate reports of its shocks. I wish to stick
to the sources as far as I can.
What is with this strange formulation, ‘What is an internet?’ FromWiener’s critical
reading of Leibniz, I argue the need to distinguish the Internet from an internet. The
Internet is taken to be the virtual medium of control, that which globally establishes
the possibility of cybernetic power. Like Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker I
argue that ‘there is not one Internet but many internets’,15 but only in the sense that
the Internet is an infinite virtuality, equivalent to the ‘universe’ in Leibniz’s writings,
whereas an internet is an actual instantiation of networks whose heterogeneity is not the
result of different protocols, but networks with competing and conflicting purposes.
It corresponds to Leibniz’s ‘world’. A network pertains to a unity of purpose, a monad.
For example, the network of engineers, laboratories, military offices, corporations,
Cold War concerns and cybernetic problematics whose unity of purpose established
13. Wiener, HUHBb, 18.
14. Paul Virilio, The Information Bomb, trans. Chris Turner (London & New York: Verso, 2000), 112.
15. Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene Thacker, ‘Protocol, Control, and Networks,’ Grey Room,
2004, 10.
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the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ. Networks overlap and transpose, they seek to determine one another’s
behaviour for their own strategic ends in a logic related to game theory, but they do so
in one language, one protocol, which is diffracted not by the problems of translation
but by cryptology and the active secreting of information, in the double sense of its
release and its hiding. If a monad with a greater degree of self-conscious perception
‘causes’ another monad in Leibniz’s system, according to Wiener control is exerted by
the network which possesses a greater degree of information over its opponent than
it does of them. A limited grammar of offensive and defensive tactics is afforded, each
relating to the protection of one’s own information and extraction of it from one’s
opponent. In this thesis I attempt to explicate this logic and prove it to be necessary
in Wiener’s writings.
Chapter outline
The first chapter is a short response to the question, ‘Who invented the internet?’ This
is to concretely situate my object within its history, to reflect on and challenge the
boundary-work that has taken place by internet historians, and to deploy from the
outset the concepts of network and internet that shall be developed through the course
of the thesis. I focus on Joseph Carl Robnett Licklider, who from the Sputnik debacle
in 1957 on through the 1960s developed the idea of computer networking to the point
of its realisation as the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ, through the coordination of the Pentagon-based
office he founded. I consider Licklider to name the corporate-military-academic
network of institutions, ideologies, investments and problematics who produced the
early internet. I describe how Wiener and cybernetics more generally had had a
formative effect on Licklider in the 1940s, and how Licklider instantiated cybernetics
in his project for a ‘man-computer symbiosis’,16 whose fruit by the end of the 1960s
was the interactive, graphical, internetworked digital computer we know today. I
then continue to discuss the place in his thought of RᴀNᴅ researcher Paul Baran’s
problematic of a computer network that could survive nuclear war in order to launch
a Second Strike. Although a popular point of reference amongst philosophers, I show
how a succession of historical accounts have argued Baran’s relevance to be a myth,
and that, by implication, the internet was from its outset a civilian machine of peace.
By reference to direct historical sources, I challenge this boundary work and show
that Licklider was indeed concerned with such problematics. My intention is not
to argue that the internet must be understood as martial rather than civil, but that
this distinction between peace and war has never held ground with respect to the
internet. I end by arguing that Baran’s encrypted military network points to an
alternative means of understanding the networking of networks based on conflicting
16. J. C. R. Licklider,Man-Computer Symbiosis, Cambridge: MIT Archive, MC499, box 6, Novem-
ber 20–21, 1958.
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epistemologies rather than, as conventionally, interconnecting topologies.
The second chapter begins by discussing the parallelism that exists betweenWiener
and Deleuze’s tripartite periodisation of modernity according to the three apparatuses:
the clock, the steam engine, and the cybernetic machine. I argue that the internet is
the specific machine appropriate to the third age, which is to say, the contemporary.
I attempt to draw a parallel between the concepts which allow both Wiener and
Deleuze to relate a society and a machine. Parallel to the dispositif for Deleuze, I
argue, for Wiener is the theological notion of a divine image in which man is created,
which he secularises into the concept of an ‘operative image’. This concept provides
Wiener with a means to argue that machines can be made according to the essence
of nature, as it is understood in its age. I argue that two relevant but contradictory
models of such operative images are to be found in the age of the clock – Hobbes and
Leibniz – and that a kind of monstrous fusion of the two is depicted by Reinhardt
Koselleck in the early Masons. Through developing a reading of Wiener’s discourse
on Karel Čapek’s robots and his agreement with the idea of cybernetics constituting
a ‘prodigious Leviathan’, I attempt to show that such a monster is what Wiener has in
mind by the contemporary operative image. I conclude by proposing that Wiener
puts forward an alternative test to the Turing Test in which life is construed to be
what, because it has the capacity to learn, can play a game of strategy against its
creator.
This leads onto the third chapter in which the concept of learning is addressed.
This relates to the nineteenth century operative image, since, as I argue, the cybernetic
concept of learning derives from the notion of self-regulation in an organism, and that
this in turn is based on the image of the steam engine. I begin by showing that both
Claude Bernard and Alfred Russel Wallace both consciously likened their respective
theories of individual (ontogenetic) and species (phylogenetic) adaptation on the
steam engine, although Bernard’s doing so has been forgotten. I trace the genealogy
of the term homeostasis, invented by Walter Cannon to name Bernard’s theories,
emphasising that Cannon personally played a formative role in the development of
cybernetics. I argue that the term homeostasis carries implications which transgress
Cannon’s intention of it, but are pertinent and intimated by Bernard. Through
Jean-Pierre Vernant, Nicole Loraux and Giorgio Agamben I argue that the stasis
of the homoioi, the civil war of the equals, names the essential dynamism of the
political in ancient Greek democracy. But I show that Cannon ignores this and
instead reads homeostasis to imply a process of universal learning, or wisdom, which
he then projects from the body of the individual organism to the body politic. I
discuss Georges Canguilhem’s critique of the wisdom of the social body, especially
because it has been seen to be an implicit critique of Wiener. Before attempting
to respond, I turn to the critique of the notion of homeostasis itself by Hans Jonas
and the second-order cyberneticians, Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela and N.
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Katherine Hayles, and attempt a defence. Finally, I attempt to show that Wiener
agrees with Canguilhem’s critique of Cannon’s universally benevolent homeostasis,
and instead reads homeostasis in terms of conflict. This means that the homeostasis
and learning that takes place on the internet is always partial, never for the wisdom of
the whole social body, always for the benefit of the network concerned. This returns
to the conclusion of the second chapter that the cybernetic operative image concerns
a strategic plane, a game of strategy.
The short fourth chapter attempts to think through what Wiener means by a
‘game’. I argue that he posed two concepts of game theory, one of which being
represented by Benoît Mandelbrot’s analogy of information theory and Ferdinand de
Saussure’s famous image of the chessboard. The other, a critical adoption of John von
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s game theory. Both of these two theories of games
are considered by Wiener to accord to a distinct type of opponent. Structuralist chess
is the game of ideal science and of a passive ‘Augustinian’ opponent who stands for
the natural encoding of truth, whose game is in the act of decoding. Von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s game stands for a ‘Manichean’ opponent who actively seeks to
win through confusing their opponent, spying on them and concealing themselves.
This is the game of war, politics, law, business and the reality of science today – in
other words, the entire domain of human society as reflected by the internet. I argue
that this distinction can be deepened and woven back through the discussion of the
operative image through a reading of Leibniz’s own game theory and, via Michel
Serres, the problem of translation as distinct from the problem of conflict.
The fifth chapter is the longest. It is an attempt to formulate a detailed and pro-
ductive reading of Wiener’s relation to Leibniz, the ‘patron saint for cybernetics’.
It begins with Wiener’s early education and publications on Leibniz, arguing that
Wiener was formatively influenced by a Neo-Kantian account of the Leibnizian
concept of apperception. I argue that this concept is to be found in Wiener and
Arturo Rosenblueth’s foundational papers of cybernetics, offering a reading of them
which attempts to establish their correspondence to an important paper by Leibniz.
I argue that in Wiener and Rosenblueth’s papers the philosophical concept of ‘in-
formation’ is established, not by name but through the term ‘determination’, and
that this aligns to the Leibnizian (or rather Neo-Kantian) concept of ‘apperception’.
This concept is more philosophically interesting than ‘information’ because it has
a triple meaning which accounts for the purposivity, knowledge and power of a
substance, and it does not imply Cartesian dualism. Wiener considers substances to
actually intercommunicate, whereas Leibniz construed them to only do so by analogy.
This difference changes the entire structure of the monadology from a hierarchy to
a ‘heterarchy’, I argue, and this, a field of conflict over determination in its triple
sense. I attempt to distinguish the various possible modalities of determination in
a conflict, before moving on to RᴀNᴅ theorists John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s
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theories of cyberwar and netwar. I critically address Hardt and Negri’s import of the
concept of swarm from their works, showing that they failed to address the concept’s
true source. This leads to a critical distinction of their Spinozistic concept of control
from Wiener’s cybernetic post-Leibnizian. Finally, I counterpose Hardt and Negri’s
network to that which is implicit in François Ewald’s work, arguing that unlike both,
Wiener’s cybernetics affords the possibility of grasping real political exteriority.
Chapter 1
‘Who invented the internet?’
Why bother asking the question, ‘who invented the internet?’, if not to perpetuate a
mythology of geniuses and ‘great men’ (specifically, men) and to deny the countless
others on the stage and off who participated in its development?
There is a certain temporality at stake, of speeds and the constitution of virtual
futures. Wiener believed that the Royal Society’s denial of Leibniz’s role in inventing
the calculus, and their jingoistic championing of Newton, retarded Anglophone
sciences for centuries while they refused to consider Leibniz’s superior, and now
standard, notation system.1 With respect to Alfred Russel Wallace’s widely neglected
invention of the theory of evolution in his ‘Ternate Essay’ read by Charles Darwin
a good year prior to his publication of On the Origin of Species (1859), Gregory
Bateson claimed it ‘nonsense to say that it does not matter which individual man
acted as the nucleus for the change’: Wallace’s paper presented at analogy between
the mechanism of evolution and the self-regulating steam engine that, had it met
adequate recognition, could have precipitated the beginnings of cybernetics a hundred
years earlier.2 ‘[Which] individual man acted as the nucleus for the change’, Bateson
stressed, ‘is precisely [what] makes history unpredictable into the future.’3
The question of who invented the internet matters because its answer establishes
the bounds of legitimate discourse, and thereby furnishes certain problematics and
concepts found within its grounds. It is to lift the veil of nature shrouding discurs-
ive boundaries and find the intentional labours beneath.4 One could say that the
1. Norbert Wiener, Prolegomena to Theology, Cambridge: MIT Archives MC22, box 33B, folder 881,
1961; On the topic of the ‘Leibniz-Newton calculus controversy’ see, Alfred Rupert Hall, Philosophers at
War: The Quarrel Between Newton and Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
2. Gregory Bateson,Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979), 43. Bateson
seems to imply an untenable continuity of the thermodynamic and cybernetic age in this argument, but
its principle still holds. See also, Wiener, Cybernetics, 36; George Beccaloni, Alfred Russel Wallace and
Natural Selection: the Real Story, January 2013; Alfred Russel Wallace, ‘On the Tendency of Varieties to
Depart Indefinitely from the Original Type,’ Journal of the Proceedings of the Linnean Society: Zoology 3,
no. 9 (August 20, 1858): 53–62.
3. Bateson, Mind and Nature, 43.
4. I draw this from the sociological concept of ‘boundary work’, see Thomas F. Gieryn, ‘Boundaries
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legitimacy of a discourse is irrelevant. With respect to the internet, the otherwise
penetrating Leibniz scholar Justin E. H. Smith has recently done just that, proposing
a ‘deep history of the Internet’ composed of ‘sympathetic snails’, fungal networks and
scrawls posted in the Wailing Wall to God.5 But doing so he completely misses the
specificity of the internet in our time, its dynamics, and moreover, as I shall argue,
the fundamental importance of his very own Leibniz to it.
Questioning the boundaries of legitimate discourses through their inventors
matter also because their boundaries have already been drawn, such that as Wiener
and Bateson lamented, because (and perhaps especially) they already effect the diffusion
of ideas whether noticed or not, and so it matters to assess whether these realities are
fictitious or not.
By naming an inventor, it is not that I wish to specify an author for copyright
purposes, but rather name a network of concepts, institutions, ideologies, theories,
desires, interests, problematics and so on which weave through and connect a multi-
plicity of other networks. To take a negative example: a brilliant German engineer
named Konrad Zuse single-handedly built what might be considered the first Turing-
Complete digital computer in 1941, but I take him to be just a curiosity from the
perspective of the history of the computing because, long unknown to the West, he
does not name the network through which the digital computer was invented.6 John
von Neumann, on the other hand, links the first American computer through to Los
Alamos and the hydrogen bomb, the Universities of Pennsylvania and Princeton,
game theory, Wiener, cybernetics and the Macy Meetings, neurophysiology, artificial
intelligence, cryptology, capitalism and anti-Communism, the State of Israel, the
entire military-industrial-academic network through which the digital computer was
invented. Hence the bitter controversy over whether it is right that the fundamental
architecture of the digital computer should have ever been named the ‘Von Neumann
Architecture’ is essentially a liberal one, concerned with the failure to accrue com-
modity value by certain individuals.7 To refer to von Neumann as the ‘inventor’ of
the computer is to name not him as an individual, but the entire network apparatus
which his is the signifier.
of Science,’ in Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (London: Sage, 1999), 393–443 and Ronald R.
Kline, The Cybernetics Moment: Or Why We Call Our Age the Information Age (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 2015), 104.
5. Justin E. Smith, ‘The Internet of Snails,’ Cabinet Magazine, no. 58 (2015): 29–37; Smith is the
author of, Justin E. Smith, Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life (Princeton: Princeton, 2011).
6. Marguerite Zientara, The History of Computing (Framingham, MA: Computerworld Communica-
tions, 1981), 35–48.
7. Namely, J. Presper Eckert and John W. Mauchly. See, Presper J. Eckert and Nancy Stern, An
Interview with J. Presper Eckert OH 13, Oral history interviews (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis:
Charles Babbage Institute, October 28, 1977), 33–55; Bill Mauchly et al., ‘Who Gets Credit for the
Computer?: An Exchange,’ The New York Review of Books, September 27, 2012, Alexander 5th Randall
and J. Presper Eckert, ‘Q & A: A lost interview with ENIAC co-inventor J. Presper Eckert (1989),’
February 14, 2006, accessed, https://www.computerworld.com/article/2561813/computer-hardware/q-
a--a-lost-interview-with-eniac-co-inventor-j--presper-eckert.html.
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1.1 J. C. R. Licklider’s artificial-homeostasis
On 29 October 1969 the Internet came to being, with a message sent from the
University of California to the Augmentation Research Center at Stanford Research
Institute. This ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ, named initially after the Pentagon-based (Defense) Advanced
Research Project Agency (D/ARPA), established following the Sputnik debacle in
1957, was the ‘invention’ (according to the concept above) of J. C. R. Licklider.
It is pivotal for my argument to advance at the outset that Licklider was a cybernet-
ician. He names the network through which the internet as the ‘ultimate cybernetic
machine’, in the words of MIT historian Slava Gerovitch, could be realised.8 Licklider
was anMIT acoustics psychologist who relinquished Skinner’s behaviourism for cyber-
netics after attending weekly ‘circles’ organised byWiener in the 1940s, becoming, in
his own words, ‘a faithful adherent … who was always hanging onto [cybernetics]’.9
He would participate in the 1950 Macy Meeting,10 and in the first Annual Symposium
of the American Society for Cybernetics (ASC) in October 1967, alongside cybernetic
luminaries Margaret Mead, Warren McCulloch, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Heinz von
Foerster, its organiser.11 At the (CIA initiated)12 ASC Symposium, Licklider presented
on his hallmark topic, ‘The Interaction of Men and Machines’. Today such a title
may sound banal, but Licklider’s vision of an ‘interaction’, ‘symbiosis’ or ‘partnership’
of humans and digital computers is not a mere preemption of the Human-computer
interaction (HCI) research field; it concerns the creation of a cybernetic closed-loop
feedback system: ‘The inputs to the man are derived from the system, and his outputs
are fed into the system. The man is thus “imbedded” in a system’.13 Though the
jargon ‘cybernetically-extend organism’ or ‘cyborg’ would be invented for such man-
machine systems in the years to follow,14 Licklider was followingWiener’s cybernetic
research into ‘artificial homeostasis’ such as automatic insulin dispensers, hearing
gloves for the deaf and responsive prosthetic limbs.15 Licklider’s cybernetic concern
was specifically on the artificial homeostasis of mental capacities a ‘man-computer
symbiosis’ or, as his follower Douglas Engelbart would formulate it, ‘augmenting
8. Slava Gerovitch, ‘The Cybernetics Scare and the Origins of the Internet,’ Baltic Worlds II, no. 1
(2009): 32-38.
9. J. C. R. Licklider, William Asprey, and Arthur Norberg, An Interview with J. C. R. Licklider
(OH 150), Oral history interviews (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis: Charles Babbage Institute,
October 28, 1988), 13.
10. Kline, The Cybernetics Moment, 48–49.
11. The American Society for Cybernetics, Program For The First Annual Symposium, Cambridge: MIT
Archive, MC499, box 8, October 26, 1967.
12. Kline, The Cybernetics Moment, 185–90.
13. J. C. R. Licklider, Notes on Psychology of Man-Machine Systems, Cambridge: MIT Archive, MC499,
box 4, October 10, 1957.
14. Kline, The Cybernetics Moment, 170–78.
15. Wiener uses the term ‘artificial homeostasis’ in Norbert Wiener, ‘The Concept of Homeostasis
in Medecine,’ Transactions and Studies of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia, 20 1953, 87–93; For
commentary see, Kline, The Cybernetics Moment, 170; On cybernetic and non-cybernetic prosthesis, see
Wiener, Cybernetics, 25–26.
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the human intellect’.16 This would be the telos of the internet. How to improve the
regulatory capacities of cognitive systems. Enthused by the prospect of realising this
‘man-computer symbiosis’, in 1962 ARPA created a department in the Pentagon for
Licklider to pursue his cybernetic vision, the Information Processing Techniques
Office (IPTO), directing its vast funds through corporate and academic research and
development laboratories.17
From the outset of the 1960s under Licklider’s directorship (and then others when
he parted for a hiatus at IBM in 1964) the IPTO would transform the digital com-
puter from the solitary monolithic calculator that it had been from von Neumann’s
invention into the graphical, interactive, windowed, mouse-driven, multi-purpose,
hyperlinked and internetworked computer that we know today.18 With ARPA’s vast
budget and Licklider’s cybernetic vision of artificial homeostasis, the IPTO orches-
trated the production of the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ, the internet in its first instantiation. This was
Licklider’s concept. It was Licklider who proposed to create networks of ‘thinking
centers’ connected by communication lines in 1960,19 who addressed his colleagues as
‘Members and Affiliates of the Intergalactic Computer Network’ in 1963,20 Licklider
who conceived of a ‘procognitive system’ which would allow for ‘man’s interaction
with the body of recorded knowledge’ by means of an ‘intermedium’ of connected
computers,21 Licklider who started the IPTO’s experiments in computer network-
ing.22 By 1967 his proselytising of networked computers was beginning to catch on,
with various experiments at universities, banks, militaries and hospitals. In May he
would note in a memorandum, ‘It isn’t June yet, but computer networks are bustin’
out all over.’23 But his vision was not of distinct networks, to each institution its own.
He wanted to create an integrated network of networks, embedding the entire socius
in a computer network system. As he wrote in what is effectively the manifesto of his
internet (published in 1968 no less) with his successor at the IPTO, Robert Taylor,
who directed the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ’s production until its launch:24
16. Doug Engelbart, Augmenting Human Intellect: A Conceptual Framework, technical report AFOSR-
3223 (Stanford Research Institute, October 1962).
17. M. Mitchell Waldrop, The Dream Machine: J. C. R. Licklider and the Revolution That Made Computing
Personal (New York: Penguin, 2002), 196–201.
18. The standard history of the IPTO is, Arthur L. Norberg and Judy E. O’Neill, Transforming Computer
Technology: Information Processing for the Pentagon, 1962-1986 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1996); The related study on the IPTO’s role in creating the internet is, Janet Abbate, Inventing the Internet
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
19. J. C. R. Licklider, ‘Man-Computer Symbiosis (1960),’ IRE Transactions on Human Factors in
Electronics HFE-1 (March 1960): 7.
20. J. C. R Licklider, Memorandum For Members and Affiliates of the Intergalactic Computer Network,
April 1963.
21. J. C. R. Licklider, Libraries of the Future (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1965), 1, 6, 93.
22. Norberg and O’Neill, Transforming Computer Technology, 159.
23. J. C. R. Licklider,Memorandum: Burgeoning of Activity in the Field of Computer Networks, Cambridge:
MIT Archive, MC499, box 3, May 10, 1967; The same day he wrote, J. C. R. Licklider, Memorandum:
Classification of Computer Networks, Cambridge: MIT Archive, MC499, box 3, May 10, 1967.
24. Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon,Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins of the Internet (New
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Today the on-line communities are separated from one another functionally as
well as geographically. Eachmember can look only to the processing, storage and
software capability of the facility upon which his community is centred. But now
the move is on to interconnect the separate communities and thereby transform
them into, let us call it, a supercommunity. The hope is that interconnection
will make available to all the members of all the communities the programs and
data resources of the entire supercommunity.25
Licklider envisaged an internet in which all domains of human life would be embedded.
Taylor, who went on to continue ‘Licklider’s vision’ at Xerox PARC, would later say
of today’s digital computer, ‘[Licklider] is really the father of it all.’26
Now, the major significance of Licklider’s ‘vision’ in the invention of the internet
is uncontroversial. As internet historians Christos J. P. Moschovitis et al. argue,
‘Even a cursory look at the writings of Joseph C. R. “Lick” Licklider makes it clear:
Licklider, a psychologist and a computer scientist, conceived the essential vision for
the Internet.’27 Neither is it especially controversial to assert the deep influence of
cybernetics upon Licklider, although the implications of this have yet to be thought
through as I hope to do here.28
What has been defined by successive historians as outside the bounds of legitimate
discourse is to emphasise that military imperatives informed ‘Licklider’s’ invention. For
example, internet historian John Naughton considers Licklider to have been driven
by a ‘utopianism’ which lead him to pursue a ‘demilitarisation’ of ARPA.29 Such
arguments deny the relevance of the profound influence that the North American
Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) missile defence network of the 1950s
played on Licklider, and that he invented the concept of a ‘man-computer system’
while seeking to perfect the SAGE system;30 that he considered military simulation
York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 12.
25. J. C. R. Licklider and Robert W. Taylor, ‘The Computer as a Communication Device,’ Science
and Technology, April 1968, 31–32.
26. ‘I don’t think that Ivan [Sutherland, Licklider’s immediate successor at the IPTO], nor I, nor
anyone who’s been in that DARPA position since has had the vision that Licklider had. … I think
most of the significant advances in computer technology, especially in the systems part of computer
science over the years – including the work that my group did at Xerox PARC where we built the first
distributed personal computer system – were simply extrapolations of Licklider’s vision. They were not
really new visions of their own. So he’s really the father of it all.’ Robert Taylor and William Asprey, An
Interview with Robert Taylor (OH 154), Oral history interviews (Minneapolis: Charles Babbage Institute,
February 28, 1989), 9.
27. Christos J. P. Moschovitis et al., History of the Internet: A Chrononology, 1843 to the Present (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1999), 37; See also, Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 43; Vinton G. Cerf
et al., ‘A Brief History of the Internet,’ The Internet Society, 2003, accessed April 13, 2015, http:
//www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet; Leonard
Kleinrock, ‘An Early History of the Internet,’ IEEE Communications Magazine 48, no. 8 (August 2010): 29;
M. Mitchell Waldrop, ‘No, This Man Invented The Internet,’ Forbes, November 2000, John Naughton,
A Brief History of the Future: The Origins of the Internet (London: Phoenix, 2000), 81.
28. Thomas Rid, Rise of the Machines: The Lost History of Cybernetics (London: Scribe, 2016), 143;
Naughton, A Brief History of the Future, 66-67; Gerovitch, ‘The Cybernetics Scare and the Origins of
the Internet.’
29. See, Naughton, A Brief History of the Future, 66-67.
30. J. C. R. Licklider, The Truly SAGE System, or Toward a Man-Machine System For Thinking, Cam-
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systems necessary for the development of civilian ones;31 that he continued research
on military networks throughout the 1960s, for example inMemorandum: An Air Force
Role in Counter-InsurgencyWarfare (1962) when he poses the need to invent ‘distributed’
communications systems (expressively not ‘centralised’) that would be suitable for
soldiers in Vietnam to autonomously call for airstrikes, reinforcements and aid drops,
or a 1969 paper where he commands expertise over the contemporary state of missile
defence systems;32 and that his original realisation of a ‘man-computer symbiosis’ itself
would be a ‘man-computer thinking system’ that would be ‘centred upon a large-scale
computer and simulation system’.33 Alliez and Lazzarato characterise Licklider truly
when they write, ‘the Cold War led to experimentation on the planetary scale in
a global epistemology of the soviet enemy based on simulation.’34 But more than
ignoring the extent to which military imperatives informed Licklider’s worldview,
historians have effectuated their boundary work separating the invention of the
internet from the presses of war by resolutely denying that the internet was designed
to survive nuclear attack so that a ‘second strike’ could be ordered.
Although numerous philosophers have taken this as given – for example Donna
Haraway,35 Paul Virilio,36 Michael Hardt and Toni Negri,37 Alexander Galloway
and Eugene Thacker,38 and Howard Caygill39 – it has in fact been decisively written
out of the official historical narrative of the internet by the most authoritative and
popular histories of the internet, including and especially the Internet Society’s own
history which, given its authors, has claim to being almost autobiographical.40 What
bridge: MIT Archive, MC499, box 6, August 20, 1957; Licklider, Man-Computer Symbiosis.
31. J. C. R. Licklider, Theoretical Aspects of Research on Man-Machine Systems, Cambridge: MIT Archive,
MC499, box 6, 1957.
32. J. C. R. Licklider, Memorandum: An Air Force Role in Counter-Insurgency Warfare, Cambridge:
MIT Archive, MC499, April 26, 1962; J. C. R. Licklider, ‘Understimates and Overexpectations,’ in
An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System, with an introduction by Senator
Edward M. Kennedy (New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row, 1969), 118–129.
33. Licklider, Man-Computer Symbiosis, 6–7. Emphasis added. See also Licklider, ‘Man-Computer
Symbiosis (1960),’ 7; The military need for simulation is repeated throughout Licklider’s writings,
making referring to them individually somewhat redundant, but we shall just mention the title of his
little-known 1964 essay J. C. R. Licklider, ‘Artificial Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and Command
and Control,’ inMilitary Information Systems: The Design of Computer-Aided Systems for Command, ed.
Edward Bennett, James Degan, and Joseph Spiegel (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 118–133.
34. Éric Alliez and Maurizio Lazzarato,Wars and Capital, trans. Ames Hodges (South Pasadena, CA:
semiotext(e), 2016), 231–32.
35. Donna J. Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™: Fem-
inism and Technoscience (New York & London: Routledge, 1997), 4–5.
36. Virilio, The Information Bomb, 109.
37. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000),
299.
38. Galloway and Thacker, ‘Protocol, Control, and Networks,’ 19; Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene
Thacker, The Exploit: A Theory of Networks (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press,
2007), 53.
39. Howard Caygill, On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 205.
40. The venerable list of co-authors attributed to the Internet Society’s history include Lawrence
G. Roberts, project manager of the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ’s initial development; Robert Kahn and Vinton G. Cerf,
founders of the Internet Society itself and creators of the TCP/IP gateway protocol which allows
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this boundary work has attempted to achieve has been to separate civil and martial
domains from the history of the internet and depict it lily-white at birth, a machine
which may have later been hijacked by extrinsic forces but was born for academic
and industrial peace not war. Through Norbert Wiener’s cybernetics I wish to argue
that, on an ontological level, the boundary between war and peace makes no sense
with respect to the internet. And though I would be in good company to simply
ignore the official historians, I see it as unavoidable to first show this to be the case on
a historical level too.
1.2 Paul Baran’s Survivability
I write ‘Licklider’ to name the network through which the internet was invented.
This network incorporates cybernetics, but a cybernetics which the official historians
tell us has no connection to war aside from a certain one-way parasitical relation
to military funding bodies. On a conceptual level the official historians attempt to
divorce the necessity of the relation between cybernetics and warfare, specifically by
targeting the legitimacy of including Paul Baran within Licklider’s invention. I shall attempt
to deny this through historical counter-argumentation in order to free this thesis up
for conceptual discourse.
Perhaps Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon played the first move in depicting the
internet as born to simply ‘[embody] the most peaceful intentions – to link computers
at scientific laboratories across the country so that researchers might share computer
resources.’41 The first to attack the ‘grim myth’ that ‘ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ had been built to
protect national security in the face of a nuclear attack.’42 Certainly Naughton would
rehearse the same argument.43 But the Internet Society’s own history is the most
authoritative on the matter:
It was from a RAND study that the false rumor started claiming that the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ
was somehow related to building a network resistant to nuclear war. This was
never true of the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ, only the unrelated RAND study on secure voice
considered nuclear war. However, the later work on Internetting did emphasize
robustness and survivability, including the capability to withstand losses of large
portions of the underlying networks.44
These three sentences are all it takes the Internet Society to brush aside the ‘false
rumor’ that Paul Baran and his concern to build a ‘highly survivable’ communications
system capable of withstanding thermonuclear war are within Licklider’s network.
different network architectures to interact with one another; David D. Clark who lead efforts to bring
TCP/IP beyond mainframes to desktop computers; and Leonard Kleinrock, under whose instruction
the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ’s first message was sent in October 1969. Cerf et al., ‘A Brief History of the Internet.’
41. Hafner and Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late, 10.
42. Ibid.
43. Naughton, A Brief History of the Future, xi, 83.
44. Cerf et al., ‘A Brief History of the Internet.’
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Although I shall be engaging with Baran at greater length later in this thesis, let us
briefly recap what it is their boundary work seeks to exclude before attempting to
contest it.
In On Distributed Communications (1964) Baran published through the RAND
Corporation his designs for a ‘highly survivable system’ for transmitting commu-
nication that would be capable of withstanding thermonuclear war.45 His concept
proposed three major technical innovations which, in combination, decisively broke
with the entire analogue communication orthodoxy of the day.
By means of analogue communication networks – a product of the nineteenth
century – if a person wished to make a phone call, their telephony device would
transduce their voice into a continuous analogue signal stretched all the way to the
recipient’s device, which would transduce the signal back into voice. The greater the
distance of communication, the greater the noise in the call. This analogue signal
said nothing of its destination, so in order to reach the receiver, the caller would
need to dial into a central telephone exchange where either a switchboard operator,
typically a woman, would manually program (‘switch’) a connection between sender
and receiver through a tangle of plugs and sockets, or else this would happen by
automatic machines. Because of the need for such industrially-organised switch-
boards, the analogue network was centralised like the spokes of a wheel to a hub.
Baran realised that these central hubs constituted critical weaknesses to the national
communication infrastructure, given that, after Sputnik, they had become vulnerable
to intercontinental ballistic attack. This upended the rules of the game of Mutually
Assured Destruction, whereby neither superpower would first attack the other with
nuclear weapons since to do so would be to guarantee a counterattack. If only one
well-chosen hub was brought down, the President would be unable to call the appro-
priate commander to launch a ‘second strike’. Hence Baran was driven to design a
‘survivable’ communications network not by ‘intellectual curiosity,’ nor ‘the desire
to write papers,’ nor in ‘response to a work statement,’ but by ‘a most dangerous
situation that existed’ – that of ‘the world’s superpowers … stumbling into World
War III.’46
Following Sputnik, Baran embarked on devising a network that could sustain
mass destruction but still transmit the President’s (and other military) communications.
If all the ‘intelligence’ of the analogue network resided in the women who manually
plugged the analogue switchboard, Baran’s was a digital network where all this
intelligence would reside in the network infrastructure itself. This would involve
a series of related inventions. Instead of humans, computers would operate the
45. Paul Baran, On Distributed Communications (Sant Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1964), vol. I,
16.
46. Paul Baran and Judy O’Neill, An Interview with Paul Baran OH 182 (University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis: Charles Babbage Institute, March 1990), 13–14.
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switchboard ‘nodes’ automatically. Instead of one massive message which would
block the entire channel during their transmission by a modulator, messages would
be broken into discreet, digitally-encoded, standard-sized ‘blocks’ ‘like a fruit salad’47
before transmission, each carrying the address of its desired recipient as well as its
sender, so that the recipient could confirm reception of the block by their demodulator,
and the sender could repeat their transmission of a block until being notified of their
success.48 The nodes would ideally be connected to one another as a ‘distributed’
grid or mesh rather than ‘centralised’ network (the third category of a ‘decentralised’
network represents a compromise between the two), with channels to several other
nodes so that if one were attacked, or simply overwhelmed with traffic, the node
would send the message automatically to a different intermediary node until it finally
reached its destination, where it would be reconstructed with the other blocks of
the same original message.49 In this sense of it automatically ‘switching’ its paths
depending on its state at any one moment, the network would ‘learn’ and ‘adapt to
the environment’ as though it were intelligent.50 Baran would give this system the
clunky name of ‘Distributed Adaptive Message Block Networking’, or by way of
a folksy American shortcut, ‘Hot-Potato Routing’, since ‘rather than hold the “hot
potato,” the node tosses the message to its neighbor, who will now try to get rid of
the message.’51 With sufficient channels linking each node of this distributed network
(Baran calculated three each) it would be extremely difficult to undermine the system
as a whole through bombing it. It would hence be ‘survivable’ or, in more recent
parlance, ‘resilient’. Its resilience is determined by its capacity for learning.
Despite campaigning throughout the first half of the 1960s for the construction
of his system, Baran decided in 1966 to ‘[pull] the plug on the whole baby’, having
failed to overcome the resistance of a deeply analogue-minded orthodoxy in the
telephone and military establishment who could have implemented it, and being
wary of half-baked implementations that would have undermined its reputation.52
Yet almost precisely the same architecture would be employed two-years later in
another American military-funded network, the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ, which Baran did not work
on. Referring to ‘blocks’ as ‘packets’ – the term used by the UK National Physics
Laboratory’s (NPL) Donald Davies’ for an equivalent architecture – ‘packet switching’
remains the basis of the internet architecture today. The question has therefore since
persisted: was the internet invented in order to withstand nuclear strike? Is it first and
foremost a military network? Is the network of Baran, with RAND, nuclear weapons
47. Baran, On Distributed Communications, vol. IX, 8.
48. Ibid., vol. I, 20–23.
49. Ibid., vol. I, 1–3.
50. Ibid., vol. I, 31.
51. Ibid., vol. I, 25, 26–28.
52. Paul Baran and Stewart Brand, ‘Founding Father,’ Wired 9, no. 03 (March 2001); Baran and
O’Neill, An Interview with Paul Baran OH 182, 34.
18 CHAPTER 1. ‘WHO INVENTED THE INTERNET?’
Figure 1.1: The three network topologies. Baran, On Distributed Communications, vol.
I, 2.
and game theory, that which invented the internet?
This is precisely the narrative which the official historians sought to overturn,
although in doing so, they introduced a counter-myth of their own: that the internet
never was invented for military purposes. This is to say that Baran’s problematic does
not align with the network of Licklider.
In the acerbic sentences quoted above, the Internet Society presents four argument
against Baran’s being essential to the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ, which I shall now contest.
The first concerns the pointed description of Baran’s project as being merely ‘a
paper’ – the Internet Society having written, ‘The RAND group had written a paper
on packet switching networks.’53 ‘Paper’ seems a denigrating description for a work
whose fourteen volumes filled well over eight-hundred pages, far more than any single
study ever produced by the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ team.54 Perhaps they considered it theoretically
slight compared to their own project? Yet they agree that it already envisaged
53. Cerf et al., ‘A Brief History of the Internet,’ emphasis added.
54. It is commonly said that On Distributed Communications totalled eleven volumes. This is a mistake.
Baran has described how further volumes had been classified upon publication. This included a volume
on the system’s ‘weak spots’, another on the ‘real world geographical layout of the network’ (authored
by a Rose Hirshfield), and the last on secure telephony. Paul Baran and David Hochfelder, Paul Baran:
An Interview Conducted by David Hochfelder, IEEE History Center, October 1999.
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its central conceptual innovations, including the concepts of packet switching and
network distribution. I can think of only one plausible explanation for this description.
That by referring to it as merely ‘a paper’ they regarded it as merely a written,
theoretical proposition, in the sense that Baran was not able produce an actual network
from it. That On Distributed Communications lacked the level of detail required for the
actual hardware and software components to function. This was the view of Robert
Kahn, co-creator of the TCP/IP gateway.55
If so, this seems a rather unfair charge to make given that Baran’s having been
prevented from realising his network because of military and industrial politics stopped
him from confronting the technical details Kahn considers him to have neglected and
that like Kahn he would have only realised it as part of a team. The argument that his
work is as distinct from the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ as a sketch is to a working machine seems more
of an Aristophanic prejudice than a fair representation of events.
The second problem with the Internet Society’s exclusion of Baran from the
genealogy of the internet is that by depicting his study as concerning ‘secure voice’
communications, they portray it to be a network designed for just one specialised
task, and a task that failed to transcend the existing communication network’s purpose
at that. Kahn argues this too, though in a slightly weaker vein.56 By contrast the
ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ/Internet was designed to be a multi-purpose system, with any transmittable
application in mind.
Yet this position is contradicted already in the introductory volume of On Dis-
tributed Communications where there seems to be no major emphasis on voice com-
munications at all. Baran writes that the network would ‘handle all forms of digital
data including “real-time” voice.’57 In the non-classified volume dedicated to voice
transmission, Baran describes his network as ‘suitable for both digital voice and digital
data applications.’58 Baran described his network as a ‘universal interface’ by which
‘signals from data, teletypewriters, facsimile would all be digitised.’59 This proved,
Baran recalled in interview, to be ‘another hard concept for older telecommunications
experts to swallow without audibly choking.’60 So too apparently for the Internet
Society, who misrepresents the scope of Baran’s network, leaving the impression not
55. ‘In some sense, it all started with the work that Paul Baran did at RᴀNᴅ. … Paul was and is a
very brilliant fellow … But Paul was not a technologist at the time in terms of actually trying to build
something. … I believe he had no detailed notion of how it might really be implemented, except
somehow electronics might one day be cheap enough to do the task.’ Robert E. Kahn and Judy O’Neill,
An Interview with Robert E. Kahn OH 192, Oral history interviews (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis:
Charles Babbage Institute, April 1990), 17–18.
56. ‘I think Paul [Baran] was focusing mainly on survivable voice communications, which was a big
Air Force problem at the time. Not too much on computers, although he did understand you could
link computers that way. … He didn’t seem to be thinking about the computer and the computer
communication problem as much as he was voice communications.’ ibid., 18.
57. Baran, On Distributed Communications, vol. I, v. Emphasis added.
58. Ibid., vol. VIII, v. Emphasis added.
59. Baran and O’Neill, An Interview with Paul Baran OH 182, 18.
60. Ibid.
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only that theirs was the first network intended to create a ‘universal interface’, but the
equally false notion that Baran’s network was distinguishable from theirs on the basis
of its limited applicability.
Third, the Internet Society’s Brief History of the Internet, published in 1997, claims
that its coauthor Leonard Kleinrock’s research pre-existed Baran’s and that the inven-
tion of packet switching by Kleinrock, Baran and Donald Davies ‘had all proceeded
in parallel without any of the researchers knowing about the other work.’61 Yet
Janet Abbate has argued strongly that Baran’s ideas were indeed widely disseminated
amongst communication technology researchers at the time.62 Were the inventors
of the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ truly ignorant of Baran’s research? In a prior interview from 1990
Kleinrock contradicts this position by saying, ‘I was well aware of [Baran’s] results.
In fact I quoted his results in my own [1962] dissertation [on network queuing].’63
The co-inventors of the TCP/IP protocol, Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn, claim to have
had no recollection of encountering Baran’s work until well into the development
of the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ in 1968.64 But Baran, with the evidence of diary entries, recalled
‘many, many discussions with the folks at ARPA, starting in the very early ’60s’, and
attested how ‘People say they’d never heard of me at the time, yet I’d chaired a session
with them in it.’65 He added that by the time of the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ’s development, ‘The
information about packet switching was not a surprise, not new,’ and that Lawrence
Roberts, who lead the engineering of the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ and co-authored the Internet
Society’s Brief History, had cited Baran’s RAND reports as having ‘either caused or
[having been] a factor in specifying a fully distributed approach.’66 It could be added
that the designer of the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ’s topological infrastructure, Howard Frank, recalled
that he saw his work as ‘the follow-on to the work that Paul Baran did.’67 And David
Walden, who managed the team which built the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ’s nodes, recalled,
[Baran] was in the community. [His work] was known. I can’t remember the
first day I heard Paul Baran’s name. But I’d be surprised if I didn’t know it in
those days. Because some of the issues that came up were issues like: ‘Do we
have to do, [and] worry about some of the stuff Paul Baran is worrying about.
What is the RFP [Request For Proposals] going to say? Are we really concerned
about reliability in the face of nuclear attack?’, and that kind of stuff.68
61. Cerf et al., ‘A Brief History of the Internet.’
62. Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 21, 39–39.
63. Leonard Kleinrock and Judy O’Neill, An Interview with Leonard Kleinrock OH 190, Oral history
interviews (Los Angeles, CA: Charles Babbage Institute, April 1990), 7.
64. Vinton G. Cerf and Judy O’Neill, An Interview with Vinton Cerf OH 191, Oral history interviews
(University of Minnesota, Minneapolis: Charles Babbage Institute, April 1990), p. 12; Kahn and O’Neill,
An Interview with Robert E. Kahn OH 192, pp. 18-19.
65. Baran and Brand, ‘Founding Father,’ 1.
66. Baran and O’Neill, An Interview with Paul Baran OH 182, 39.
67. Howard Frank and Judy O’Neill, An Interview with Howard Frank OH 188, Oral history interviews
(University of Minnesota, Minneapolis: Charles Babbage Institute, March 1990), 10.
68. David Walden and Judy O’Neill, An Interview with David Walden OH 181, Oral history interviews
(University of Minnesota, Minneapolis: Charles Babbage Institute, February 1990), 8–9.
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Finally, one finds the concluding volume of On Distributed Communications in Lick-
lider’s archive at MIT.
The fourth problem with the Internet Society’s boundary work concerns the
emphasis on Baran’s network being ‘secure’. This holds truth to it in that unlike
the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ, cryptographic security was an essential dimension of Baran’s network,
which was designed to be a ‘universal high-secrecy system, made up of a hierarchy
of less-secure sub-systems.’69 For the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ, cryptological concerns would be an
afterthought. By emphasising that Baran’s work concerned secure communications,
the Internet Society really imply that Baran’s network is distinguished from theirs
for being a military network, where secrecy was privileged, whereas theirs was an
civilian one, in which no secrecy was needed.
This is an unfair criticism to make because until the revolution of public-key
cryptography in the mid-1970s,70 the possibility of secure communications over a
network open to non-military networks would have vastly increased the difficulty and
costs of implementing the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ. Furthermore, the cryptographic ideals which
Baran proposes match what much of the internet would become (though not their
details, in lieu of public-key cryptography). It is not that the messages in his network
were to be secret from the public and open to all the military, but that they would
be doubly encrypted internally from sender-to-recipient (end-to-end) and node-to-
node (link-by-link) such that messages could be transmitted on a need-to-know basis
which would avert eavesdropping.71 This is the kind of cryptographical system that
the internet became, for everything from shopping websites to instant messaging
apps. Baran was simply ahead of the curve. He had a complex notion of security
which included, the Internet Society forgets, the open publication of most – not all –
volumes of On Distributed Communications.
Hence, the Internet Society’s four reasons for expelling Baran from the history
of the internet – his lack of clarity, his specialised focus on voice transmission, that
he was not known to the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ community and that his was a secret network –
are all untenable. What this means is that the claim that the internet never did have
anything to do with ‘with supporting or surviving war’ and that it ‘embodied the most
peaceful intentions’ is simply itself a myth.72 As such Baran’s survivable network thesis
becomes a legitimate telos of the invention of the internet. When Licklider himself
discusses ‘survivability’, ‘dispersal to withstand localised damage’, ‘load levelling’ and
‘down-sensitivity’ we should not imagine these to be distinct from those of Baran, the
69. Baran, On Distributed Communications, vol. IX, 7.
70. Arguably the greatest revolution in the history of cryptology was the publication of, Whitfield
Diffie and Martin E. Hellman, ‘New Directions in Cryptography,’ IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory 22, no. 6 (November 1976): 644–654.
71. Baran, On Distributed Communications, vol. IX, 10–18.
72. Hafner and Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late, 10.
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innocent concerns of science as distinct from war.73 This is not to return to a notion
that the internet is a military apparatus as opposed to civilian, but to argue that this
distinction has lost its meaning.
It is often advanced that the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ was only a network at birth and only
became an internetwork with the advent of the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ’S Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) in the 1970s, which allowed the various other computer networks in
development, such as Louis Pouzin’s CYᴄᴌᴀᴅᴇS in France and the UK’s eventually
realised NPL Network, to intercommunicate by means of a shared protocol.74 An
internet, by this account, is a network of singularities with a harmonious commonality.
Baran, whose system – according to this topological definition – would be an
archetypal network rather than internet since it was designedwithout interconnection to
non-military networks in mind, poses a competing epistemological way to understand
this distinction. His secure network itself is bifurcated throughout with competing
networks of transmission such that there is no one network but rather a myriad
of overlaying, competing networks, each merging into one another, hiding and
eavesdropping on communications not intended for them. This poses a different,
epistemological rather than topological account of what an internet is: a network is
defined by its members sharing their knowledge, purpose and control, whereas an
internet is defined by such networks in competition. It is not their commonality that
makes an internet according to this epistemological definition, but their conflict.
If Licklider names the network of institutions, socii and machines by means of which
the internet was invented, then by implication it bears a certain correspondence to –
a certain reproduction of – his network’s form. This is why the investment in erasing
Baran from its history exists, since doing so gives an altogether different picture
of the internet and the society which produced it: both the internet and America
come out looking, conveniently enough, like expressions of peace and the benevolent
intentions of science and liberal democracy. At stake is not just the reputation of one
man, but an entire society in the making.
73. Licklider, Memorandum: Classification of Computer Networks, 5–7.
74. Naughton, A Brief History of the Future, 157; Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 127–30.
Chapter 2
Clocks
‘The thought of every age is reflected in its technique,’ writes Wiener in Cybernetics
(1948),1 and Deleuze, in his ‘Postscript on Control Societies’ (1990) argues that certain
machines ‘express the social forms capable of producing them and making use of
them.’2 There are strong grounds for reading together these two arguments that
certain machines ‘reflect’ or ‘express’ their ‘age’ or ‘society’.
Both Wiener and Deleuze divide modernity into three epochs. Wiener writes in
1948:
If the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries are the age of clocks, and the
later eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries constitute the age of steam engines,
the present time is the age of communication and control.3
In 1990 Deleuze argues:
One can of course see how each kind of society corresponds to a particular
kind of machine – with simple mechanical machines corresponding to sovereign
societies, thermodynamic machines to disciplinary societies, cybernetic machines
and computers to control societies.4
Both Wiener and Deleuze agree on which machines represent the first two epochs:
the clock and the thermodynamic engine. With respect to the third, contemporary,
moment, both agree that it is defined by cybernetics and its machines. Wiener,
writing when the von Neumann network had just invented the first digital computer,
describes the age of communication and control as no longer primarily concerned with
the ‘economy of energy’, but ‘the accurate reproduction of a signal’, which is to
say, information as opposed to noise or entropy.5 Deleuze, writing on the eve of
the internet’s widespread adoption, writes that our control societies correspond to
‘information technology and computers’ whose ‘passive danger is noise, and the
1. Wiener, Cybernetics, 38.
2. Deleuze, Negotiations, 180.
3. Wiener, Cybernetics, 38.
4. Deleuze, Negotiations, 175.
5. Wiener, Cybernetics, 37–38.
23
24 CHAPTER 2. CLOCKS
active, piracy and viral contamination.’6 By these depictions alone both agree that
some form of cybernetic communication network corresponds to the age: Wiener
refers to communication engineering, Deleuze’s invocation of noise, piracy and viral
contamination only making sense in the context of networks of computers. That is,
it is not the digital computer that corresponds to our society’s age, but some kind of
network. I read both as simply too early to write: Ours is the historical moment which
corresponds to the Internet.
Wiener is always quoted for saying: ‘Information is information, not matter or energy.
No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.’7 But what
is a reader to really make of these words? I wish to experiment with reading them
in terms of the three ages: Matter being the ‘materialism’ of the age of clocks, energy
being the ‘materialism’ of the age of engines, information being the ‘materialism’ of
the age of the Internet. The ‘present day’ – our contemporary – is that which must
take into account its disjunctive historical specificity with respect to these two earlier
moments.
Expanding on this sentence Wiener writes that ‘the mechanical brain does not
secrete thought “as the liver does bile,” as the earlier materialists claimed, nor does
it put it out in the form of energy, as the muscle puts out its activity.’8 My reading
of ‘information is information not matter or energy’ as concerning the break of the
age of the Internet from that of the ‘older materialists’ in the age of steam engine and
clock is perhaps complicated by tracking down Wiener’s un-referenced quotation
(‘as the liver does bile’) to a pre-cybernetic source: a critique of phrenology by a
nineteenth century American physiologist named Thomas Sewall, in which both the
mechanical and energetic materialisms are rendered explicit.
In An Examination of Phrenology (1839) Sewall argues that phrenologists hold a
larger brain to ‘possess more power than a small one’ by analogy to a large liver which
‘will secrete more bile than a small one’, their analogy implying that ‘the brain …
elaborates thought as the liver does bile from the blood’.9 Phrenologists, he continues,
regard the brain to be ‘a galvanic battery, and thought the fluid eliminated by its
action.’ Wiener’s reproduction of this argument implies that his most famous claim
rests on a paraphrased old critique of phrenology! Nevertheless, while Wiener must
have had Sewall’s book at hand when writing this passage, his argument cannot be
reduced to it; I stand by my reading that information’s distinction from matter refers
to a break with the age of the clock, and its distinction from energy being a break
with that of the thermodynamic engine.
In this chapter I shall begin to emphasise the cybernetic determinations of Lick-
6. Deleuze, Negotiations, 180.
7. Wiener, Cybernetics, 132. Emphasis added.
8. Ibid., 132.
9. Thomas Sewall, An Examination of Phrenology: In Two Lectures, 2nd ed. (Boston: D. S. King, 1839),
59. I have emphasised the passage which Wiener quotes.
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lider’s network. I turn to Wiener, who profoundly influenced Licklider in the 1940s,
to address the nature of the reflection of a historical moment in its technique. This
would be to determine the parallel concept of Wiener’s to that employed by Deleuze
in the ‘Postscript’ to depict the fact of machines as expressions of the sociohistorical
forms. That is, parallel to Foucault’s dispositif, the network through which the hetero-
geneous elements of a society are strategically connected and whose contemporary
instantiation Deleuze names ‘control’.10 As Bernard Dionysus Geoghegan has em-
phasised, in its English translation as ‘apparatus’, dispositif merges ambiguously with
appareil, instruments becoming epistemological figures which ‘coordinate, suspend,
or rationalize difference.’11 My approach perhaps differs from Geoghegan’s in that his
emphasises the plurality of technical apparatuses, whereas I shall argue of one. This
relates to the distinction between the dispositifs of discipline and control instituted
by Deleuze. For Foucault there are various machines – prisons, schools, hospitals,
sanatoriums, etc. – and while each corresponds to the dispositif and speaks of it, they
form a heterogeneous vocabulary. Each are heterogeneously associated by means of
the language of the disciplinary dispositif through which they analogically translate.
Different machines each constitute elements of a single univocal language, the dispos-
itif, or at least a partial language of, in Deleuze’s words, ‘paralinguistic signs, breaths
and screams’.12 If Geoghegan insists on the productive ambiguity of the dispositif as
appareils, then I shall insist on the ambiguity of one appareil with the dispositif (which
many appareils reflect). A single machine of machines. Perhaps this is implied in
Deleuze’s distinction of the dispositif of control as continuous, unbounded, and, as
Alexander Galloway has argued, homogeneous.13 And why Hardt and Negri have
construed this affirmatively, reconstruing the equivocal dispositif with the univocal
Spinozan category of ‘common form’ that everything expresses.14 Nevertheless, my
reading of Wiener calls for a return, against Deleuze (at least according to Galloway’s
presentation of his ‘digitality’) and especially Hardt and Negri, to an equivocal het-
erogeneity, albeit one which insists on heterogeneity as taking place within a single
apparatus, the internet: not through Spinozan commonalities, but the post-Leibnizian
10. Foucault’s sole discussion of themeaning of dispositif is to be found in the interview ‘TheConfession
of the Flesh’, Power/Knowledge, 194–228. The opening sequence of the discussion was omitted from
translation; Stuart Elden has published it on his blog, https://progressivegeographies.com/2013/12/
30/the-missing-question-from-foucaults-confession-of-the-flesh-interview-a-translation/.
11. Bernard Dionysius Geoghegan, ‘From Information Theory to French Theory: Jakobson, Lévi-
Strauss, and the Cybernetic Apparatus,’Critical Inquiry, 2011, 99; On the general difficulties of translating
dispositif see, Jeffrey Bussolini, ‘What is a Dispositive?,’ Foucault Studies, no. 10 (November 2010): 85–
107.
12. This is said, following Alexander Galloway’s lead, through hooking up Deleuze’s ‘Postscript’ to
his distinction of analogue and digital in his book on Francis Bacon. Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon:
The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (London & New York: Continuum, 2003), 113, 121;
Allexander R. Galloway, ‘Computers and the Superfold,’ Postscript on Control Societies, Deleuze Studies
6, no. 4 (2012): 513–28.
13. Galloway, ‘Computers and the Superfold’; Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 116.
14. Hardt and Negri, Empire, On the 329–331.
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conflicts of networks against networks.
This is to get ahead of myself. To begin with we might say that the concept
which shares the role for Wiener as the dispositif is neatly characterised by François
Ewald’s characterisation of the dispositif itself, it ‘presents to modern society its true
picture of itself.’15 And further, that this new picture is a ‘new monster’, as Deleuze
says, of control, but so because it is, as Wiener affirmed in Père Dubarle’s review of
Cybernetics, a ‘prodigious Leviathan’ which presents a new mode of power, a ‘machine
à gouverner’, with gouverner doubly signifying the traditional political governor and
the new cybernetician.16 The monstrosity of the new Leviathan, which portrays our
society’s true picture, is implicit on the level of Wiener’s equivalent to the dispositif –
the ‘operative image’ – since it is characterised by a fusion of Leibniz and Hobbes; a
bastard offspring which neither early modern philosophers would have ever desired.
Power decided by arbitrary might instead of necessary wisdom, a State without any
sense of contract. The internet, as the ‘ultimate cybernetic machine’ (Gerovitch),17
is the image to which our cybernetic society corresponds. But what does ‘image’ in
such a context mean?
Wiener’s approach to the correlation between machine and society, or machine
and organism, is determined by a post-theological imaginary specifically founded
upon the nature of the ‘image’ of God in which man is created. This theological
imaginary is expressed all the way from Cybernetics to his final work God and Golem,
Inc. (1964) in which it is most directly thematised. This final book has perplexed some
of Wiener’s closest readers, who consider it an ‘[extension of] the reach of cybernetics
beyond science, engineering, politics, labor and other social concerns into the realm
of religion’.18 What renders his notion ultimately a secular one, or rather secularised,
is that his concept of image is not ontological but historical, presenting every age
with the image of the human’s historical being by means of ‘the machine made in his
own image’.19 In every age, humans discover a new image of what it means to be a
creative being and they create a singular machine which represents this.
By image, Wiener means a dynamic rather than static one: it is not about resemb-
lance but about a simulacrum of a logic of operation. He writes that,
15. François Ewald, ‘A power without an exterior,’ in Ewald, Michel Foucault, Philosopher, 170.
16. Dubarle’s review of Cybernetics (1948) was swiftly published in Le Monde on 28 December 1948,
Wiener having had the book published, in English, simultaneously in France as well as the USA. Wiener
considered Dubarle’s review to be ‘very penetrating’ and quoted a large section of it in The Human Use of
Human Beings, its translation likely his own. Wiener, HUHBb, 157; The French reception of Cybernetics
would have mattered acutely to Wiener, since, as Geoghegan catalogues, he was persuaded to formalise
his ideas into a book initially by its Paris publisher, Hermann et Cie, whereas MIT Press and Wiley &
Co. had to bully and splurge their way to a simultaneous US release. Bernard Dionysius Geoghegan,
‘The Cybernetic Apparatus: Media, Liberalism, and the Reform of the Human Sciences’ (PhD thesis,
Northwestern University and Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, 2012), 166.
17. Gerovitch, ‘The Cybernetics Scare and the Origins of the Internet,’ 38.
18. Kline, The Cybernetics Moment, 152.
19. Wiener, HUHBb, 160.
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In order to discuss intelligently the problem of a machine constructing another
after its own image, we must make the notion of image more precise. Here we
must be aware that there are images and images. …[Besides] pictorial images,
we may have operative images, which perform the functions of their original,
may or may not bear a pictorial likeness to it. Whether they do or not, they
may replace the original in its action, and this is a much deeper similarity. It
is from the standpoint of operative similarity that we shall study the possible
reproduction of machines.20
The picture of the self which the operative image reflects is not the static being of
its aesthetic presentation but the becoming of its productive organisation. Such an
emphasis on the dynamism of the image rather than its appearance is fundamental to
the cybernetic ‘theory of machines’. As Ross Ashby says in 1956, ‘cybernetics … treats
not things but ways of behaving. It does not ask “what is this thing?” but “what does
it do?” … The materiality is irrelevant’.21 Such an argument is founded on Wiener’s
‘philosophical’ analogy of machines and organisms. In Cybernetics Wiener poses that
an engineer’s servomechanism and the function of a gene are not ‘philosophically very
different’, and argues, ‘I do not in the least claim that the details of these processes are
the same, but I do claim that they are philosophically very similar phenomena.’22 The
operative image is a specific artifice: it crosses the threshold from utility into life, and
as living it is that which can itself reproduce life. It is a human-created, or ‘invented’,
representation not of what life looks like and is but of how it functions. What the
living do. Wiener declares, ‘It will not do to state categorically that the processes of
reproduction in the machine and in the living being have nothing in common.’23
The formulation ‘operative image’ is a late one, introduced only in Wiener’s final
texts, but he refers to the same concept as a ‘working simulacrum’ in this passage from
Cybernetics:
At every stage of technique since Daedalus or Hero of Alexandria, the ability
of the artificer to produce a working simulacrum of a living organism has always
intrigued people. This desire to produce and to study automata has always been
expressed in terms of the living technique of the age.24
As ‘working simulacrum of a living organism’, or an ‘expression’ of the ‘living tech-
nique of the age’, the operative image refers to the operative mechanism of the being
which betrays the characteristics of the living and could, if realised with sufficient
perfection, create another living being. Why? Because it has been manufactured
according to the laws which govern the very occasion of life itself.
20. Norbert Wiener, God and Golem, Inc. (London: Chapman & Hall, 1964), 37–38.
21. W. Ross Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics (London: Chapman & Hall, 1957), 1–2.
22. Wiener, Cybernetics, 180.
23. Wiener, God and Golem, Inc., 52.
24. Wiener, Cybernetics, 40.
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If Wiener’s writings have been taken seriously in France whilst being derided as
‘mainly philosophical’ (especially in contrast to Shannon) at home in America,25 one
reason surely stems from his flat refusal to conform to the Anglo-Saxon boundary
work of the nineteenth century by which ‘science’ and ‘philosophy’ were divorced
from one another – in the UK by the likes of William Whewell of Cambridge.26
Like Whewell’s obstinate student James Clerk Maxwell – whose ‘On Governors’
Wiener considered to be the ‘first significant paper on feedback mechanisms’27 –
ontological concerns of ‘natural sciences’ cannot be separated fromWiener’s writings.
Wiener scorned those with ‘brilliant ideas’ but ‘a distressing inability to place [them]
in any philosophical structure’, as he recalled of Claude Bernard’s English translator
J. B. Henderson,28 he held disdain for the ‘peculiar sense of power, and worship of
power, to be found among the less philosophical and more administrative technical
men.’29 He wroteCybernetics to ‘display some of the ideas and philosophical reflections
which led [him] in the beginning to enter upon this field, and which have continued
to interest [him] in its development.’30 The reason Wiener is ‘too philosophical’ for
those who expect a separation of powers between ‘philosophy’ and ‘science’ is simple:
his work is ‘philosophical’ according to the tradition of Descartes, Leibniz, Newton,
Maxwell and so on: that is, within the tradition of natural science. This said, he
recognises the contiguous historicity of the natural science, and even, in his final
book, alludes to his own axiom’s future redundancy.31
25. Kline, The Cybernetics Moment, 36.
26. On Whewell’s 1833 coining of ‘scientist’ in distinction to ‘philosopher’, and his student James
Clerk Maxwell’s rejection of the distinction and his commitment to the tradition of natural philosophy
that Whewell’s move was intended to make redundant, see P. M. Harman, The Natural Philosophy of
James Clerk Maxwell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 11.
27. Referring to his coining of ‘cybernetics’, Wiener reflects: ‘In choosing this term, we wish to
recognize that the first significant paper on feedback mechanisms is an article on governors, which was
published by Clerk Maxwell in 1868.’ Wiener, Cybernetics, 13; See, J. C. Maxwell, ‘On Governors,’
Proceedings of the Royal Society, no. 100 (1868).
28. Norbert Wiener, Ex-Prodigy: My Childhood and Youth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953),
165–66; Wiener encountered Henderson during his publication of The Fitness of the Environment in
the 1911–1913 seminar on scientific method organised by Josiah Royce, who receives special thanks in
the book’s preface. Did Wiener encounter Bernard’s concepts of ‘milieu intérieur’ at this point, and the
concept that would come to be called ‘homeostasis’? Although Bernard does feature in Henderson’s
early book, he does so only with respect to his positive experimental methodology and its opposition to
vitalism, in line with the conventional reception of Bernard at the time. (This situation would begin to
change only in the 1920s, Henderson contributing the translation of Introduction à l’étude de la médecine
expérimental (1865) in 1927.) What the young Wiener would have certainly encountered in Henderson,
not-insignificantly given the focus of his first cybernetic works with Rosenblueth, was an attempt to
read Darwinian evolutionary biology with respect to the categories of purposivity, teleology and order.
But this only with respect to an organism’s relation to its outer environment, rather than the Bernardian
conflict between an inner environment and outer. Lawrence J. Henderson, The Fitness of the Environment:
An Inquiry into the Biological Significance of the Properties of Matter (1913: Macmillan, 1913), x, 286–88.
29. Wiener, Prolegomena to Theology, 89. Emphasis added.
30. Wiener, Cybernetics, xv. Emphasis added.
31. ‘Homeostasis, whether for the individual or the race, is something of which the very basis must
sooner or later be reconsidered.’ Such a fundamental reconsideration ambiguously begs whether the
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Wiener’s concept of an ‘operative image’, whose contemporary manifestation is
the internet, has roots within the tradition of natural science, and I wish to argue that
it translates a concept in Leibniz’s Monadology.32 But perhaps the most immediate
notion of creating a ‘working simulacrum of nature’, in Wiener’s words given the
notion of cybernetics producing a ‘prodigious Leviathan’, is that of Thomas Hobbes’
introductory argument of the Leviathan: ‘NᴀᴛᴜRᴇ, the art whereby God hath made
and governs the world, is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also
imitated, that it can make an artificial animal.’33
That is, we begin with the distinction of the age of information from that of
‘matter’, whose operative image is the clock.
2.1 Big gods, little gods: Hobbes contra Leibniz
Does Wiener’s ‘operative image’, which stands in place of the dispositif and whose
manifestation is the internet, accord to the model of the image of creation as conceived
by Hobbes or Leibniz? Does it accord to both?
A typical early modern, Hobbes followed Robert Boyle’s view that the primary
mechanism of a corpuscle must bear explanation of the mechanical kind that could
equally explain the structure and inner workings of a clock,34 he followed the Cartesian
view that, ‘when swallows come in spring, they operate like clocks. The actions of
honeybees are of the same nature.’35 He considered the organic body to operate in the
image of the clock and the clock itself to be of the image of nature. In the introduction
to the Leviathan Hobbes famously depicts nature as clockwork machine designed by
an original clockmaker God, writing, ‘For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the
very foundation of cybernetics would remain tenable, or whether cybernetics itself constitutes this
critique of homeostasis. Wiener, God and Golem, Inc., 86.
32. Following standard convention, throughout this thesis I shall refer to Mondadology and ‘mon-
adology‘ distinctly. Monadology refers to the text which Leibniz authored in 1714, whose title was
given posthumously by its German publisher in 1720. As ‘monadology’, I refer to Leibniz’s general
‘system’ of thought expressed in the Monadology and other especially late texts. G. W. Leibniz, Leibniz’s
Monadology: A New Translation and Guide, ed. and trans. Lloyd Strickland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2014), 5–12
There is some debate over whether Leibniz can be considered a ‘systematic philosopher’. Margaret
Wilson, for example, argues against this because his output spans so many disciplines, evolves over
decades and lacks a central opus like Spinoza’s Ethics. Reading Michel Serres, Lucie Mercier has
argued persuasively of Leibniz’s systematicity as a ‘methodological pluralism’, its multilinearity and
multivalence. Respectively, I read Leibniz as indeed a systematic thinker, one whose methodology is like
the monadology itself: a myriadic, sprawling, integrated network where each position grants a different
degree of clarity as to its relation to its universe of ideas. MargaretWilson, Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on
Early Modern Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 372–88; Lucie Kim-Chi Mercier,
‘The Inside Passage: Translation as Method and Relation In Serres and Benjamin’ (PhD, CRMEP,
Kingston University, 2015), 99–103; Also, Nicholas Jolley, Leibniz (New York: Routledge, 2005), 9-11.
33. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ix.
34. Peter R. Anstey, The Philosophy of Robert Boyle (London: Routledge, 2000), 55, 60.
35. Descartes, ‘Letter to the Marquess of Newcastle’ (23 November 1646), The Philosophical Writings
of Descartes, vol. III, 304.
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Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so manyWheeles, giving motion to
the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer?’36 Therefore, Hobbes poses,
given that humans can create clockwork automata, why should they not strive to
create the paragon such automata through ‘imitating that Rationall and most excellent
worke of Nature, Man.’
Wiener says of the early modern clockmakers, ‘As in ancient times the craftsmen
made their tools in the image of the heavens. A watch is nothing but a pocket orrery,
moving by necessity as do the celestial spheres’.37 To Descartes the human-made
clock is merely an infinitely coarse image of God’s clockwork universe.38 Otto Mayr
argues that, especially until Huygens invented the pendulum in 1657, clocks primarily
provided a ‘conceptual image’ of the universe rather than, as one might expect, the
utility of timekeeping: ‘Their objective, it seems, was universality; they attempted
to mirror the whole human experience’.39 Similarly, Derek J. de Solla Price argues
that for the ancients the sundial and water-clock were also not primarily timekeeping
devices, but rather means to ‘simulate the heavens’, and that the flying machines of
that master of Renaissance clockwork automata, Leonardo da Vinci, were less to
enable humans to fly than for the ‘perfection of a simulacrum for the mechanism of a
bird’.40 Hobbes would raise the stakes of this tradition, claiming that the human can
imitate themselves, in body and soul. ‘Art goes yet further, imitating that Rationall
and most excellent work of Nature, Man.’41 In this claim Hobbes surpasses Descartes
for whom only God could create the entire human, since he held a monopoly over the
production of souls. For Hobbes the entire human is imitatable because he construes
the soul to be, in Carl Schmitt’s words, no more than ‘a mere component of a machine
artificially manufactured by men’.42
The mechanical clock is a machine whose laws of operation are pre-established by
its clockmaker and cannot be adjusted but by an external intervention. Its authority
derives from a single central source, the toothed escapement, whose original fourteenth
century form even looked like a crown and was named the ‘virge escapement’, after
the ‘virge’ (or ‘mace’) which represents the authority, force and capacity for violence
of a divine or earthly sovereign (virges were initially weapons and instruments of
corporal punishment). One finds the mechanical clock figured as such almost from the
outset of its invention, divinely in Dante’s Inferno (1320),43 and secularly in Chaucer’s
36. Hobbes, Leviathan, ix.
37. Wiener, Cybernetics, 38. Emphasis added.
38. Descartes, Treatise on Man (1664), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I, 99.
39. Otto Mayr, Authority, Liberty & Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe (London: John
Hopkins University Press, 1986), 10.
40. Derek J. de Solla Price, ‘Automata and the Origins of Mechanism and Mechanistic Philosophy,’
Technology and Culture, 1964, 13–14, 21.
41. Hobbes, Leviathan, ix.
42. Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political
Symbol, trans. Georgre Schwab and Erna Hilfstein (London: Greenwood Press, 1996), 34, 37.
43. Par. XXIV.13–5. Also Par. XXIV:13–18 and XXXII:143–45, and, according to Francesco
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Book of the Duchess (1368–1372).44 But, argues Mayr, it is in the seventeenth century
that the image comes into its own, and with the Leviathan at the pinnacle of the
‘mechanical universe’.45 Mayr argues that the image of the clock is authoritarian by
nature: ‘order, peace, equilibrium were to be achieved through central planning,
steering, decision-making. All the members of the system outside the sole central
authority remained mere little wheels in a great train, and they possessed neither
freedom nor individuality.’46
Wiener may have enthused about the claim that cybernetics threatens to engender
‘the rise of a prodigious Leviathan’ which would render that of Hobbes ‘nothing but
a pleasant joke’;47 yet there is an important distinction between the kind of imitation
conceived of by Hobbes and Wiener. As Schmitt writes, the relation for Hobbes
between humans and their ‘homo artificialis’ (‘a huge machine, a gigantic mechanism
in the service of ensuring the physical protection of those governed’) is not merely
that of maker and engineer, but also of material and machine.48 The human is both
the material and maker of the Leviathan, subjected to its power and author of its
power. This is crucial to ensure that the ‘huge man’ takes its life and power from
the covenant of those it rules over and to render the state ‘impersonal’ and distinct
from its prince. Whilst it is not the case that the personality of the state for Hobbes is
derivative only of the sum of its human parts – Mark Neocleous has shown that it also
has a distinct personality of its own49 – it would be inconceivable to think of Hobbes’
machine without its human elements. Out of the operational image of a material,
clockwork nature, Humans create a ‘mortal god’, as Hobbes refers to his machine,
who reciprocally transforms them from wolves into the citizens who constitute his
inner mechanism. But what Hobbes attempted, even if he ultimately fails, is to ensure
a contract between the machine and its creator, such that it is the people who are ruled
by the machine who hold ultimate authority over it. What ensues from cybernetics is
a machine which rules over its creator without any such notion of contract. It does
this by beginning with Leibniz.
Ciabattoni’s reading, XXIII.97–102. Francesco Ciabattoni, Dante’s Journey to Polyphony (Toronto,
Buffalo & London: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 186–87.
44. See, Guillemette Bolens and Paul Beckman Taylor, ‘Chess, Clocks, and Counsellors in Chaucer’s
Book of The Duchess,’ The Chaucer Review 35, no. 3 (2001): 281–293.
45. Otto Mayr, ‘A Mechanical Symbol for an Authoritarian World: German Clocks and Automata
1550-1650,’ in The Clockwork Universe, ed. Klaus Maurice and Otto Mayr (New York: Neale Watson
Academic Publications, 1980), 1–8.
46. Klaus Maurice and Otto Mayr, ‘Introduction,’ in The Clockwork Universe: German Clocks and Auto-
mata 1550-1650, ed. Klaus Maurice and Otto Mayr (New York: Neale Watson Academic Publications,
1980), vii–ix.
47. Wiener, HUHBb, 157.
48. Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, 34–35.
49. Mark Neocleous, Imagining the State (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2003).
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Leibniz distinguishes the ‘minds’ of humans from the ‘souls’ (or ‘bare monads’) of
animals and vegetable life on the basis of a mind’s capacity to have a certain degree
of clear self-reflective perceptions, or apperception, whereas souls are capable only of
confused perceptions. This apperception allows minds to discover within themselves
innate ideas such as ‘I’, cause, being and God, or the truths of mathematics and
geometry.50 This mind’s capacity for insight into a priori concepts is the same which
gives it the capacity to understand the natural organisation and mechanism of nature,
and therefore to create living mechanisms in its image. In the Monadology (M83) he
writes,
that souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of created things,
whereas minds are also images of the divinity itself, or of the very author of nature,
capable of knowing the system of the universe, and of imitating something of it
through their own smaller scale constructions [échantillons architectoniques], each
mind being like a little divinity of its own sphere [chaque esprit étant comme une
petite divinité dans son département].51
With this, as with many verses in the Monadology, Leibniz directs the reader to a
passage in the Theodicy (1710), notably T147, which we shall return to.
A mind’s distinct capacity for self-reflection and thereby the discovery of necessary
truths casts it in the image of God. Every mind is an image of God. This is one of
theMonadology’s rare theological motifs and it subtly embraces a certain branch of
a Judaeo-Christian mysticism. A consequence of the capacity to innately discover
necessary truths is the capacity to know the essence of creation, nature and being
itself. Hence minds are reflections of the ‘very author of nature’ and can come to
know ‘the system of the universe’ itself. Such a capacity would be limited by the
degree of perfection of a mind’s conscious perceptions (apperceptions), which for any
embodied being entails a certain degree of confusion such that a human would never
near anything like equivalence with the infinite degree of clarity of God himself; but
they can raise their degree of understanding of the necessary truth of being, indeed
they should since this would allow them to appreciate the necessity of its wisdom,
the ‘pre-established harmony’ of God’s creation that ensures our world is the ‘best
of possible worlds’ (M53, 55).52 Such truth is not deducible exogenously from the
empirical senses to their causes (a posteriori) but only endogenously through reasoning
50. M26–30. See also, G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 292–294, 368.
51. M83. Lloyd Strickland trans., Leibniz, Monadology, 149–151. Emphasis added.
52. As argued in the Theodicy, §196: ‘For in this case the determination would spring from the nature
of the thing, the line would be perpendicular, and the angle would be right, since that is all that is
determined and distinguishable. It is thus one must think of the creation of the best of all possible
universes, all the more since God not only decrees to create a universe, but decrees also to create the
best of all.’
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over the foundations of things to their effects (a priori).53
The operative image which Leibniz employs is, as for Hobbes, the clock. Leibniz
liked to ask his readers to ‘imagine two clocks or watches which are in perfect
agreement’. Ruling out miracles or external influences, such a feat could only occur if
a perfectly skilled and accurate clock maker had made them agree at the beginning of
time, as though he were ‘always putting forth his hand’, but without doing so since
the clocks themselves unfold their original instructions.54 Wiener took this to be the
model of the clockwork image, depicting it as ‘passively dancing figures on top of a
music box. They have no real influence on the outside world, nor are they effectively
influenced by it.’55
Now, whilst it would for Leibniz contradict reason to countenance that any being
but God could create new beings, a mind with sufficient clarity as to the system of the
universe could plausibly imitate ‘something of it’ in the world of composite reality
through what Leibniz calls their ‘échantillons architectoniques’: and it is by doing so
become ‘a little divinity of its own sphere.’
It is this untranslatable échantillons architectoniques that I wish to suggest finds a
translation in Wiener’s ‘operative image’.
The phrase has been translated variously, with varying connotations, by Leibniz
scholars. As ‘architectonic ensamples’ (Robert Latta)56 or ‘architectonic samples’
(Leroy E. Loemker),57 which is literal and obscure; ‘schematic representations’ (Roger
Ariew and Daniel Garber),58 which emphasises that minds imitate God by devising
mathematical or physical accounts of the universe, although given that Leibniz says as
much in our ‘knowing the system of the universe’ this readingwould be an unnecessary
repetition in a text which does not mince words; as ‘constructive exemplars’ (Anthony
Savile)59 or ‘constructive samples’ (Nicholas Rescher)60 with an emphasis on imitating
God through political organisations, scientific knowledge and the construction of
53. Strickland argues that the pre-Kantian meaning of a priori and a posteriori which Leibniz employed
derives from his great interlocutor Antoine Arnauld’s Port-Royal Logic (La logique, ou l’art de penser;
1662–1683), which Foucault considers to have been a basis of the classical episteme. The distinction
between a priori and a posteriori is there made not primarily in terms of the status of sensibility but rather
in terms of the direction of illumination, with the former relating to ‘proving effects through their causes’
and the latter ‘causes their through effects’. Part IV, ch. 1, p. 104, Pierre Nicole and Antonoine Arnauld,
Logic, Or the Art of Thinking: Being the Port Royal Logic, trans. Thomas Spencer Baynes (Edinburgh:
Sutherland & Knox, 1850); Leibniz, Monadology, 302.
54. ‘A New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances’ G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical
Papers and Letters, 2nd ed., ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrechy, Boston & London: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1969), 460.
55. Wiener, Cybernetics, 41; Wiener, HUHBb, 22-23.
56. G. W. Leibniz, The Monadology, and Other Philosophical Writings, trans., with an introduction by
Robert Latta (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), 266.
57. Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 651.
58. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 223.
59. Anthony Savile, Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Leibniz and the Monadology (London: Rout-
ledge, 2000), 238.
60. Nicholas Rescher, G. W. Leibniz’s Monadology: An Edition for Students (Abingdon & New York:
Routledge, 1991), 275.
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artefacts, but given that architectonique refers to an architectural sense of construction,
this seems too broad; and ‘smaller scale constructions’ (Strickland),61 which emphasises
the imitation of Leibniz’smachina mundi through the construction of little machines or
models composed by its same principles. It is along the lines of Strickland’s translation
of imitation in the image of the machine of the world that I believe ‘operative image’
functions.62
In passage T147, to which the interested reader of M83 is referred, Leibniz’s
emphasis is somewhat different. The Theodicy’s passage relates not to the imitation of
the mechanism of the machina mundi, but to a mind’s political governance of their little
world being an imperfect imitation of divine governance. Imperfection here means
above all the occurrence of evil: the problem of theodicy itself. In the Theodicy’s
passage Leibniz writes that the ‘collision’ of one mind’s world with another’s – i.e.,
war – occurs inevitably because of a falling to passions – that innate limitation of
all monads but God – but that these privations of the good (Leibniz’s concept of
evil is fundamentally Augustinian), when given the correct framing, must be re-
cognised as part and parcel of the ‘greater adornment of [God’s] world.’ Profane
governance is guided not by the contingent path towards peace, but by the discovery
and imitation of the necessary laws through which the Divine Kingdom has been
ordered. Against Hobbes, for whom every disagreement – theological ones first and
foremost – ultimately fall to the contingent will of the sovereign to resolve, Leibniz’s
somewhat-medieval politics buck the spirit of his age by continuing to hold the
Catholic Church to universally ‘bind the whole human race together.’63 Hence the
imitation of divinity pressed upon in the Theodicy concerns less the mechanism of
nature as the logic of its necessary moral order.
Without denying a gap with respect to the échantillons architectoniques in the Mon-
adology and the associated passage in the Theodicy, I wish to insist that this gap can be
read as expressive of a complementary metaphysical and moral account, especially
if both passages are qualified via Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz’s ‘world’ as being ‘a
compossible architectonic totality’ [un ensemble architectonique compossible].64 ‘Archi-
tectonic’ here signifies a system of monads who, lacking windows, are themselves
architectural structures – cells 65 – whose Baroque architecture is ‘compossible’ in so
far as it is that total system of non-contradictory relations which has been chosen
by God from all other possible alternatives because it is – despite every privation,
every limitation, every ‘evil’ – the best of them all.66 According to Deleuze’s reading,
61. Leibniz, Monadology, 150.
62. This comparison of translations of échantillons architectoniques follows that of from ibid., although it
corrects a.
63. Leibniz, ‘On Natural Law’ (date unknown), Political Writings, 79.
64. Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (London: Athalone Press,
1993), 66.
65. Ibid., 28.
66. See M53
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architecture signifies both the metaphysical relationality of the universe and its specific
moral instantiation as the best of possible worlds. Hence, there is indeed a distinc-
tion between the metaphysical account of the Monadology and the moral one of the
Theodicy; yet there is no contradiction. As Leibniz says: ‘God has no less the quality of
the best monarch than that of the greatest architect; … he has attained the utmost good
possible, provided one reckon the metaphysical, physical and moral goods together.’
(Theodicy, §247) The échantillons architectoniques through which humans imitate God’s
nature are irreducibly both mechanical (concerning machines made in the image of
God’s nature) and moral (concerning the necessary good). A clock, a telescope, a
magnifying glass, a government: The machine which functions best would be that
which best imitates the rational and ordered – which is to say clockwork – nature
of things, and, morally speaking, this would be the most universally beneficent and
good organ.
The difference between Leibniz and Hobbes on the matter of imitating the image
of God’s nature is therefore a stark one. To Leibniz, everyone can become a god
who rules over their created machines; to Hobbes, everyone creates a machine who
rules over them as a god. Nowhere is the difference between the two philosophers
more obvious than in the ultimate manifestation of this difference politically. Let us
mention how: To Hobbes, the state is conceived as a single person who rules over all
irresistibly, but to Leibniz the state should be bound by international law [codex iuris
gentium] to a confederation in the tradition of the federated Church;67 to Hobbes, a
sovereign who must jealously guard its secrets from its enemies and thereby reprimand
its citizens to each ‘mind his own private, than the public business’,68 whereas to
Leibniz secrets should be those of the cloister of the mind and its perceptions into
which God whispers,69 while the sovereign must be bound by the public acts of
constitutional law and international peace treaties;70 for Hobbes, a state of nature
where the equal sovereign right of everyone to everything destines civil war, for
Leibniz, a natural distribution of little sovereign gods who even in encroaching
upon one another express naturally the greatest good; for Hobbes a sovereign whose
exceptional right to everything trumps all facts and whose contingent laws can be
unjust and even evil, for Leibniz a justice founded on the necessary laws of wisdom,
which is to say, knowledge of the good.71 All this flows from the question of whether
67. See the ‘Codex Iuris Gentium’ (1693) and ‘Caesarinus Fürstenerius’ (1677), both in Political Writings.
68. Thomas Hobbes, De Cive: English Version, ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983),
138–140.
69. ‘[God] leaves [man] to himself, in a sense, in a small department, ut spartam quam nactus est ornet.
He enters there only in a secret way, for he supplies being, force, life, reason, without showing himself.’
Theodicy, T147.
70. Leibniz, ‘Codex Iuris Gentium’, Political Writings, 165–176.
71. At least this represents something of the argument of Leibniz’s critique of Hobbes’ political thought
in his ‘Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice’ (1703), Political Writings. In effect it would
have also been potent against Spinoza, who, in Reinhart Koselleck’s words, too ‘deemed it perfectly
reasonable to look on every good deed as sinful if it harmed the State just as conversely, sins became
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we must create a mortal god in God’s image (Hobbes) or else in the image of God
make ourselves little gods (Leibniz), since in the former the machine ultimately rules
over its creators, and in the latter, the creator ultimately rules over their machines.
2.2 A monster, the Masons
Can Wiener’s concept of the operative image be said to be closer to Hobbes’ or
Leibniz’? In truth he seems to fear that in the age of communication and control, the
society of control, one sets out from the échantillons architectonique but is compelled
towards a sort of Leviathan. This would be a monstrous fusion for the reason that
Leibniz, who devoured Hobbes’ writings and claimed in his youth to have ‘profited
from them as much as from few others in our century’,72 construed his entire political
philosophy to be opposed to Hobbes’ on the basis that it attributes God (divine and
earthly) the ‘right to do everything, because he is all powerful.’73 Leibniz’ system is
to ensure the necessary wisdom in every aspect of God’s creation and in the political
architecture of the wise sovereign who imitates God.
Such a monstrous fusion is anticipated by Reinhart Koselleck in Critique and Crisis
(1959). Koselleck suggests that in the decade following Leibniz’s death in 1716 his
political theory found a certain actualisation – by the secret society of Masons.74
The early Masons, Koselleck argues, construed in Leibniz’s theodicy the ‘historico-
philosophical legitimation of [their] moral art.’ They rose to his system of secret
beneficence, wisdom, and success of planning, to the notion of a best of possible
worlds which they would ensure by opaquely ‘[steering] it from the secret backroom
of the moral inner space.’ But in construing themselves to be ‘the true initiates’, they
deviated from Leibniz’s system by replacing his God with themselves. They construed
themselves as the necessary sovereign of the profane. Koselleck writes,
Leibniz’s theological, rational theodicy becomes the rational, historico-philosophical
justification of the new man, the ‘earth god’ who wants to control history. The
Masonic order has become the guardian of the rule of harmony in the universe.75
Such an argument would have likely pleased Wiener, for whom the threat posed by
cybernetics of engendering a ‘World State’ was nothing short of a problem worth
pious works if they served the common wealth.’ Critique and Crisis, 20–21.
72. Letter to Thomas Hobbes (13/22 July 1670), Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 106; Maria
Rosa Antognazza argues that Leibniz comprehensively read Hobbes before doing so even for Descartes,
Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011), 52; There would be a ‘lasting impression of Hobbes on Leibniz’, argues Catherine Wilson, who
notes that as late as 1684, five years after Hobbes’ death, Leibniz had compiled a complete catalogue of
his work. Catherine Wilson, ‘Motion, Sensation, and the Infinite: The Lasting Impression of Hobbes on
Leibniz,’ British Journal for the History of Philosophy 5, no. 2 (September 1997): 341.
73. Leibniz, ‘Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice’, Political Writings, 47.
74. Reinhart Koselleck,Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society (Oxford:
Berg, 1988), 131.
75. Ibid.
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dedicating especially the first edition of the Human Use of Human Beings to.76
How did the Masons, according to Koselleck’s argument, turn Leibniz into a
global and contractless-Hobbes so easily? By creating their ‘earth god’-‘mortal-
god’-‘huge man’ in the image of God dethroned by themselves. By turning the
Masonic order into the God who sits not on the Leviathan’s throne – which despite
its exceptionality and secrecy is inconceivable without the public contract through
which men voluntarily surrender to the sovereign their status as gods in their own
right – but that of Leibniz’s God dethroned. Through casting initiated man in the
image of dead God, which is to say, himself, but no longer himself since that which his
image is a reflection of no longer exists. Both mirror and mirrored images are struck
through: Man is created in the image of God. In such a system, which can certainly not
be attributed to Leibniz himself since the positive being of God provides for him the
theodical ‘virgin spring’ upon which to build the monadology, the necessary truth
which God had assured becomes, as for Hobbes, the contingent truth of men. So too
the global territory of divine ministry which for Leibniz needed no contract, which
if formerly premised on the treasure of a wisdom secret to reason becomes established
through the historical successes of a secret society with imperial ambitions. In their
reflection as the image of God, the men of the Masons transcend from being gods of
a microcosm among microcosms to creating a secret Leviathan, an artificial anterior God
with ambitions for the whole cosmos composed of Mason bodies. But whereas for
Leibniz the reign of God and the moral wisdom of the world is assured by necessary
truth, for the Masons, its assurance rests on the mere fact of their success, a facticity
alike (but not akin) to that of Hobbes’ merely mortal God who can only secure the
good of peace through the artificial fiat of its composition, the social contract. And
whereas for Leibniz, God is (given the principle of non-contradiction) one, in that the
Masons have nothing other than a belief in their own ‘true initiation’ to justify their
sovereignty, what is to stop other such self-assured secret societies from engaging
against them in a backroom struggle, a crypto-politic or crypto-war, for the same
secret crown? The ‘earth god’ of the Masons is a special kind of monster which would
have appalled both Leibniz and Hobbes alike, precisely because it takes leave from
the fusion of their conflicting concepts of image.
76. ‘With the airplane and the radio the word of the rulers extends to the ends of the earth, and very
many of the factors which previously precluded a World State have been abrogated. It is even possible
to maintain that modern communication, which forces us to adjudicate the international claims of
different broadcasting systems and different aeroplane nets, has made the World State inevitable.’ In the
1950 edition these words conclude their chapter, whereas in the second edition Wiener follows on with
a section that somewhat dampens them. Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics
and Society, 1st ed. (London: Eyre / Spottiswoode, 1950), 102; Wiener, HUHBb, 82.
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2.3 A prodigious robot
I shall attempt to show that such a monstrous fusion of Leibniz and Hobbes’ notions
of the image of creation is implicit in Wiener’s own notion. Wiener frames the
theological notion of the ‘image’ around the following rhetorical question,
God is supposed to have made man in His own image, and the propagation of
the [human] race may also be interpreted as a function in which one living being
makes another in its own image. In our desire to glorify God with respect to man
and Man with respect to matter, it is thus natural to assume that machines cannot
make other machines in their own image; that this is something associated with
a sharp dichotomy of systems into living and non-living; and that it is moreover
associated with the other dichotomy between creator and creature.
Is this, however, so?77
which later continues,
Manmakes man in his own image. This seems to be the echo or the prototype
of the act of creation, by which God is supposed to have made man in His
image. Can something similar occur in the less complicated (and perhaps more
understandable) case of the non-living systems that we call machines?
What is the image of a machine? Can this image as embodied in one machine,
bring a machine of a general sort, not yet committed to a particular specific
identity, to reproduce the original machine, either absolutely or under some
change that may be construed as variation? Can the new and varied machine
itself act as an archetype, even as to its own departures from its own archetypal
pattern?
It is the purpose of the present section to answer these questions, and to
answer them by ‘yes.’78
Wiener’s framing is not of Hobbes’ image of humans collectivised into a transcendent
‘mortal God’, but the Leibnizian one of imitating God by means of creating a creature
to whom one’s relationship is that of creator; of imitating God’s image through
constructing an échantillon architectonique and of thereby becoming in regards to it a
patriarchal little God. In so doing ‘man’ the creature becomes ‘Man’ the creator. But
it is not the capacity for humans to be creators of machines (‘to glorify … Man with
respect to matter’) that Wiener sees problematic – this is taken for granted – but rather
the capacity for matter to become creator, machines to reproduce, to become creator
Machines. For the machine itself to transcend its own status as a mere ‘archetypal
pattern’, an échantillon architectonique. But this poses an immediate dilemma: if the
Machine possesses the divine power of creation, then what becomes of Man, no
longer master of machines, but the machine’s competitor?
Writings on the danger of competition between humans and cybernetic machines
have tended to fixate on the threat of automated machines to human labour, or
77. Wiener, God and Golem, Inc., 20.
78. Ibid., 36.
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the persistence of human civilisation as such. Indeed these were certainly major
concerns for Wiener, who, prior to even the publication of The Human Use of
Human Beings made efforts to forewarn that the ‘automatic automobile assembly line’
could provoke disastrous mass-unemployment.79 This echoes Marx’s writings of
the ‘automatic factory’ governed not by humans but a self-regulating automaton
who subordinates human workers to its autocratic subjectivity and tends towards
their elimination.80 It preempts the warnings of Donald N. Michael and the Ad
Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution who would in the early 1960s formalise
the notion of mass unemployment (or ‘disruption’ as Michael puts it) of labour by
computers and cybernetic machines into the term cybernation.81 Evidence suggests
Wiener encountered such a socialist tradition at an early age via his father’s translation
of the great Yiddish labour poet Morris Rosenfeld.82 It also speaks from the related
tradition of science fiction works such as Samuel Butler’s Erewhon (1872), Wiener’s
reading of which emphasising the reduction to slavery of human labour through
its competition with mechanical ‘slaves’.83 Similarly from Karel Čapek’s play R.U.R.
(‘Rossum’s Universal Robots’) which, as Jessica Riskin argues, was more about ‘clones’
in a relation of slavery to their creator than about metallic men.84 Following Riskin,
Čapek’s play, in which robots liberate themselves from human bondage – they win
the competition – was more an indictment against industrial capitalism, and this is
certainly reflected in Wiener’s prologue to its May 1950 performance in Boston,
which, alas, is documented only by a short report published in the New York Times.85
Thomas Reid’s discussion of this event emphasises how Wiener focused on machines
79. ‘Letter to Walter Reuther’, as reproduced in David F. Noble, Progress Without People: New Tech-
nology, Unemployment and the Message of Resistance (Toronto: Between the Lines, August 13, 1995),
161–63; For Noble’s commentary, see pp. 63-64. See also, Norbert Wiener, ‘The Machine Age,’ The
New York Times (New York), May 2013, 7.
80. Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Ben Fowkes, with an introduction by Ernest Mandel, vol. One (1976),
I.XV.4, 544–53.
81. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution, The Triple Revolution (April 6, 1964), 5; Donald
N. Michael, Cybernation: The Silent Conquest (Santa Barbara, CA: Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions, 1962); Donald N. Michael, ‘Automation,’ The New York Review of Books, November 25,
1965, Kline, The Cybernetics Moment, 214–16; Rid, Rise of the Machines, 100–12.
82. Norbert Wiener’s father LeoWiener, who commanded ‘some forty’ languages, was the pioneering
founder in 1896 of Slavic Studies at Harvard University. Among his translations done while Norbert
was a child, was the first translation of Morris Rosenfeld, published as Songs from the Ghetto (1898). The
motif of its opening poem ‘The Sweat Shop’ is the transformation of man into the slave of the machine,
featuring such withering verses as: ‘In its sound I hear only the angry words of the boss; In the two
hands I see his gloomy looks. The clock, I shudder, – it seems to me it drives me and calls me “Machine,”
and cries out to me: “Sew!” ’. Morris Rosenfeld, Songs from the Ghetto, trans., with an introduction by
Leo Wiener (Boston: Copeland / Day, 1898), 3; Wiener recounts his father’s translation of Rosenfeld in,
Wiener, Ex-Prodigy, 55, 146, 235–36; and Norbert Wiener, I Am a Mathematician: The Later Life of a
Prodigy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956), 18, 48.
83. Wiener, Cybernetics, 27; Wiener, HUHBb, 159.
84. Jessica Riskin, The Restless Clock: A History of the Centuries-Long Argument over What Makes Living
Things Tick (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 296–300.
85. W. K., ‘Revival of R. U. R. With New Prologue: Presenting Palomilla As Plato Said,’ The New
York Times (New York), May 7, 1950,
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undermining taking ‘the bread from the mouths of our workers.’86 One could invert
this fear, as Louis Chude-Sokei does, into the ‘late imperial anxieties’ of white masters
fearing that their racialized and therefore mechanised colonised subjects would revolt
against them.87 But whereas Rid portrays Wiener’s prologue to R.U.R. as being
resolutely within a conventional labour tradition, he neglects to mention its closing
remarks.
Wiener opened the Boston performance of R. U. R by reference to the Republic’s
argument that the ship of state should be steered by philosopher kings, calling for ‘poet
engineers’ or ‘engineer poets’ to prevent the condition whereby ‘humanity as a whole
can be ruled by nothing less than men who span the whole of humanity’; how they
would be necessary to ensure that cybernetics is not employed ‘for vain ostentation
or to satisfy the lust for power, [which] can lead only to damnation’, but rather ‘to
some purpose which we recognize as righteous and which transcends all petty private
ambitions.’ This is not an argument reducible to the threat of automation upon
labour; nor is it an existential ‘facile humanism’ of the sort that Gilbert Simondon
critiques.88 It repeats Wiener’s call in The Human Use of Human Human Beings for
philosophers and anthropologists to steer humanity away from the ‘manifold dangers’
of the ‘mechanization of the world as a great super-human apparatus working on
cybernetic principles.’89 Whilst refusing to be oblivious to the very real threat of
machine automation to human labour, Wiener’s claim in his introduction to R. U. R.
is that the real threat of the automaton, the machine made in the image of nature, is
the nature of its human element: economically, that of the owners of new automatic
factories, but moreover politically, those who would exploit the evils of machines
for their own ‘lust for power’ that could globally ‘span the whole of humanity.’
What Čapek’s play reveals via Wiener’s prologue is comparable to Čapek’s Prague
contemporary Franz Kafka’s ‘photo’ of his father as depicted by Deleuze and Guattari:
an image which is ‘expanded beyond all bounds … a political map of the world.’90
But whereas Deleuze and Guattari’s Kafka concerns a psychoanalytically pathological
86. Rid, Rise of the Machines, 83–85.
87. Louis Chude-Sokei, The Sound of Culture: Diaspora and Black Technopoetics (Middletown, Conncti-
cut: Wesleyan University Press, 2016), 16; Louis Chude-Sokei, ‘At the Borders of Flesh: A Secret History
of Race and Technology,’ October 2016, accessed September 12, 2017, https://backdoorbroadcasting.
net/2016/10/louis-chude-sokei-at-the-borders-of-flesh-a-secret-history-of-race-and-technology/.
88. Simondon’s Modes of Existence of Technical Objects is aimed against the ‘primitive xenophobia’
of a ‘facile humanism’ whereby the technical object is construed as a ‘stranger’ of a foreign reality
to man. Whereas Wiener regards automation as a secondary problem consequent of cybernetics,
Simondon altogether denounces the fear of autonomous ‘robots’ as myth and stereotype. Real servitude
for Simondon is not of man to robot, but of alienation from the technical reality which constitutes
human reality. Wiener would be less concerned with such an existential dilemma than the material
relations of domination amongst humans by means of their techniques, as well as their making their
habitat uninhabitable. Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, trans. Cécile
Malaspina and John Rogove (Minneapolis, MN: Univocal, 2017), 15–21
89. Wiener, HUHBb, 158–59.
90. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota, 1986), 9–15.
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‘Oedipalisation of the universe’ which symbolically concerns the author’s father, the
globalisation of the image of a new ‘earth god’ which Wiener’s Čapek depicts is very
real. The image of this machine of damnation is not intended to be an ‘exaggeration’.
It is exactly what is at stake in the Manichean terrain of the cybernetic age, the age
reflected by the image of the internet, which institutes a clamour for power whose
ultimate prize is that of Leibniz’s God, the secret governance of all men. By referring
to Platonic poet engineers, Wiener’s analogy to the ship of state is prescient, since it is
the kybernetes who steers the ship, the cybernetician.
This is the threat of a World State and ‘prodigious Leviathan’ to which the Human
Use of Human Beings is intended to be a warning, as depicted most starkly by Dubarle’s
Le Monde review of Cybernetics of which Wiener was so fond:
The machines à gouverner will define the State as the best-informed player at
each particular level; and the State is the only supreme co-ordinator of all partial
decisions. These are enormous privileges; if they are acquitted scientifically, they
will permit the State under all circumstances to beat every player of a human
game other than itself by offering this immediate dilemma: either immediate
ruin, or planned co-operation. This will be the consequences of the game itself
without violence. The lovers of the best of worlds have something indeed to
dream of!91
What Wiener finds so compelling in Dubarle’s review, which alludes to both
Hobbes and Leibniz by referring to a ‘prodigious Leviathan’ and ‘The lovers of the
best of worlds have something indeed to dream of !’, is his appreciation of Wiener’s
argument concerning the new cybernetic strategic game of power and knowledge,
his emphasis on the ‘human processes which may be assimilated to games’.92 What is
the State but the player who has acquired the most information? Who has imitated
the being of nature, via Leibniz, and has come out a new Hobbes?
Preempting Simondon,93 Wiener argues that Dubarle’s machine à gouverner is
‘not frightening because of any danger that it may achieve autonomous control over
humanity’, since learning machines are ‘helpless by themselves’, but rather because
they,
may be used by a human being or a block of human beings to increase their
control over the rest of the human race or that political leaders may attempt
to control their populations by means not of machines themselves but through
political techniques as narrow and indifferent to human possibility as if they had,
in fact, been conceived mechanically.94
This is a competition of control. How does one compete against a human or block
of humans in the game of control when they have such a vastly superior apparatus
91. HUHBa, 206–09, HUHBb, 155–57.
92. Wiener, HUHBb, 156. Emphasis added.
93. Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 15–21.
94. Wiener, HUHBb, 158–59.
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of communication and control at their disposal? When they have the resources to
combat the ‘information deluge’95 so much more proficiently than you?
It is the ‘symbiosis’ of man and machine that Wiener was fearful of, precisely
the symbiosis which Licklider set out to, and succeeded in, realising. Who opened
Pandora’s box. By inventing the internet, Licklider’s network generalised the plane
of cybernetic conflict across the globe.
Hence the problem of competition with cybernetic machines for Wiener, of
the creator no longer being the master of the machine, as Leibniz intended, but of
a machine having become the master of its creator, as for Hobbes, but without any
sense of contractual legitimacy, is not a competition between human and mechanical
labour but of a generalised competition whose structure and machines are defined by
cybernetics. It is this global and strategic field of competition that I claim orders the
relations between networks, that constitutes an internet. It is this network of networks
which allows a single age or society of control to be spoken of.
2.4 Wiener’s theodicy
Wiener conceives of the operative image through the game of strategy. Today
society is a set of games: the game of the market, politics, diplomacy, war,96 law,97
communication,98 everywhere ‘the game of power and money’.99 That is, they are
relations according to which a theory of strategic games applies. Wiener critically adopts
the operative image of game theory, and axiomatic to his critique is the concept
which we shall discuss in our next chapter, homeostasis.
Wiener frequently invoked the game theory of fellow cybernetician John von
Neumann in his writings with Oskar Morgenstern: ‘an arrangement of players or
coalitions of players each of whom is bent on developing a strategy for accomplishing
its purposes, assuming that its antagonists, as well as itself, are each engaging in the
95. J. C. R. Licklider, ‘The Information Deluge,’The John Hopkins Magazine (Cambridge: MIT Archive,
MC499, box 8), 1967,
96. ‘The market is a game, which has indeed received a simulacrum in the family game of Monopoly.
… Even in the case of two players, the theory is complicated, although it often leads to the choice of a
definite line of play. In many cases, however, where there are three players, and in the overwhelming
majority of cases, when the number of players is large, the result is one of extreme indeterminacy and
instability. The individual players are compelled by their own cupidity to form coalitions; but these
coalitions do not generally establish themselves in any single, determinate way, and usually terminate in
a welter of betrayal, turncoatism, and deception, which is only too true a picture of the higher business
life, or the closely related lives of politics, diplomacy, and war.’ Wiener, Cybernetics, 159, 171.
97. ‘[A] game in which the litigants try by methods which are limited by the code of law to obtain
the judge and the jury as their partners’ Wiener, HUHBb, 98.
98. ‘[Benoît Mandelbrot and Roman Jakobson] consider communication to be a game played in
partnership by the speaker and the listener against the forces of confusion, represented by the ordinary
difficulties of communication and by some supposed individuals attempting to jam the communication.’
ibid., 162.
99. Wiener, Cybernetics, 162; See also, Norbert Wiener, ‘Some Moral and Technical Consequences of
Automation,’ Science 131 (3410 1960): 1355–1358.
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best policy for victory.’100 These strategies include the employment of confusion, bluff
and other ‘jamming forces’. With reference to the terrain envisaged by Dubarle,
Wiener adds, ‘This great game is already being carried on mechanistically, and on a
colossal scale.’101 The state of a society is the state of this game, which is to say, its
strategic arrangement. There are clear Foucaultian intimations in Wiener’s description
of society as a ‘strategic arrangement’ and ‘apparatus’ whereby power and knowledge
converge.
Wiener continues, game theory employs a flawed operative image: ‘von Neu-
mann’s picture of the player as a completely intelligent, completely ruthless person is
an abstraction and a perversion of the facts.’102 ‘Not even the best human brain ap-
proximates to this.’103 This is to say, the game does not function like a ‘single machine’
whereby each side has unlimited capabilities and deals with its cards in the best possible
way.104 A game is not a network. It has no perfect theory since, a priori, ‘Games with
a perfect theory are not interesting’.105 Ticktacktoe is one such example.106 Who
bothers with a game which they know from the outset precisely how to already win?
The game of control is dependent on a certain degree of resistance, where control is
not total, where power is not omnipotent. Burroughs’ paper ‘The Limits of Control’
also makes this point: ‘You don’t control a tape recorder – you use it …When there is
no more opposition, control becomes a meaningless proposition.’107 The competitive
society with players that are not omnipotent, is essentially not a system of ‘use’, of a
‘single machine’, or single network controlling itself, but a game of control among
networks. An internet.
What does this have to do with our topic of the operative image? Wiener admits
that his readers might find his emphasis on games ‘remote’, but insists that it raises
an important theological problem: ‘the problem of the game between the Creator
and a creature.’108 A theory of strategic games is implicit in the operative image, but
once again from a theodical paradigm that returns to the problematics of Leibniz and
Hobbes.
Wiener turns to the Book of Job and Milton’s Paradise Lost, their mutual thread
being the struggle between God and evil, the problem of theodicy: specifically an evil
personified as the Devil. Wiener emphasises that the Devil is ‘one of God’s creatures’,
a reading especially pronounced in Milton’s Paradise Lost, whereby Lucifer is cast as a
100. Wiener, HUHBb, 162–63.
101. Ibid., 158.
102. Ibid., 159.
103. Wiener, Cybernetics, 164.
104. Ibid., 158.
105. Wiener, God and Golem, Inc., 22.
106. Wiener, Cybernetics, 171; Wiener, ‘Some Moral and Technical Consequences of Automation,’
1355–56.
107. Burroughs, ‘The Limits of Control,’ 38.
108. Wiener, God and Golem, Inc., 23.
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fallen angel who leads a revolt against the rule of God and his Son. Now, even though
the Devil is ‘a master of subtlety’, ‘to play a game with an omnipotent, omniscient
God is the act of a fool’, so how can they play against each other? How can God
and Beelzebub compete over Job’s soul or for the liberty of the fallen angels if ‘any
uprising of the rebel angels is foredoomed to failure’? Wiener’s answer is that ‘God is
something less than absolutely omnipotent’. God’s conflict with his creation is very
real, which is to say, the Devil (his creature) has a degree of power and liberty, he
does not ‘derive all its possibility of action from God himself.’109
Theodicy, says Wiener, teaches that in the act of playing a game with one’s
creation, with one’s constructed machine, the ‘inventor has arrogated to himself the
function of a limited creator.’110 To construct a machine with which one can play
against is essentially to diminish one’s potency. Let us phrase this in the (cybernetic)
language employed by Burroughs: to be engaged in a struggle of control (to modify
another’s behaviour) is to admit that you cannot simply use them and that, moreover,
whilst they can neither simply use you, they have the capacity to control you. Control
is an essentially finite, imperfect means of exerting power, with an infinite, endless
potential. The power of a machine à gouverner will never be total, since ‘total control’
is a contradiction in terms. But it can be vastly in excess of one’s own control.
2.5 The Wiener Test
Why is Wiener drawn to the problem of theodicy? Because he has conceived of a
machine which reflects a new universal image of creation which learns, a ‘learning
machine’, and it threatens to make the ‘little god’ of man the creator of a living evil.
The internet itself is a learning machine, which automatically learns the best routes
for its traffic. A network itself, as a microcosm of the entire internet, is also a machine
which learns, doing so for its own gain.
Wiener argues that if one can play a game against another, then they have a life
of their own. This is because they have the capacity to develop a strategy of resistance
against you, however feeble. This is say, they learn.
Wiener is intimating Alan Turing’s famous test, whereby the intelligence of a
machine and its capacity to ‘think’ is accredited through an ‘imitation game’ whereby
the machine must trick a human into believing it to be a fellow human, by means
of formulating an adequately ‘natural’ language conversation over a computer net-
work.111 What might be called the Wiener Test differs from this on a number of
accounts.
Turing’s game takes a binary answer. ‘Can the machine think?’ Yes or No. Either
109. Wiener, God and Golem, Inc., 23–24; See also, Wiener, HUHBb, 165-66.
110. Wiener, God and Golem, Inc., 25.
111. Alan M. Turing, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence,’ Mind 59 (236 1950): 433–460.
2.5. THE WIENER TEST 45
the machine can think because it has fooled the human, or it has not so it cannot.
It is anthropocentric. Human intelligence is construed to be the gold standard of
intelligence. And this human intelligence is that of a universal human subject who, as
Hayles argues, has no embodied and historical situation:112 are we talking about Alan
Turing being the judge of intelligence or a fifteenth century serf who would have
considered a clockwork goose to be alive?
The ‘Wiener Test’, as it might perhaps be called, asks whether a game can be
played against a machine at all, which is to say, whether a mutual contest to alter one
another’s behaviour, to control each other, can be engaged. In this sense it has vastly
lower expectations than the Turing Test, but this is because it refers to an infinity
of degrees of intelligence rather than a binary two. In The Human Use of Human
Beings Wiener plays his game with a kitten. He calls to it and it looks up, registering
his message, changing its behaviour, and thereby being controlled. Then the kitten
‘lets out a pitiful wail’ and it is Wiener who, alerted to its hunger, is controlled, since
it is his behaviour which has been changed.113 This simple sequence exemplifies to
Wiener that the kitten is ‘moderately intelligent’. This is a game that can be played
by humans with their inventions, or God with his. The question of whether a being
can pass for a human in its communication, can ‘speak human’, critical for Turing,
is irrelevant for Wiener. What is at stake for him is rather the degree of intelligence,
which is the same as to say its degree of learning, adaptability and ‘life’. This is to say,
homeostasis.
A being is ‘alive’ if it is an ‘organised system’ which ‘learns’. An organised system
is that system (call it a human, computer, network, organism, kitten or just a ‘box’)
which transforms an incoming message into an outgoing message based on its internal
principle of transformation. Wiener tells us that if, to this principle of transformation,
a criterion of performance or a telos is attributed, and if the principle of transformation
is adjusted so as to tend to generally improve its performance, then it can be said
to ‘learn’. To learn is to adjust the principle by which an input is transformed into
an output in such a way that the output can be said to be better than it had been
formerly.114
Wiener’s first example of this was the coupling of his WWII anti-aircraft predictor
(AA predictor) and the self-regulating organism in ‘Behavior, Purpose, Teleology’
(1943) with Arturo Rosenblueth and Julian Bigelow.115 The AA predictor neatly
materialises this schema: its incoming signal or input is the light from an aeroplane
hitting its photoreceptors over a period of time, recorded as a temporal series in its
112. N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and
Informatics (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1999), xi–xiv.
113. Wiener, HUHBb, 23.
114. Wiener, God and Golem, Inc., 21.
115. Norbert Wiener, Arturo Rosenblueth, and Julian Bigelow, ‘Behavior, Purpose, Teleology,’ Philo-
sophy of Science, no. 10 (1943): 18–24.
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memory; its outgoing message, or output, is a missile; its principle of transformation
which calculates where to fire the missile has as its telos the interception of the
enemy aeroplane. Through successive images received by its photo-receptors, the
AA predictor adapts its principle of transformation so that it chooses the most likely
coordinates of the enemy plane in the time taken for a surface-to-air missile to reach
its altitude; and then it sends an output, so to speak, of its own to the aeroplane, with
the hope of successful delivery.
In the same founding paper this learning machine is depicted as a cat who induces
from observation the ‘extrapolated future position’ of its prey,116 and Wiener would
later write of the ‘very complicated’ outgoing and incoming messages at play when
the kitten swipes at a swinging spool with one paw and then catches it with the
other.117 The capacity for any being, whether human, missile, cat or computer, to
achieve ends by means of learning with respect to their environment or opponent
is the signifier, for Wiener, of its being alive. This is because, following from the
nineteenth century traditions of homeostasis and natural selection, the concept of life
itself is defined as that which is capable of adaptation.
With this chapter I have claimed this to be distinct from two philosophers cast
as representative of the age of clocks, Hobbes and Leibniz, arguing that let loose
is a monstrous fusion of the two akin to Koselleck’s depiction of the early Masons:
an opaque machine through which domination occurs without contract. I have
attempted to show that the ‘operative image’ of cybernetics is the internet, and every
internet is a site of strategic conflict among learning networks which aim towards
the control of other networks. The question now becomes, is society as a whole a
learning machine? Can we speak of homeostasis on the level of the internet itself?
116. Wiener, Rosenblueth, and Bigelow, ‘Behavior, Purpose, Teleology,’ 3.
117. Wiener, HUHBb, 23.
Chapter 3
Engines
‘Information is information, not matter or energy.’1 If the former chapter attempted
to distinguish the operative image of the internet from that of the clock, taking
Hobbes and Leibniz as its representatives, this attempts to do so by means of the steam
engine, which in Canguilhem’s words constitutes the ‘paradigmatic machine’ of the
nineteenth century.2 What distinguishes the engine from the clock in the cybernetic
schema is not its capacity for superior strengths or speeds, but its capacity to ‘take
cognizance of what has already been said’,3 the principle of feedback. In the 1780s
JamesWatt, inspired by developments in British windmills,4 added a mechanism to his
steam engine to automatically regulate its behaviour such that it would automatically
maintain a steady dynamism, increasing and decreasing its inputs of energy in order
to maintain a regular output. This was the ‘flyball governor’ after which Wiener,
Hellenising, named ‘cybernetics’, and on which James Clerk Maxwell wrote in 1868,
in Wiener’s words, ‘the first significant paper on feedback mechanisms’.5 Whereas
according to Wiener the behaviour of the clock is pre-established by the clock maker
and can only be corrected by an external hand, the steam engine can, so to speak, keep
itself alive. The self-regulation of a cybernetic machine is absolutely fundamental
to cybernetics, which reformulates it as the negative feedback loop, the capacity for a
mechanism to oppose or restrain its behavioural output and maintain stability. This is
distinguished from positive feedback loop wherein an output is amplified into instability.
The chapter asks how the thermodynamic and cybernetic operative images differently
interpret self-regulation.
In order to distinguish the concept of self-regulation in the Age of Clocks and
Internet, I shall focus my reading of the operative image of the self-regulating steam
1. Wiener, Cybernetics, 132. Emphasis added.
2. Georges Canguilhem, A Vital Rationalist, ed. François Delaporte, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, with
an introduction by Paul Rabinow (New York: Zone Books, 1994), 85.
3. Wiener, HUHBb, 132.
4. Otto Mayr, The Origins of Feedback Control (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970), 90–108.
5. Wiener, Cybernetics, 11; Wiener, HUHBb, 132; Maxwell, ‘On Governors.’
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engine around the ‘discovery’ of the self-regulating organism by Claude Bernard, the
great French experimental physiologist, and his American follower in the century
to follow, Walter Cannon. The latter would formalise Bernard’s theory into the
prescient term ‘homeostasis’, extend the concept into the social realm, and in the
last months of his life persuade Wiener and Arturo Rosenblueth, with whom he had
coauthored a late work on the automatic regulation of the nervous system,6 to pursue
the ‘line of work’ that would lead to Cybernetics.7 Therein lies a direct genealogy from
Bernard to Cannon to Rosenblueth and Wiener, to each a certain homeostasis of
concepts, but between Cannon and the cyberneticists a fundamental discontinuity.
Homeostasis is not a concept without its adversaries. Significant critiques have
been launched at Wiener’s cybernetics on behalf of those who consider self-regulation
to obscure the self-organising principle of organisms, or who condemn its analogy with
machines, notably N. Katherine Hayles, Francisco J. Varela and Hans Jonas (a former
student of Heidegger). Canguilhem’s critique of the employment of homeostasis
in the social realm is also assessed. I argue that the ambition of every network is to
maintain homeostasis, or ‘negative feedback’, for itself despite the costs to others.
Although Hippocrates taught that the body has a natural propensity to compensate
for illness and heal itself,8 the foundation of the modern concept of self-regulation is
perhaps the invention of the thermometer in 1592, supposedly by Galileo.9 It allowed
Italian physician Sanctorio Sanctorius to note in his De Statica Medicina (1614) the
body’s remarkable capacity to maintain a constant temperature despite illness. As the
instrument’s precision grew with the replacement of water for wine and, by 1670,
mercury, it became possible to accurately measure the temperature of bodies. In
1714 German physicist Gabriel Fahrenheit afforded this temperature to be quantified
through setting the thermometer’s zero-degree to be the temperature of sal ammoniac
in his hometown at winter( ! ), establishing the body’s constant temperature to be
96 degrees. Swedish astronomer Anders Celcius, having constructed a thermometer
of his own, simultaneously conceived of a less arbitrary measurement schema. The
realisation that the temperature of the body not only remained constant but held
the ‘power’ to ‘destroy heat’ and ‘generate cold’ when the ‘atmosphere exceeded
the proper temperature’, and vice versa, heat in the cold, was the discovery of two
6. Walter B. Cannon and Arturo Rosenblueth, Autonomic Neuro-Effector Systems (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1937).
7. This is why it should not be surprising that Rosenblueth and Cannon are the first names mentioned
in the introduction to Cybernetics. See, Wiener, Cybernetics, 1, 16–17.
8. Georges Canguilhem,Writings on Medicine, trans. Stefanos Geroulanos and Todd Meyers (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 72.
9. This paragraph reads from, L. L. Langley, ed., Homeostasis: Origins of the Concept (Stroudsburg,
PA: Dowden, Hutchinson & Ross, 1973), 1–4; And, L. L. Langley, Homeostasis (London: Chapman &
Hall, 1965), 1–10.
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eighteenth century Royal Society members, Charles Blagden (1714-1820) and John
Hunter (1728-1793). The trajectory of these early discoveries was to culminate in the
work of the French experimental physician Claude Bernard.
Bernard would discover the tendency towards a certain ‘fixity’ not only in an
organism’s temperature, but its gastric juices, liver function and nerve dilation.10 By
no later than 1859 had he established his principle, ‘La fixité du milieu intérieur est la
condition de la vie libre.’11 That a ‘higher organism’, a warm blooded animal, possesses
a certain freedom in not being ‘chained’ to the conditions of its environment, because
of its capacity to ‘regulate the harmony’ of its internal environment by means of a
‘compensatory mechanism’ innate to the nervous system: ‘It is the nervous system,
we have said, that provides the mechanism for compensation between intake and
output.’12 We find already here in Bernard’s writings the notion of a self-regulating
mechanism with input and outputs, so fundamental to cybernetics, and this is so
because the organism is conceived being the inner environment [milieu intérieur] with
respect to an outer environment, and the ‘intakes’ and ‘outputs’ function as principles
of traversal. The self-regulating organism is that which is able to compensate for
adjustments for the intake of its outer environment through adjusting the output of
the mechanisms constitutive of its inner environment.
Now, even Canguilhem criticises Bernard for seeming to have ‘forgotten’ that the
‘paradigmatic machine of his era was the steam engine’, after Bernard distinguishes
‘mechanical machines’ from ‘organic machines’ on the basis of the former being ‘fixed’
and ‘immutable’ and the other being ‘flexible’ and ‘elastic’.13 And Hayles argues that
Bernard’s thesis was extended to machines only in the 1940s, presumably meaning
by cyberneticians.14 It seems as though this passage from Bernard’s Introduction to
Experimental Medicine (1865) is what has been forgotten:
A living machine keeps up its movement because the inner mechanism of the
organism, by acts and forces ceaselessly renewed, repairs the losses involved
in the exercise of its functions. Machines created by the intelligence of man,
though infinitely coarser, are built in just this fashion. A steam engine’s activity is
independent of outer physico-chemical conditions, since the machine goes on
working through cold heat, dryness and moisture.15
Exactly as do Hobbes and Leibniz with respect to their operative image, Bernard
construes life to be not even analogous with that of his age, but continuous to a
10. Charles G. Gross, ‘Claude Bernard and the Constancy of the Internal Environment,’ The Neuros-
cientist, September 1998, 380.
11. Langley, Homeostasis, 4.
12. Claude Bernard, ‘Lessons on the Phenomena of Life Common to Animals and Vegetables. Second
Lecture: The Three Forms of Life,’ in Langley, Homeostasis, 129–150, especially 146–47.
13. Canguilhem, A Vital Rationalist, 85–86.
14. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 8.
15. Claude Bernard, Introduction to Experimental Medicine, trans. Henrey Copley Greene, with an
introduction by Lawrence J. Henderson (Henry Schuman, 1949), 121. Emphasis added.
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‘coarser’ degree. It is not only that, following François Madendie and the Ideologues
(A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy and Pierre Cabanis), Bernard was adamant that biology
should contend on the same experimental materialist plane as chemistry and physics,
denying vitalist principles or substantive dualism, although he allowed for emergent
properties from the complexity of matter.16 Or only that the notion of a milieu in
biology stems from the French translation of Newton’s ‘fluid’ (in particular, ether)
which Lamarck and Hippolyte Taine had imported from mechanics into biology.17
It is that the continuity between organism and self-regulating machine is already
there in Bernard’s writings. Wiener did not have to invent this continuity between
homeostatic organism andmachine to depict the organic body in terms of an inorganic
‘inner economy’, whose elements consist in ‘an assembly of thermostats, automatic
hydrogen-ion-concentration controls, governors, and the like, which would be
adequate for a great chemical plant.’18 He was continuing its tradition from Bernard.
It should be added that it was not only on the level of an individual organism with
respect to its environment that the nineteenth century saw this operational image
expressed, the ontogenetic level, but also on level of a collective species adapting itself
with respect to other collectivities, the phylogenetic level. As Wiener knew,19 in the
first paper of the theory of evolution by natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace’s
‘On the Tendency of Varieties to Depart Indefinitely from the Original Type’ (1858)
– which was well known to Charles Darwin20 – the operative image of the steam
engine is also at stake:
The action of this principle is exactly like that of the centrifugal governor of the
steam engine, which checks and corrects any irregularities almost before they
become evident; and in like manner no unbalanced deficiency in the animal
kingdom can ever reach any conspicuous magnitude, because it would make
itself felt at the very first step, by rendering existence difficult and extinction
almost sure soon to follow.21
Gregory Bateson, apparently also unaware of the passage of Bernard’s above,
argues that were Wallace’s passage to have been adequately noted, ‘The whole cy-
bernetics movement might have occurred 100 years earlier’.22 This seems to reveal a
conflation of the operative image of the steam engine and that of the internet, which
I reject. Bateson would not be alone in this however, as we shall see.
16. Gross, ‘Claude Bernard and the Constancy of the Internal Environment,’ 380–81.
17. Georges Canguilhem, ‘The Living and Its Milieu’, in Knowledge of Life, 99–100.
18. Wiener, Cybernetics, 115.
19. Ibid., 36.
20. The claim over authorship of the concept of natural selection between Wallace and Darwin could
well have degenerated into a rancour comparable to that of Leibniz and Newton over the discovery of
calculus, were it not for Wallace’s magnanimous reticence to contest it for himself. Both Wallace and
Darwin received awards for what was frequently referred to as the Darwin-Wallace Theory until into
the twentieth century. Beccaloni, Alfred Russel Wallace and Natural Selection: the Real Story.
21. Wallace, ‘On the Tendency of Varieties to Depart Indefinitely from the Original Type,’ 32.
Emphasis added.
22. Bateson, Mind and Nature, 43.
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3.1 Homeo-stasis/Homo-statics
Walter Bradford Cannon was born in Wisconsin in 1871, seven years after Bernard’s
death in Paris. In the French translation of his major work The Wisdom of the
Body (1932) (though not in the original English edition) he leaves an appropriate
accreditation to Bernard’s influence, writing: ‘The central idea of this book, “the
stability of the inner medium of the organism in higher vertebrates,” is directly inspired
by the precise views and deep understanding of the eminent French physiologist
Claude Bernard.’23
While Bernard may describe the organism in terms of the operative image of
the day, opening up the possibility for its broader application, he does not push his
concept further than the individual organism. Cannon does, applying it as a model
for understanding human behaviour behaviour as such, on an individual and social
level. It is this expansion – albeit one rooted firmly in experimental biology – which
opens the way for cybernetics to project the model of the self-regulating machine
onto all beings, albeit, with a twist. It is Cannon who first describes the self-righting
mechanism as one of ‘learning’, and who in 1926 invents the rich neologism for this,
homeostasis.24 Bernard invents the concept, Cannon invents and extends the term.
What’s in the word, ‘homeostasis’? Cannon explains how he conceived of this
neologism carefully.25 Homeo, from Greek homoio to indicate ‘likeness’ or ‘similarity’,
with their connotations of degrees of variation rather than the ‘fixed’ and ‘rigid con-
stancy’ of homo, ‘sameness’. This is consistent with Jean-Pierre Vernant and Nicole
Loraux’s translations, wherein homoio stands for ‘equality’, ‘alikeness’ and ‘interchange-
ability’.26 And it is consistent with Bernard’s depiction of the organism as ‘elastic’ and
‘flexible’ rather than ‘fixed’ and ‘immutable’.27 Stasis – whose political sense is un-
mentioned though is, as we shall see, implicit – to indicate a condition of immobility
and stagnation that is ‘so peculiarly physiological’ as to warrant distinction from the
‘relatively simple’ division of mechanics known as statics, which is concerned with
physical systems whose ‘action of forces’ totals a certain balanced rest.28 Homeostasis
names the telos of every organism, the criterion of performance of its principle of
transformation. In Bernard’s words: ‘all the vital mechanisms, however varied they
23. Translated by, Langley, Homeostasis, 2. Cannon does, though accredit Bernard within the body
of The Wisdom of the Body, though only on p. 37, and within his essays, notably, ‘Organization for
Physiological Homeostasis’ (1929), pp. 399–400.
24. Walter B. Cannon, ‘Physiological Regulation of Normal States: Some Tentative Postulates Con-
cerning Biological,’ in Selected Readings in the History of Physiology, ed. John Farquhar Fulton (1926),
329–332.
25. Walter B. Cannon, ‘Organization for Physiological Homeostasis,’ in Langley, Homeostasis, 251.
26. Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (London: Methuen, 1982), 61; Nicole Loraux,
The Divided City: On Memory and Forgetting in Ancient Athens, trans. Corinne Pache and Jeff Fort (New
York: Zone Books, 2006), 54.
27. Canguilhem, A Vital Rationalist, 85–86.
28. Cannon, ‘Organization for Physiological Homeostasis,’ 251.
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may be, have only one object, that of preserving constant the conditions of life in the
internal environment.’29 Wiener refers to this as ‘our homeostatic mechanism’.30
Cannon’s careful definition of homeostasis leaves a second concept implicit. If the
living organism is characterised by homeostasis, then the non-living could be said
to be characterised by what might be formulated as ‘homostatics’, with an adjective
form of ‘homostatic’, inverting Cannon’s neologism.31 Such a rigid, unchanging
thing – with the sense of moralism intentional – which returns to precisely the same
position (should it have the energy) might be an appropriate description of the clock.
Hence implicit in the concept by which the operative image of the steam engine is
distinguished, is that which repudiates the operative image of the former age. That
which is homeostatic has an internal source of activity, that which is homostatic
relies on another for its source of dynamism. Is this a difference of degrees or kind?
Certainly for Wiener, the difference between something that has homeostasis and
that which might be attributed with homostatics is one of degrees. The differential of
theses degrees between two things, two networks, is the differential of control of one
over another.
Cannon never seems to appreciate that the very term ‘homeostasis’ implies conflict,
in a fundamentally martial and political sense, although this is anticipated in Bernard’s
writings:
We have said that life cannot be explained, as it has been believed, by the
existence of an internal principle of action acting independently of physico-
chemical forces, and, above all, contrary to them. Life is conflict.32
How is this conflict essential to life to be understood? Scholars of the Greek world,
Vernant and Loraux, have both written on the condition of stasis – civil war – in
Greek society. Homoioi, Vernant writes, designates the equality of ‘men who were
alike’ (emphasis on men) such that they could be interchanged for one another.33 This
equality was such that the Greeks could employ machines to allot jurors by the fall of
black and white marbles.34 Homoioi would become isio, ‘equals’, and the Polis, the
city State, would be structured by isonomia, equal participation of all citizens in the
exercise of power, when Solon, the ‘man of the middle’, would declare debt slavery
void, thereby ending the stasis (civil war) and distributing cratos (sovereignty, power)
29. ‘No more pregnant sentence was ever framed by a physiologist,’ said J. S. Haldane of this in 1922.
Haldane identified the self-regulatory function of breathing and was the father of Wiener’s friend,
J. B. S. Haldane. Bernard, ‘Lessons on the Phenomena of Life Common to Animals and Vegetables.
Second Lecture: The Three Forms of Life,’ 149; Cannon, ‘Organization for Physiological Homeostasis,’
251.
30. Wiener, Cybernetics, 114–15; Wiener, HUHBb, 85–86.
31. I recognise that the adjective might be easily confused with the unfortunate adjectival form of
‘homeostasis’ that Cannon employs, ‘homeostatic’, but I have not been able to find a better term.
32. Bernard, ‘Lessons on the Phenomena of Life Common to Animals and Vegetables. Second Lecture:
The Three Forms of Life,’ 129. Emphasis added.
33. Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought, 61; Loraux, The Divided City, 54–55.
34. On the kleroteria see, http://agathe.gr/democracy/the_jury.html.
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to the demos (the people). The universal isonomia would be equal with respect to the
democratic, public and depersonalised meson (centre) of power, the Agora, which
Vernant’s description of Greece in Anaximander’s map befits: a ‘common mediator
… through which all elements are related’.35 Peace, as annulment of stasis, was not at
the centre of the Polis. ‘The Agora and the battlefield are indissoluble’, says Loraux, at
the centre of the Agora is the agōn.36 Democracy is constituted by citizens taking sides
and standing (histēmi) against one another, for only in doing so can a city divided by
civil war (stasis, whose roots are in histēmi) come back together. The apathetic citizen
will have their rights stripped, ‘he will be politically dead – as if stasis had taken on
the role of civic duty.’37 Stasis is the occasion for the political life of the Polis.38 The
middle around which all are equal, homoioi, is the place where two conflicts, stasis,
two standings, become the single life of the Polis.
But this is a certain kind of conflict that is also the reason for its harmony. Whether
Cannon knew it or not, ‘homeostasis’ as the stasis of the homoioi refers to the conflict
governing the threshold between inside and outside that the living being at any one
moment is. It not only names the life of the organism after Bernard, but the occasion
of the democratic organisation after Solon. In this sense homeostasis names a tense
ambivalence of conflict and harmony, war and accord, inside and out. Bernard would
express this ambivalence when he says:
For us, in a word, life results from a conflict, from a close and harmonious
relation between the external conditions and the pre-established constitution
of the organism. … It is not by warfare against the cosmic conditions that the
organism develops and maintains itself, but on the contrary, by an adaption, an
accord with them.39
I read this ambivalence to reflect the depiction of stasis, civil war, portrayed by
Giorgio Agamben. Rebutting the definition of stasis as meaning a ‘war within the
family’, Agamben argues that it marks a ‘threshold of indifference’ between inside
and outside, home and city, intimate and foreign, and between ‘blood kinship and
citizenship’.40 What could be a better way of describing the relation of milieu intérieur
to the environment outside given that Bernard at first identified the former wholly
with blood,41 so much so that Cannon translates milieu intérieur as ‘fluid matrix’?42
Agamben’s hypothesis is that ‘in the system of Greek politics civil war functions as a
35. Jean-Pierre Vernant,Myth and Thought among the Greeks, trans. Janet Lloyd and Jeff Fort (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 190–208.
36. Loraux, The Divided City, 99.
37. Ibid., 103. See in general, 98–104.
38. Caygill, On Resistance, 9.
39. Bernard, ‘Lessons on the Phenomena of Life Common to Animals and Vegetables. Second Lecture:
The Three Forms of Life,’ 129.
40. Giorgio Agamben, Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm, trans. Nicholas Heron (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2015), 14–15.
41. Gross, ‘Claude Bernard and the Constancy of the Internal Environment.’
42. Cannon, ‘Physiological Regulation of Normal States,’ 399–400.
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threshold of politicization and depoliticization, through which the house is exceeded
in the city and the city is depoliticised in the family.’43 Stasis is a function which
doubly displaces, politicising the household and ‘economising’ (from oikos, house)
the city, interiorising the outside as the inside is exteriorised. It ensures that there is
no isolated ‘substance’ but rather a ‘field incessantly traversed by tensional currents of
politicization and depoliticization, the family and the city’.44 Whereas the homostatic
clock represents peace through acquiescence to another’s control, homeostasis names
the conflict of the constitution of a threshold of interiority and exteriority through
which harmony is expressed. Where life is for Hobbes the result of acquiescence to
the sovereign machine-god, and for Leibniz an acquiescence to the divine wisdom
within, according to the operative image of the steam engine it is the conflict itself.
This will provide the basis for the kind of conflict of network through which an
internet is defined.
Though I wish to construe the stasis of homeostasis and Bernard’s claim that ‘life is
conflict’ along the lines of Vernant, Loraux and Agamben, it should be noted that
although Bernard wrote of the ‘social life of cells’ he refused to enlarge his system of
the constancy of the milieu intérieur beyond the level of the experimentally-observable
organism itself, and he even shirked, for the same reason, from applying it to the
organism on a phylogenetic level, as regards the evolution of species. This is why he
writes of fixed and inflexible ‘pre-established laws’, analogous to the laws of matter,
which determine the ideal type, the universality, of vital phenomena in respect of their
real instantiation given the conditions of their environment.45 These pre-established
laws are vestiges of clockwork mechanism, for Bernard the milieu still contains the
Newtonian laws of matter. Perhaps this position was over-determined by his efforts
to refute Bichat’s vitalist argument that the organism contrasts to physical phenomena
through its anarchic irregularity.46 Nevertheless, despite the singular prestige Bernard
met in his lifetime for his work founding experimental biology, comparable within
France to Einstein’s around the world in the century to follow, it was only when the
profound collective phylogenetic significance of his ideas caught on fifty years after
his death that the ontogenetic thesis which is today considered synonymous with his
name came to any significant attention at all.47 Bernard provided not only a concept
but the origins of a programme, a homeostasis of concepts, which would draw into
43. Agamben, Stasis, 16. Agamben’s emphasis removed.
44. Ibid., 23.
45. Bernard, ‘Lessons on the Phenomena of Life Common to Animals and Vegetables. Second Lecture:
The Three Forms of Life,’ 129.
46. Georges Canguilhem, Knowledge of Life, trans. Stefanos Geroulanos and Daniela Ginsberg (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 122–25.
47. Gross, ‘Claude Bernard and the Constancy of the Internal Environment,’ 383–84.
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its interior concepts first from an evolutionary biological register and then from a
social one. The collective, phylogenetic, significance of homeostasis as an evolution
of organisms would lead to the idea of a collective homeostasis in the social lives of
humans.
The process by which the age of the engine’s image of the ontogenetic and
phylogenetically homeostatic organism came to supplant the homostatic clockwork
organism (or ‘divine machine’) that commanded over the age of the clocks occurred
through a succession of evolutionary biological writings in the first decades of the
twentieth century. Through their studies of the salt content of marine life, Léon
Fredericq, René Quinton and Archibald Macallum would begin the process of de-
picting phylogenetic evolution as the increasing sophistication of the milieu intérieur’s
regulatory capacity with respect to its environment.48 Arguments continuous with
their thesis but in regards to mammals would be made by William Bayliss and Ernest
Starling, discoverers of the first hormone, Joseph Barcroft and J. S. Haldane, pioneers
of the regulatory functions of breathing, and Charles Scott Sherrington, a founder
of modern neurophysiology.49 These writers would supple the eternal laws Bernard
believed legislated the constitution of every organism, vestiges of the clock, into an
elastic phylogenetic homeostatic mechanism, whereby the very life of a species would
depend on the relentless redrafting of its laws to meet new circumstances. They
would unite the entire life of the organism in its individual and collective instantiation
as homeostatic. This would allow Canguilhem to write of Darwin:
[To] live is to submit an individual difference to the judgement of the ensemble
of living beings. This judgement has only two possible outcomes: either death
or becoming oneself part of the jury for a while. So long as one lives, one is
always judge and judged.50
Is not the kind of law produced by this stasis of the homoio, when the jury decrees either
assimilation or death, not the peace treaty where there is no sovereign contract? This
puts to rest the operative image of the clock in the sense of Hobbes’ pre-established
contract with the sovereign, and Leibniz’s pre-established harmony of monads.
If homeostasis in the ontogenetic sense implies the conflict through which every
living thing is permeated by its environment, then on a phylogenetic level it means the
defined status of the collective itself is at stake. What is at stake is the very consistency
of the organism in its molecular and molar state, which both become elastic.
Even so, still an organism is of a single, if shifting species. Still it is an ‘individual’.
When this becomes a homeostasis of networks according to the third operative image,
not only will every network conflict in homeostatic ‘harmony’ with every other, but
their allegiances become myriadic, no longer bound to a single species, but rather in
48. Ibid., 384.
49. Ibid.
50. Georges Canguilhem, ‘The Living and its Milieu’, Knowledge of Life, 105.
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overlapping, shifting, paradoxical internets. Let us see how the operative image of
the homeostatic engine is seen to play out in the realm of human society.
3.2 Cannon’s social homeostasis
The move from the homeostasis of the organism to the homeostasis of the social
organism, from the body organic to the body politic, was especially pronounced in the
concept’s American reception. In his 1935 ‘physiologist’s interpretation’ of Vilfredo
Pareto’s Trattato di sociologia generale (1916), J. B. Henderson, the American translator
of Bernard’s Introduction, argues that the theory of regulation and homeostasis in an
organism agree with Pareto’s argument that after small disturbances (short wars, minor
epidemics and other lesser catastrophes) a social system ‘will tend to restore the original
state, very slightly modified by the experience.’51 This was an argument premised on
the epilogue to Cannon’s Wisdom of the Body (1932), entitled ‘Relations of Biological
and Social Homeostasis’. In Cannon’s book homeostasis is posed not as conflict, but a
collective emancipation from conflict itself. Cannon not only wrote of the conventional
homeostatic mechanisms of an organism (regulation of body temperature, acidity,
etc.) but of homeostatic behaviours such as shivering, seeking shelter and wearing
coats. Ultimately these develop Bernard’s description of the self-regulating organism
as ‘free’ with respect to its external environment into the liberty of the individual
human with respect to their society, doing so through positing a harmony of body
and body politic: ‘steady states in society as a whole and steady states in its members
are closely linked.’52
Cannon is able to expand from the life of the individual organism to that of
the social human because he construes homeostasis in the anthropomorphic sense
of a process of ‘learning’ – ‘the use of the word “learned” is not unwarranted’, he
emphasises53 – specifically the learning of ‘self-righting mechanisms’.54 There is
a wisdom to the body. According to Cannon, life, liberty, learning, wisdom and
rightness (or, to say the same, truth) are all bound to one another in the concept of
homeostasis. The concept therefore does not, for him, entail a conflict of all against
all, but the prospect of a collectively beneficent liberation, a phototropism in which
a society advances towards a collective self-rightness by means of its phylogenetic
learning. As the most evolved organism, that with the greatest capacity for learning
and self-righting, humans hold the capacity for improving such mechanisms. They
can engender a universal social homeostasis.
‘The main service of social homeostasis’, Cannon writes, ‘would be to support
51. Lawrence J. Henderson, Pareto’s General Sociology: A Physiologist’s Interpretation (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1935), 46.
52. Walter B. Cannon, The Wisdom of the Body (London & NY: W. W. Norton, 1939), 323.
53. Ibid., 22–23.
54. Ibid., 25.
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bodily homeostasis.’55 If Bernard shows homeostasis to liberate the individual organism
from a ‘constant danger of disaster’ and the ‘management of the details of bare existence’
through its automatic ‘correction’ of itself, then social homeostasis should liberate
the individual from the ‘slavery’ of their own constant attention to disaster so as to
become, says Cannon, ‘free to enter into agreeable relations with our fellows, free to
enjoy beautiful things, to explore and understand the wonders of the world about us,
to develop new ideas and interests, and to work and play, untrammelled by anxieties
concerning our bodily affairs.’56 Social homeostasis releases ‘the highest activities of
the nervous system’ from the bare existence of fending for themselves as individuals,
and onto instead ‘adventure and achievement’. From ‘essential needs’ to ‘priceless
inessentials’.57
I read this as Cannon arguing: it is social homeostasis which relieves the individual
from Hobbes’ state of nature and stasis of all against all, wherein there is no industry,
culture, arts, letters, society, where there is ‘continual fear and danger of violent
death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’58 That is, the
operative image of the homeostatic steam engine provides a challenge for the need for
a Leviathan. Where Hobbes prescribes a homostatic clockwork body politic whose
logic is pre-established, to which all must submit as cogs in order to live free from
the slavery of averting the constant threat of death, Cannon suggests that the body
politic automatically regulates itself due to an innate wisdom, albeit one which will
be improved through the natural ‘learning’ of humankind, like a species of fish that
evolves more effective gills.
Perhaps this automatic regulation is akin to Leibniz’s pre-established harmony.
Instead of the perfect clockmaster God’s having established every event in advance by
means of his divine wisdom, wisdom is innately within the body politic itself. Not in
a prescribed homostatic sense, but in its automatic homeostatic self-adjustment. Ours
– yes, even in the year of The Wisdom of the Body’s publication, 1932 – would be
the ‘best of possible worlds’, because it is the expression of human society’s innate
wisdom. As Bernard retained an element of Newton’s mechanism through his holding
to the pre-established laws governing a species, Cannon could be said to cling on
to the moral wisdom which the clockmaster God has pre-established in the world
itself. Perhaps this is why he does not consider conflict to be implicit and essential to
homeostasis. As we shall see, Wiener will eradicate any sense of an innate wisdom in
the social world, and networks shall strive for their own homeostasis.
Now, the wisdom which individual and social homeostasis aspires to ensure is
stability: ‘The organism suggests that stability is of prime importance.’59 Stability is more
55. Ibid., 323.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Hobbes, Leviathan, I.13, 113.
59. Cannon, The Wisdom of the Body, 315–17.
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important than private property or economy. There is in this a justification for a
certain state of exception, again, pulling us back to Hobbes for whom the Leviathan
ultimately demands obedience at all cost, rather than Leibniz for whom the state
should reflect divine wisdom in its judgement. Stability at all costs.
What does this mean? Cannon argues that whereas the milieu intérieur of the body
is carried by blood and lymph, that of the body politic consists in rivers, roads, trains
and boats.60 He echoes Harold A. Innis who simultaneously argued such a principle
in his classic study The Fur Trade in Canada (1930) to show that the frontiers of Canada
had been constituted by the riverine routes of the beaver trade.61 The ventricles of
the body politic are the principles of its order. For Cannon the life of the social body
derives from the humans who flow through its veins. They are its water, salts and
sugar. Hence, just as ‘The organism throws away not only water and salts, but also
sugar, if they are present in excess in the fluid matrix’,62 individual humans should be
prepared to sacrifice themselves for the greater benefit of the homeostatic stability of
society.
Certainly Cannon describes a number of unexceptional means for stabilising the
body politic in the face of crises, the storage of foodstuffs, etc.63 But he also insists on
the control of its population and borders. He writes, ‘[Any] wisdom which the human
organism has to offer to the social organism would be based on the provision of a
population which is adjusted to reasonably assured means of subsistence and which is
undisturbed by large increases from either local or foreign sources.’64 This, in 1932.
Further, like the natural turnover of cells after they have served their course, ‘Death
means ridding society of old members in order to yield places for the new. A State or
a nation does not need to contemplate its own end, because its units are ceaselessly
refreshed.’65 Cannon’s homeostatic body politic supposedly ends the instability of the
war of all against all; but it does so at the cost of the Malthusian self-sacrifice of its
constituent members.66
60. Cannon, The Wisdom of the Body, 313–315.
61. Beginning with ancient Egypt’s Nile and ending with the rivers of Canada, Innis writes of rivers
as principles of centralised order which have provided the conditions of possibility for the creation
of society and state: its labour, institutions, solidarity. The centralisation which the river imposes is
contested by the decentralisation imposed by other kinds of communication networks, notably today,
mass media. For Innis, rivers, railways and roads are essential networks through which a society is
produced; but, unlike Cannon, he would insist on the different orders each would impose. On the basis
of this paradigm, Marshall McLuhan would formulate his famous dictum ‘The medium is the message’
(or ‘mass-age’), writing in The Gutenberg Galaxy, ‘Harold Innis was the first person to hit upon the process
of change as implicit in the forms of media technology. The present book is a footnote of explanation
to his work.’ Harold A. Innis, Empire & Civilization, ed. David Godfrey (Victoria & Toronto: Press
Porcépic, 1986), 12, 176; Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 50.
62. Cannon, The Wisdom of the Body, 317.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 319.
65. Ibid., 320.
66. If the reputation of Malthusianism on the Continent during and after the rise of Nazism needs
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3.3 Canguilhem’s critique of social homeostasis
I will now turn to Canguilhem’s critique of Cannon’s social homeostasis. His translat-
ors Stefanos Geroulanos and Todd Meyers argue that ‘a quiet target’ of this critique is
Wiener’s cybernetics.67 This is a reasonable assessment to make given that Cannon
pushed Wiener to pursue his research on cybernetics, given that the final chapter of
Cybernetics (first ed.) concerns homeostasis in society, given that the Human Use of
Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society is an extended treatment on the theme, and
given that in 1951 Wiener wrote a paper ‘Homeostasis in the Individual and Society’,
where he argues, ‘The body politic is not without homeostasis, or at least the intention
of having homeostasis’.68 But it seems to me that construing Cannon’s notion of social
homeostasis to be continuous with Wiener’s is to fail to notice the fundamental break
that occurs between them, that is, between the homeostasis of the steam engine and
that of a network. It mixes operative images. It neglects to notice how for Wiener
the body politic is expressively anti-homeostatic.
In 1955, before an audience one presumes would have been sympathetically weary
of the depiction of the State as an organic body (L’alliance Israélite Universelle69), Cang-
uilhem presented ‘The Problem of Regulation in the Organism and Society’.70 This is
a critique of the final chapter of Cannon’s The Wisdom of the Bodywhich despite being
described by Canguilhem as ‘the weakest part of his book’ and having resulted from
‘the temptation that the scientist shares with the common man, which is to import into
sociology this magnificent concept of regulation and homeostasis’,71 it nevertheless
provokes from him an impassioned and productive argument which has been read by
his translators as a veiled attack on Wiener’s cybernetics.72 Canguilhem’s argument
draws on Bergson’s The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932), published the
illustration: Wiener’s own eight-page meditation on Malthus in the Human Use of Human Beings would
be silently redacted from its 1942 German translation, despite the section containing the book’s entire
discussion of Lamarckian and Darwinian evolution. Everything from ‘This entire question of balance of
population…’ (p. 48) to ‘What shall we do?’ (p. 56) is absent from the influential German translation of
the first edition of HUHB (1950), published as Mensch und Menschmaschine: Kybernetik und Gesellschaft
(1952). Given that the same section reappears in Wiener’s second edition of HUHB (1954), it is doubtful
that Wiener would have intended for this to be the case. And given that his German translator Gertrud
Walther, who also translated cyberneticist W. Grey Walter’s The Living Brain (1953), was judicious
enough to list her translations of Wiener’s cybernetic vocabulary in her introduction, it seems unlikely
that this was an innocent omission.
67. Canguilhem, Writings on Medicine, 20.
68. Norbert Wiener, ‘Homeostasis in the individual and society,’ Journal of the Franklin Institute 251,
no. 1 (January 1951): 65–68.
69. The philosopher andHellenist Pierre-Maxime Schuhl had furnished his invitation, Canguilhem says.
(p. 67) One wonders whether Emmanuel Levinas may have been in attendance, since he administered
and taught at the Alliance from the 1930s on.
70. Canguilhem,Writings on Medicine, 67–78. As Pasquinelli argues, Canguilhem’s critical reading
must be understood ‘against the background of the German Lebensphilosophie and the catastrophe of
Nazi Staatsbiologie. Matteo Pasquinelli, ‘What an Apparatus is Not: On the Archeology of the Norm in
Foucault, Canguilhem, and Goldstein,’ Parrhesia, no. 22 (May 2015): 86.
71. Canguilhem, Writings on Medicine, 75.
72. Ibid., 18–21.
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same year as The Wisdom of the Body and written at the same time in the same city,
Paris.73
The essence of Canguilhem’s argument is encapsulated by a claim which directly
targets the title of Cannon’s book: ‘There is no social wisdom in the way there is a
wisdom of the body.’74 Perhaps alluding to such ominous Malthusian implications
as above, Canguilhem pleads to be ‘vigilant toward all these comparisons [between
organism and society] whose consequences you can guess.’75 Society is not an organ-
ism, it is a machine or tool. Canguilhem uses his paper to insist on this argument
repeatedly. The difference concerns purposivity:
What defines the organism is precisely that purpose [finalité], in the form of its
totality, is present to it and to all its parts. I apologise – I will perhaps scandalise
you but society has no proper purpose; a society is a means; a society is more on
the order of a machine or of a tool than on the order of an organism.76
The purposive quality inherent in an organism, which an organism is and which a
society and a machine are said to lack, is precisely its capacity to self-regulate. Homeo-
stasis shows that an organism is capable of resolving – ‘on its own’ – a contradiction
between stability and modification because the entire organism is directed towards
what is an obvious stable state, its health. ‘We all know and agree what a sick organism
is; the ideal of a sick organism is a healthy organism of the same species.’77 The ideal
of the organism, that which is defined by the tendency to self-regulate, is to be itself,
which is to say, homeostasis.78
Yet there is no agreement, Canguilhem insists, as to the ideal of a ‘social organ-
ism’. It is true that a society may bear resemblance to an organism, as ‘organicists’
emphasise.79 But it can neither be an individual, since it does not express in its total-
ity its purposive self-regulation, nor can it be a species, since ‘it is, as Bergson says,
closed’. Bergson distinguishes the closed society ‘in which we live’ from the open
society of ‘humanity’ which society differs from in kind, but towards which it seeks
to overcome itself.80 This lets Canguilhem categorically discern, ‘Human societies
are not the human species’. Being neither individual nor species a society is ‘a being
of an ambiguous genus, is as much a machine as it is a living thing’. Not being an
73. Canguilhem, Writings on Medicine, 74.
74. Ibid., 77.
75. Ibid., 78.
76. Ibid., 76.
77. Ibid., 70.
78. Cannon’s own definition of health agrees with Canguilhem’s: ‘Perhaps as good a concept of health
as any is that of the condition of the body in which, when the body is at rest, the various organs continue
their functions at a moderate rate, and in which disturbance or stress is met promptly and is followed
fairly promptly by a return of the organs to their former moderate activity.’ Walter B. Cannon, Digestion
and Health (London: Martin Secker & Warburg, 1937), 90.
79. All Canguilhem references and quotes in this paragraph and the next come from ‘The Problem of
Regulation in the Organism and in Society’, Writings on Medicine, 76–78.
80. Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra, Cloudesley
Brereton, and W. Horsfall Carter (New York: Henry Holt / Company, 1935), 24.
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organism it has no self-regulation and its existence and organisation is dependent on
human design. ‘It simply represents a means, a tool’, a ‘type of apparatus that is not
inherent in social life as such; it is a historical acquisition, a tool that a certain society
gave itself.’ Regulation is ‘added on’ to it rather than being its essence. One is not
spontaneously wise simply because one sees with the eyes and ‘one is not wise in the
way that one sees with one’s eyes’. Wisdom and justice, the justice of ‘the supreme
regulation of social life’ and the wisdom to pursue it, are innate to the organism as
organism. To the social organisation they must be attained. ‘One must become wise,
one must become just.’81 Society will not return to a wise and just state of its own
accord since it is a tool for which such ideals and mechanisms are not innate.
What then is the ‘normal state’ of a society according to Canguilhem, if that of
the organism is inborn equilibrium, moderation and control, the balance of health?
‘Disorder and crisis.’ This is why society imposes on itself ‘historical inventions’ such
as the ‘parliamentary apparatus’ whose end is to ‘channel discontent’. ‘Justice has to
come from elsewhere’.82
Now, before I make a defence of Wiener’s critical notion of social homeostasis against
Canguilhem – if Wiener is indeed his target – I wish to take a pause. The reason is
that the very notion of homeostasis itself – irrespective of it being a social concept or
not – has come under attack by the Second Order (or Wave) Cybernetics movement
and I see it necessary to take their criticism into consideration before continuing with
Wiener’s concept. I ask for the readers patience in this movement, as now, after raising
Canguilhem’s critique of social homeostasis, seems to me the least awkward moment
to engage their criticisms. I shall also take an avowedly unconventional reading of the
Second Order critique, starting with the under-recognised critique of Hans Jonas, a
former student of Heidegger. His ‘Critique of Cybernetics’ (1953) is not only forceful
from a philosophical perspective, but productive of his concept of metabolism, which
preempts the major Second Order Cybernetic concept of autopoiesis by Humberto R.
Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, who I read alongside N. Katherine Hayles. Both
metabolism and autopoiesis operate as critiques of homeostasis, standing in its place
so to speak. So I shall cast out first to Jonas’ critique of cybernetics, then Maturana,
Varela and Hayles’ critique, then, making an ‘about turn’ I shall offer a defence against
their critiques, arguing that Hayles takes her important argument from a flawed one
by Mayr, before finally returning to Canguilhem’s critique of social homeostasis.
81. Canguilhem, Writings on Medicine, 78.
82. Ibid., 76–78.
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3.4 Second order critiques of homeostasis
Hans Jonas: metabolism
If, as Canguilhem says, at the turn of the 1930s Cannon and Bergson ‘encounter
the same problem’ from divergent backgrounds in biology and philosophy,83 then
in the ‘cybernetic moment’ in the years following the publication of The Human
Use of Human Beings the same can be said for Canguilhem and Hans Jonas.84 And
if Canguilhem takes aim at the final argument of cybernetics in which the self-
regulative purposivity of the organism is enlarged onto a society, through denying
that machines have essential purposes and depicting society as a machine, then Jonas
tries to sink cybernetics on launch through the analogy of the Anti Aircraft Predictor
and the organism by similarly arguing that whereas the organism is concerned with
self-preservation, the tool’s only intrinsic end is its own death.85
There is an aggression to Jonas’ ‘A Critique of Cybernetics’ (1953) which he
almost apologises for, an urgency to an intervention against a literature ‘which
fortunately is not yet too bulky.’86 Why? On the one hand he considers its own end
to be the capture of philosophy: ‘[Cybernetics] is not the innocent special science
which seduces susceptible philosophy by its passive beauty: from its inception it has
been out to capture her.’87 This not unlike his (repudiated) master Heidegger, who
would in exactly the same year write of modern technics as a violent ‘enframing’
(Gestell) of being.88 On the other hand, like Canguilhem, his ultimate concern is
the society constituted in the image of cybernetics. For the cyberneticians, Jonas
writes, ‘society is a communication network for the transmitting, exchanging, and
pooling of information, and it is this that holds it together.’89 This image implies
a mass denial of ethical responsibility: ‘the cybernetician looks at his objects in a
theoretical situation somewhat like the practical situation in which our commander
83. Georges Canguilhem, ‘The Problem of Regulation in the Organism and in Society’, Writings on
Medicine, 74.
84. A Jewish former student of Husserl, Heidegger and Rudolf Bultmann who voluntarily fought for
the British in WWII, Jonas had composed the standard philosophical works on Gnosticism for much of
the twentieth century prior to the War (later compiled into The Gnostic Religion (1958)) before making
a fundamental reattunement whilst fighting towards the philosophy of the organism, his major work
being The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (1966). What drove this transformation
was the tension between the crisis of human society – the radically dualistic struggle of Gnosticism
having been ‘the classic case of a human crisis on a large historical scale’ – and the organism – an
‘insoluble fusion of inwardness and outwardness’ which provides the paradigm for a reintegration of
‘fragmented ontology into a uniform theory of being.’ See, Hans Jonas, Philosophical Essays: From
Ancient Creed to Technological Man (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974), Introduction.
85. Hans Jonas, ‘Critique of Cybernetics,’ Social Research 20, nos. 2/4 (1953): 172–192.
86. Ibid., 190, 174.
87. Ibid., 190.
88. Martin Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ in The Question Concerning Technology
and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (Harper Perennial, 1977).
89. Jonas, ‘Critique of Cybernetics,’ 191.
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looks at his subordinate.’90 That is, as an extension of his own command, a ‘tool’ or a
‘robot’, tools and robots being synonymous for Jonas since each depends for its telos on
being used by another. The cyberneticians imagine a society where everyone receives
orders as inputs and mindlessly performs them as outputs, with none outside of this
society of total control, and no ultimate controller.
The philosophical novelty of cybernetics, argues Jonas, is its attempt to present
a ‘unified theory of mechanism’ which would resolve the Cartesian bifurcation of
substances into matter and soul, a ‘unified conceptual scheme, for the representation
of reality.’91 It does this through purporting that the servo-mechanism is a new kind
of mechanism which, unlike the ‘slaving giant’ of the steam engine, is ‘perceptive,
responsive, adaptive, purposive, retentive, learning, decision-making, intelligent, and
sometimes even emotional.’92 The fundamental concepts of this schema are purpose
and teleology. The cyberneticians argue that their anti-aircraft predictor functions
by the same teleological function, namely ‘negative feedback’, as a hand lifting a glass,
and when it oscillates too far and misses they depict it as akin to a sufferer of purpose
tremors, a ‘positive feedback’ which does fail to regulate its behaviour.93
Now what is meant by ‘purposeful behaviour’ hinges on the meaning of ‘final
condition’, the telos towards which a purpose is directed. The cyberneticians write,
‘the term purposeful is meant to denote that the act or behavior may be interpreted as
directed to the attainment of a goal – i.e. to a final condition in which the behaving
object reaches a definite correlation in time or in space with respect to another object
or event.’94 What do the cyberneticians mean by ‘final’ if the cybernetic feedback loop
means a constant readjustment of its behaviour such that no point is ever final? A circle
has no end. Therefore by ‘final’ one can only understand ‘the condition in which
the action ends’.95 If this is the case then the end of an organism, its innate purpose,
would be maximum entropy and death, like a watch whose spring has wound down.
The only way to break the feedback loop with a causa finalis, which is really what is at
stake, is for the supposedly self-regulating machine to be controlled from elsewhere,
like a hand that winds up its timepiece. But if this hand itself needs a hand, if every
cybernetic machine recursively needs an external input, like an endless bureaucratic
machine, like Kafka’s Castle, then ‘Cybernetics is an attempt to account for purposive
behavior without purpose.’96
Jonas’ argument against cybernetic teleology clearly incorporates that of a young
analytic philosopher named Richard Taylor, published in 1950 and discussed by
90. Ibid., 188.
91. Ibid., 175.
92. Ibid., 174–75.
93. Jonas, ‘Critique of Cybernetics,’ 176; Jonas is reading from, Wiener, Rosenblueth, and Bigelow,
‘Behavior, Purpose, Teleology,’ , with this example being from pp. 2–3.
94. Wiener, Rosenblueth, and Bigelow, ‘Behavior, Purpose, Teleology,’ 1.
95. Jonas, ‘Critique of Cybernetics,’ 177.
96. Ibid., 185.
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Galison and Hayles.97 Taylor argues that purposivity for Wiener, Rosenblueth and
Bigelow ignores the causa efficiens and means merely the culmination of an empirically
observable sequence of events. Taylor likens their concept of teleology to the end
point of a roulette wheel. Jonas incorporates Taylor’s argument but what makes his
paper more significant and interesting is that beyond posing a mere critique, Jonas
produces a far-reaching concept in the process. In actuality, says Jonas, the living
organism, far from tending towards death, is alive and is free in respect of others
because it cannot but metabolise. This elemental urge to renew itself, to constitute,
preserve and reproduce its life is essential to the organism.98
A machine may be attributed by negative feedback (homeostasis), but it does
not care if it is and so it will not strive to do so. This care to live, this conatus, is
metabolism and is unique to organisms.99 An organism has no choice but to live
and to be independent, since to live is to metabolise, to produce energy, to generate
and to regenerate every part of itself. ‘Metabolism can very well be considered as
the defining quality of life: every living being has it, no nonliving being has it.’100
‘There is no analogue in the machine to the instinct of self-preservation – only to the
latter’s antithesis, the final entropy of death.’101 In metabolisation ‘the liberty of life is
itself its peculiar necessity.’102 It enjoys a freedom ‘with respect to its own substance’,
with the substance it has come to possess, in not sharing an identity with the total
sum of its parts; an independence from a substance which it nevertheless wholly and
essentially consists in, which it has no freedom to speak of. This is all to say that
the concept of metabolism distinguishes organism and machine, and therefore breaks
the cybernetic analogy (Jonas too does not know about Bernard’s analogy with the
engine). It identifies that which is most essential to the organism to be metabolism, and
this is a wholly internal quality which pays no reference to an outside.
Metabolism, we could add, constitutes a positive freedom which contrasts with
the negative freedom of homeostasis. Metabolism is not concerned with being free
from environmental changes, as per homeostasis, but free for the production of the
self. This is an attribute which distinguishes the organism from the machine, and it
anticipates by two decades the concept of autopoiesis.
97. Richard Taylor, ‘Comments on a Mechanistic Conception of Purposefulness,’ critique of cybernet-
ics, galison and hayles write about, Philosophy of Science, 17 1950, 310–17; Richard Taylor, ‘Purposeful
and Non-Purposeful Behavior: A Rejoinder,’ Philosophy of Science, 1950, 327–32; Peter Galison, ‘The
Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision,’ Critical Inquiry 21 (1994): 249-52;
Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 95–97.
98. Jonas, ‘Critique of Cybernetics,’ 190–91.
99. Jonas develops the notion of metabolism with respect to Spinoza and conatus in, Hans Jonas,
‘Spinoza and the Theory of Organism,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy, April 1965,
100. Jonas, Organismus und Freiheit. Ansätze zu einer philosophischen Biologie, 1973, p. 83; as translated
in Francisco J. Varela and Andreas Weber, ‘Life after Kant: Natural Purposes and the Autopoietic
Foundations of Biological Individuality,’ Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2002): 112
101. Ibid., 191.
102. On metabolism see also Jonas’ essays ‘Biological Foundations of Individuality,’ 194–195, and
‘Spinoza and the Theory of Organism,’ 47.
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Varela, Hayles: Autopoiesis
Themetabolic and necessarily free concept of the organism advanced by Jonas’ critique
of cybernetics ‘already in the early 1950s and in an astonishing way precedes and
philosophically extends the findings of autopoiesis’, writes the co-author of the latter
concept, Francisco J. Varela in 2002.103 This is no minor point. Autopoiesis is the
concept whichHumberto R.Maturana would coin and jointly publish with his student
Varela in the extended essay, ‘Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living’ (1972),
concisely formalising into a single word the advance to a ‘mature phase’ (as Hayles puts
it) of the institution known as ‘second order cybernetics’.104 Jonas’ metabolic critique
of cybernetics implies the autopoietic organism, defined by Maturana and Varela as
that which ‘generates and specifies its own organization through its operation as a
system of production of its own components, and does this in an endless turnover
of components under conditions of continuous perturbations and compensation of
perturbations.’105
Autopoietic machines are autonomous. Everything they change and produce is
internal to themselves, whereas their other, the allopoietic machine (from Gk. állos,
other), produce things external to themselves. Autopoietic machines are individual
since they produce nothing but themselves. Their identity is not effected from the
outside by an external observer, since to observe an autopoietic machine is to enter its
network of productions, to produce and be produced. Allopoietic machines, which
produce external things, lack individuality because their production depends on being
observed. Autopoietic machines are unities because through their self-production
they determine their own boundaries; whereas the boundaries of allopoietic machines
are determined by their observer. Autopoietic machines are not constituted through
inputs and outputs, and therefore if they are ‘perturbed by independent events’ then
they may or may not ‘compensate these perturbations’ with internal changes that may
or may not be identical to their perturbations and must not therefore be considered
as effects of an external actor, but autonomous self-productions. They are singular,
since incomparable. They are ‘circular organisations’, albeit unlike the ones Jonas
characterises that which came to be known as ‘Wiener’s cybernetics’, since their entire
organisation is what Jonas considers to be purposive – although such language, argue
Maturana and Varela, is in itself that of an allopoietic observer.106
Hayles emphasises that ‘autopoiesis turns the cybernetic paradigm inside out.’107
Its axiom is that, whereas the ‘first order’ cyberneticians of the 1940s construed its
systems to be homeostatic and open to external influence, for the ‘second order’ all
103. Varela and Weber, “Life after Kant”, pp. 101–02
104. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 10.
105. Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the
Living (Dodrecht/Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980), 79.
106. Ibid., 80–81.
107. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 10.
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systems are ‘informationally closed’. The role of the external objective observer is
ruptured, since to observe is to effect is to be internal to a system. The ‘first order’
was interested in the ‘cybernetics of the observed system’ whilst the ‘second’, the
‘cybernetics of the observer’. Hayles writes, ‘We do not see a world “out there” that
exists apart from us.’ Instead, ‘we see only what our systemic organization allows us
to see.’108 The identity of autopoietic machines cannot be construed by an external
agent, but only from within its networked production.
This means that the paradigm of homeostasis and the central concepts of Wiener’s
cybernetics – neither message, signal, nor information – no longer apply. In Cyber-
netics Wiener had presented, simultaneously to Claude Shannon, a measurement for
the quantification of information in a message. Hayles argues that this implies the
distinction between an inside and outside, which autopoiesis denies, given that it
imagines an objective observer. With the concept of autopoiesis, we should rather
say that what is observed is always internal to the observer. Jonas makes a similar
argument: ‘It is I who let certain “messages” count as “information,” and as such
make them influence my action.’109 It is only the metabolic organism who can decide
whether something counts as information for them. Information cannot be quantified
outside of the system which autopoietically gives itself purpose. Hence, the concept
of information has ceased existing or, writes Hayles, ‘it has sunk so deeply into the
system as to become indistinguishable from the organizational properties defining
the system as such.’110
Subtly Hayles replaces Heinz von Foerster’s logical vocabulary of ‘orders’ of
cybernetics – the ‘cybernetics of cybernetics’ being logically a ‘second order’, as distinct
from the ‘first order’ of Wiener’s cybernetics111 – with the feminist terminology of
‘waves’.112 This replaces a merely logical category with one with implications of a
historical and generational transition which is not discontinuous (she faults both also
Thomas Kuhn and Foucault in this regard), but ‘fabricated in a pattern of overlapping
replication and innovation, a pattern that I call “seriation.” ’113 Doing so allows her to
imply a progressive redundancy, to ‘chronicle the journeys’ of ‘seriated change’ of
ideas which have coalesced around certain patterns of thought: ‘conceptual shifts that
took place during the development of cybernetics’.114 The ‘first wave of cybernetics’
coalesced around homeostasis and took place from 1945 until 1960; the ‘second
wave’ began with the rupture of von Foerster’s work on self-enclosed reflexivity and
continued until 1980. Then crashed a ‘third wave’ that resonates until 1995, displacing
108. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 11.
109. Jonas, ‘Critique of Cybernetics,’ 184.
110. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 11.
111. Heinz von Foerster, ‘Cybernetics of Cybernetics,’ 1979,
112. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman.
113. Ibid., 14.
114. Ibid., 15.
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reflexivity with the concept of ‘emergence’, denoting the posthuman intelligence
emergent through the chaotic distribution in the complexity of its biological substrate
rather than in control of it. In her more recent work, Hayles has argued that there has
since been a fourth wave that theorises a ‘Regime of Computation’ which underlies
and interpenetrates human consciousness.115 According to this movement, Wiener’s
problematic which we have been discussing, which clings onto the concept of the
human, is triply redundant.
‘About-turn’
I now turn to my defence of the concept of homeostasis.
I do not accept Hayles’ reading. Firstly, by treating the logical ‘orders’ as historical
‘waves’, Hayles undoes any sense to the former, which by implication undoes at
least some sense of the latter. Von Foerster invented the notion of ‘second-order
cybernetics’ at a time of increasing frustration that the branch of cybernetics concerned
with computers was concretising cybernetic ideas in such a way that had little need
for the notion of an active observer,116 and so he wanted to emphasise the cybernetics
of the entire system, a recursive ‘cybernetics of cybernetics’ and thereby ‘meta’ or
‘second order cybernetics’. If this equates to a ‘second wave’ and there is a ‘third wave’
which is itself updated in a later work by a ‘fourth wave’ then are we to think of these
as the ‘cybernetics of cybernetics of cybernetics’ and ‘cybernetics of cybernetics of
cybernetics of cybernetics’, ad infinitum? At least to me, any sense (which is not to say
truth) to von Foerster’s ‘order’ applies only to a logically first and second order.
Second, Hayles’ historical periodisation, which is ungrounded at least logically, is
overly simplistic to the point of inaccuracy. She considers the transition from first
wave to second wave to be 1960 because of Heinz von Foerster’s work of the period,
but Kline has since noted a consensus among historians that it should rather be traced
back to Maturana’s own research on the patterned phenomena of a frog’s vision from
the early 1950s. Maturana and von Foerster, he writes, therein developed their ideas
in conversation and concert.117 The greater problem is that, as Francis Heylighen
and Cliff Joslyn have emphasised, ‘most founding fathers of cybernetics, such as Ross
Ashby, Warren McCulloch and Gregory Bateson, explicitly or implicitly agreed with
the importance of autonomy, self-organisation and the subjectivity of modelling.
Therefore, they can hardly be portrayed as “first order” reductionists.’118 Also, the
major figures of the ‘second wave’ were themselves major to the first, including
115. N. Katherine Hayles, My Mother Was a Computer (Chicago & London: University of Chicago
Press, 2005); N. Katherine Hayles, ‘Unfinished Work: From Cyborg to Cognisphere,’ Theory, Culture &
Society 23, nos. 7-8 (December 2006): 159–166.
116. Francis Heylighen and Cliff Joslyn, ‘Cybernetics and Second-Order Cybernetics,’ in Encyclopedia
of Physical Science & Technology, 3rd ed., ed. R. A. Meyers (New York: Academic Press, 2001).
117. Kline, The Cybernetics Moment, 196–98.
118. Heylighen and Joslyn, ‘Cybernetics and Second-Order Cybernetics,’ 4.
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Bateson, Mead, von Foerster and Maturana. Not only this, but Bateson and Mead
agreed in 1976 that Wiener himself was, like them, ‘inside the box’, that he had
never strayed into ‘input-output’ (conceptually if not terminologically) and that his
‘cybernetics was that the science is the science of the whole circuit.’119 We could add
that the concept of emergence is explicit in his works too, such as when he writes of an
arithmetical device ‘corresponding to the whole apparatus’ of a network of telephones,
computers and staff, of the ‘communal intelligence’ of a swarm of bees, and so on.120
If the second and third ‘waves’ are to be found in the first, we should rather conclude
with Heylighen and Joslyn that cybernetic history has only shone a ‘stronger focus’
on certain themes within the sea of concepts from the start of cybernetics than left
wrecks in its wake.121
Thirdly, although Hayles implies the possibility of further ‘cybernetic waves’, by
claiming that she believes we have ‘become posthuman’ it seems to me that we have
therefore also become post-historical, since – as with my first critique – to speak of a
postposthuman, postpostposthuman, etc., is nonsensical.
Hayles considers Wiener to have withdrawn from the revolutionary implications
of cybernetics – ‘that the boundaries of the human subject are constructed rather than
given’ – to defend the liberal human, ‘fashioning human and machine alike in the
image of an autonomous, self-directed individual.’122 ‘The danger of cybernetics,
fromWiener’s point of view,’ according to Hayles, ’is that it can potentially annihilate
the liberal subject as the locus of control.’123 Hayles construes this in a number of
ways but the most important is the way in which she establishes the parallelism between
the concepts of self-regulating machinery and liberal humanism, since this is the zombie
concept onto which Wiener and the ‘first wave’ supposedly clasp. Her argument
is based on a reading of Wiener which is overdetermined by her reading of Otto
Mayr’s argument that the origins of cybernetics lie in David Hume and Adam Smith’s
notions of free market capitalism, against the clockwork system of mercantilism.
Once again, it mistakenly conflates the operative image of the steam engine with that
of the internet.
Mayr’s free market cybernetics
Mayr argues that David Hume’s ‘Of the Balance of Trade’ (1752) radically undermined
pre-established clockwork doctrine of mercantilism, that nations become rich through
119. Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, and Stewart Brand, ‘For God’s Sake, Margaret,’ CoEvolutionary
Quarterly, no. 10 (June 1976): 32–44.
120. Wiener, Cybernetics, 60–61, 157. The same can be said for so many others. McCulloch and Pitt’s
concept of the brain as a distributed network, Ashby’s homeostat as intelligent throughout its entire
body, etc.
121. Heylighen and Joslyn, ‘Cybernetics and Second-Order Cybernetics,’ 4.
122. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 84–112.
123. Ibid., 110.
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growing their treasuries while restricting imports, by depicting the international
market as a feedback loop whereby, without State interference, a balance of trade
and thereby wealth would find equilibrium. Hume asks his readers to imagine that
four-fifths of Great Britain’s wealth was wiped out overnight. Would the price of
its labour and commodities not sink accordingly and therefore its competitiveness
on the international stage not rise, and its wealth eventually return to the level of its
neighbours?124
While Hume presents ‘the earliest instance of an adequately formulated economic
feedback loop’, says Mayr, his friend Adam Smith abstracted this auto-regulating
feedback model to a plethora of economic phenomena, giving it ‘almost a life of its
own.’125 In The Wealth of Nations (1776) we find that free competition of economic
subjects balances social justice; the attraction of workers to high wages is eased by a fall
of wages due to a large supply of labour; the self-regulation of a population size to befit
the size of the market; the demand and supply of commodities and labour balancing
one another out. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith made the break in economics that
his fellow University of Glasgow colleague James Watt would a decade later make in
the realm of machines by inventing the flyball governor and ensuring the pressure
and temperature of his steam engine would be automatically regulated by means of it.
This would signify a break with the clock in both its technical application and
its operative image as, in Mayr’s words, ‘the quintessential symbol for authority’126
– a break with mercantilism and absolute monarchy, the image of the clock, or
what Foucault refers to as ‘sovereign power’.127 No longer would society be defined
by ‘a structure with a central authority, whose parts worked together with the same
inevitability, predictability, and rapidity as the wheels in clockwork.’128 It should instead
be allowed to freely self-regulate itself by means of the Invisible Hand of the market,
the economic expression of the steam engine, mechanical symbol of a liberated
world.129 For Mayr, Smith is the founding figure of cybernetics, albeit one who had
not yet fully abstracted and universalised the concept of the feedback mechanism into
all other domains, as he accredits Wiener for so doing.130
124. Otto Mayr, ‘Adam Smith and the Concept of the Feedback System: Economic Thought and
Technology in 18th Century Britain,’ Technology and Culture 12, no. 1 (January 1971): 3–5. Mayr even
draws this feedback loop as a servomechanical diagram, 5.
125. Ibid., 6.
126. Mayr, Authority, Liberty & Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe, xviii.
127. Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, vol. I: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1978); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan
Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1991).
128. Mayr, ‘A Mechanical Symbol for an Authoritarian World,’ Emphasis added.
129. ‘Smith’s Invisible Hand could not be identified with a specific person, institution, or program or
with a definite bureaucratic mechanism. It was an abstract power immanent in the system. The capability
to employ opposing, uncooperative forces to establish and maintain equilibrium is a characteristic of
self-regulating or – in cybernetic jargon – feedback systems. The Invisible Hand was nothing but the
quality of self-regulation.’ Mayr, Authority, Liberty & Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe, 175.
130. Mayr, Authority, Liberty & Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe, 187–88; Mayr, ‘Adam
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Mayr presents the invention of the liberal subject, independent owner of their own
labour power, as born of the same operative image as Watt’s cybernetic steam engine.
Championing both liberalism and cybernetics through coupling them together, Mayr
provides grounds for the many who would construe neoliberalism and cybernetics to
be synchronous, such as Tiqqun,131 Alexander Galloway,132 Richard Barbrook and
Andy Cameron,133 Adam Curtis134 and the ideologues of Stalin’s Soviet Union.135
Informed by Mayr, Hayles vociferously argues that Wiener’s cybernetics fails to
advance beyond liberal subjectivity.136
But there is something entirely incongruous to Mayr’s argument which has been
neglected. The hint is that whilst Mayr is clearly a believer and champion of liberal
capitalism’s self-regulating capability, Wiener wrote passages such as this:
There is a belief, current in many countries, which has been elevated to the
rank of an official article of faith in the United States, that free competition is
itself a homeostatic process: that in a free market the individual selfishness of the
bargainers, each seeking to sell as high and buy as low as possible, will result in
the end in a stable dynamics of prices, and with redound to the greatest common
good. This is associated with the very comforting view that the individual
entrepreneur, in seeking to forward his own interest, is in some manner a
public benefactor and has thus earned the great rewards with which society
has showered him. Unfortunately, the evidence, such as it is, is against this
simpleminded theory.137
In direct conflict with Mayr, Wiener could stand apart from ‘simpleminded’ believers
Smith and the Concept of the Feedback System,’ 18.
131. Tiqqun consider a ‘cybernetic hypothesis’ to have ‘definitively supplanted the liberal hypothesis’
and define cybernetics as ‘an autonomous world of apparatuses so blended with the capitalist project that it has
become a political project’. Tiqqun, ‘L’Hypothèse Cybernétique,’ in Tiqqun 2 (2001), 4.
132. Galloway has argued how ‘the liberal hue of contemporary [academic] methodology – with
quantitative positivism serving as the “governor” of the rainbow coalition – is chiefly due to a single
historical phenomenon that has taken place over roughly the last century. Taking a page from the French
collective Tiqqun, we might label this historical phenomenon the cybernetic hypothesis.’ Alexander R.
Galloway, ‘The Cybernetic Hypothesis,’ d i f f e r e n c e s : A journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 25, no.
1 (2014): 111.
133. ‘The prophets of the Californian Ideology argue that only the cybernetic flows and chaotic eddies
of free markets and global communications will determine the future.’ Richard Barbrook and Andy
Cameron, ‘The Californian Ideology,’ Mute 1, no. 3 (1995).
134. The twinning of neoliberalism and cybernetics is a running theme of Curtis’ video essays. His
trilogy All Watched over By Machines of Love and Grace (2011) – which takes its name from the title of
Richard Brautigan’s 1967 utopian beat poem which envisages ‘a cybernetic meadow / where mammals
and computers / live together in mutually / programming harmony / like pure water / touching clear
sky.’ – construes the cybernetic revolution to be concomitant with the rise of neoliberalism; and not
just contingently so, as one gathers from Fred Turner’s analysis From Counterculture to Cyberculture of
the transformation of the 1960s hippy ‘New Communalism’ into the harbingers of a new capitalism.
135. The equation of cybernetics and capitalism, one presumes, gave meaning to the 1954 Short
Philosophical Dictionary (the standard Soviet ideological reference) characterisation of cybernetics to be
‘an ideological weapon of imperialist reaction’ and a ‘reactionary pseudo-science’. See, David Mindell,
Jérôme Segal, and Slava Gerovitch, ‘Cybernetics and Information Theory in the United States, France
and the Soviet Union,’ in Science and Ideology: A Comparative History, ed. Mark Walker (London:
Routledge, 2003), 66–95.
136. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, Chap. 4 especially.
137. Wiener, Cybernetics, 159.
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in the self-regulating function of free market capitalism because he considered cy-
bernetics to have constituted a ‘Second Industrial Revolution’ which broke with the
‘First Industrial Revolution’.
Wiener argues The revolution of engines and textile mills was only a limited
revolution. It ‘concerned the machine purely as an alternative to human muscle.’138
The steam engine relieved slaves and horses from the toils of pumping water from
mines: ‘to replace this servitude must certainly be regarded as a great humanitarian
step forward.’139 It replaced horses and water as the source of power for textile
spinning machinery (although its effects on humans was anything but liberatory).
The First Industrial Revolution ‘displaced man as a source of power, without making
any great impression on other human functions.’140 Therefore the First Industrial
Revolution was a partial revolution. It broke with the clockwork body typified by
Descartes and Boyle but it left the dualism of body and mind unscathed. It was a
revolution of the bodily organism which remodelled the organism as a self-regulating
and homeostatic mechanism instead of a clockwork automata and displaced it with
vastly more powerful artificial variants. But it could not model the total. Mayr may
make a worthy historian of the revolution of the age of clocks and steam engines,
but he has nothing distinct to say whatsoever about what Wiener calls the Second Industrial
Revolution and its age of communication and control; the age whose operative image
is the Internet. This is why Hayles is not correct (Galison neither) in arguing that
Wiener clung to the subject of liberal capitalism.
The trajectory of Hayles’ argument is that as of 1995 we have reached a ‘Computa-
tional Universe’ whereby the essential function of all beings, human and non-human,
of the universe itself, is to process information. ‘[Computation] is a relational process
that can run in the brain, with gears, disks, balls, cylinders and levers, in electro-
mechanical and silicon devices, as well as other media not yet discovered or in nascent
developments such as quantum computers.’141 The computer ‘mirrors nature’s own
methods.’ Hayles envisages a Computational-Universal equality ‘derived from the
view that not only our world but the great cosmos itself is a vast computer and that
we are the programs it runs.’142 The subject of this would be the emergent posthuman
who no longer conforms to the autonomous, capitalist anthropoid who commands
bodies by means of disembodied information. Something akin to the Computational
Universe, she writes, is envisioned byWiener, but it differs by realising ‘the cybernetic
dream of creating a world in which humans and intelligent machines can both feel at
138. Ibid., 119. Emphasis added.
139. See chapter IX: The First and the Second Industrial Revolution of HUHBb. I refer here to pp.
121–23.
140. Ibid., 134.
141. Hayles, ‘Unfinished Work,’ 163.
142. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 239–244.
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home.’143
This phrase, at home, succinctly expresses the difference between Wiener and
not only Hayles but also Maturana, Varela and Jonas in their own ways. Theirs are
all philosophies of the home, oikos, of the reproduction of life as bare life, zoē, the
simple fact of living common to all living beings whether plant, animal or human, of
a zoological universe; there is specifically no outside: the qualified life, the bios of the
political community, no longer exists.144 In Jonas, Maturana and Varela we find life
reduced to the organism, the machine no longer an object of interest because lacking
metabolism and autopoiesis. According to Hayles, all posthuman beings relate to one
another without need for the outside of politics, since they are already at home in
their ‘Motherboard of Nature’.145 Hayles writes of the politics and economics which
effect the production of virtual bodies, but this is always merely about production.
Even the Pentagon, we are told, have given up on Clausewitz for a future of warfare
that is ‘neo-cortical’, relating to the ‘techno-sciences of information’ rather than the
achievement of overwhelming force.146 But are the true weapons of resistance today
really the productions of historical contestations concerning their own production and
the rediscovery of their embodied virtuality, as Hayles argues? To me this withdrawal
from political confrontation is at the heart of ‘second-order’ milieu.
Maturana writes that he first understood the power of the word poiesis after
reflecting on Don Quixote’s struggle to choose between the ‘path of letters (poiesis,
creation, production)’ and the ‘path of arms (praxis, action)’.147 Autopoiesis came to
him as ‘a word without a history, a word that could directly mean what takes place in
the dynamics of the autonomy proper to living systems.’
A word that evaded the need to engage in political conflict. He presumably
would have known of Marx’s description of labour as the ‘metabolism [Stoffwechsel]
of man with nature’148 as presumably did Jonas since, if for nothing else, this phrase
is employed as the definition of natural labour for his fellow Heidelberg alumni and
Jewish New York émigré, Hannah Arendt, in The Human Condition, a book whose
problematic is the eclipse of the political.149 For Marx it is precisely the separation of
143. Stefan Herbrechter considers posthumanism’s ‘deanthropocentering’ of even nonhuman actors ‘a
radicalized form of democratization.’ Posthumanism: A Critical Analysis, 200.
144. Giorgio Agamben,Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1.
145. Hayles writes how ‘Just as Mother Nature was seen in past centuries as the source of both human
behavior and physical reality, so now the Universal Computer is envisioned as the Motherboard of us
all.’ Hayles, My Mother Was a Computer, 3. The phrase has a science fiction heritage, Neal Stephenson,
subject of a chapter in the same book, having published a work entitled ‘Mother Earth Mother Board’
in 1996.
146. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 20.
147. Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition, xvii.
148. Marx, Capital, vol. 1, 283; Marx, Capital, vol. 3, 949-50, 959
149. ‘Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body, whose
spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed
into the life process by labor. The human condition of labor is life itself.’ Hannah Arendt, The Human
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humans from their metabolic nature that constitutes history and needs explanation,
not their natural productive activity itself. As Marx says in the Grundrisse:
It is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural, inorganic
conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, and hence [with] their
appropriation of nature, which requires explanation or is the result of a historic
process, but rather the separation between these inorganic conditions of human
existence and this active existence …150
Jonas, Maturana, Varela and Hayles jump the gun in construing a reality whereby,
in Marx’s words, the ‘irreparable rift’ produced by capitalist relations of production no
longer exist.151 By construing homeostasis to be an anachronism (or, as Hayles writes,
a ‘skeuomorph’, its friendly cousin152), by denying that, in Bernard’s words, ‘life is
conflict’, by denying the constitutive threshold between the internal environment of
the organism and the external environment, they turn away from the agon by which
the production of history is fought for, lost and won.
Here again I am imposing the agonistic reading of homeostasis without having
shown it to be there in Wiener contra Cannon, so let me now return to Canguilhem’s
critique in order to answer the question of what is meant by homeostasis according
to the operative image of the Internet.
3.5 Wiener’s critique of social homeostasis
We return to Canguilhem’s critique of the wisdom of the social body. That there
is no inherent homeostasis in a socius, since it has no normal state to return to aside
from disorder and crisis. Social regulation is a machine, a tool, it depends on external
input. In this sense Canguilhem and Jonas’ arguments resonate, in that Jonas also
distinguishes the tool on the basis of it needing its commands established by another.
Undermining Geroulanos and Meyers’ suggestion that Canguilhem’s critique of
Cannon’s social homeostasis is quietly targeted at Wiener, it in fact resonates with
Wiener’s own critique too, in that Wiener argues against Cannon that, ‘one of the
most surprising facts about the body politic is its extreme lack of efficient homeostatic
processes.’153 I shall attempt to now show whyWiener also rejects the Cannon’s notion
of social homeostasis, but in doing so, insists on a generalised state of conflict by
means of homeostasis.
Condition, with an introduction by Margaret Canovan (Chicago & London: University of Chicago
Press, 1958), from p. 98 on. Arendt’s employment reflects that of the chapter in John Bellamy Foster’s
Marx’s Ecology entitled ‘The Metabolism Of Nature And Society’, which .
150. Cited by Paul Burkett in Marx and Nature, 30, from Grundrisse, 489. Emphasis added.
151. John Bellamy Foster, Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature (New York: Monthly Review Press,
2000), 141–177.
152. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 17–18.
153. Wiener, Cybernetics, 158.
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In direct contrast to Mayr, Wiener denies the existence of an automatic self-
regulation, or homeostasis, under capitalism. He derides as ‘simpleminded’ the ‘huck-
sters’ who believe that ‘that free competition is itself a homeostatic process’, that the
market will regulate itself for the ‘common good’ if left to alone, which is to say,
who project the operative image of a steam engine onto society as a whole.154 This
is why Hayles’ depiction of him positing liberal individualism is incongruous. Like
Canguilhem, Wiener would have surely agreed with Alliez and Lazzarato’s anti-
Cannon assessment that, ‘Contemporary financial capitalism flees equilibrium like the
plague, since balance is equal to zero profits from the point of view of maximising
“shareholder value,” which has no concern for world development indicators (the
record of neoliberalism in this matter has been disastrous).’155 As Wiener says, in
situations like that of the market, there is only ‘extreme indeterminacy and instability
… there is no homeostasis whatsoever.’156
For Canguilhem a society cannot organically self-regulate since it can have no
common concept of wisdom. Its regulation is artificial, a machine whose history is that
of the imposition upon itself of such assemblages as parliament.157 Though Wiener
did not reject the organicist analogy of organism and society inherited from Cannon,
he considered the body politic to be an organism whose natural homeostatic capab-
ility exists inversely to the size of its population – perhaps incorporating his friend
J. B. S. Haldane’s argument from the article ‘On Being the Right Size’ (1926).158 For
Wiener, very small rural and indigenous communities do tend to have a ‘considerable
measure of homeostasis’, expressed by adequate care for the ‘unfortunate’, mainten-
ance of common infrastructure such as roads and tolerance for reintegrating minor
criminals.159 Small communities exhibit social homeostasis, as Cannon described,
because their distribution of behaviour, intelligence, values and social memory is
relatively uniform, allowing them to inherently perform a certain shared learning
without the imposition of external mechanisms. But, Wiener insists, small societies
create this harmony and common purpose through stripping the possibility of life
from those who refuse to conform, who find it ‘so ubiquitous, so unavoidable, so
restricting and oppressing’, that they are made to flee ‘in self-defence’160 (think of
154. Wiener, Cybernetics, 61, 159.
155. Alliez and Lazzarato, Wars and Capital, 368.
156. Wiener, Cybernetics, 159.
157. Canguilhem, Writings on Medicine, 76–77.
158. John Burdon Sanderson Haldane – evolutionary biologist, socialist activist and son of physiologist
John Scott Haldane – argues in ‘On Being the Right Size’, originally published in Harper’s Magazine in
1926, that the natural capacity for stable self-governance (or ‘socialism’) is proportionally determined by
the size of a political community’s population, such that its optimum size would be small like a Greek
polis. Unlike the organism, Haldane argues, this potential for stable self-governance might be artificially
extendable by means of communication media. J. B. S. Haldane, ‘On Being the Right Size,’ in Possible
Worlds and Other Essays (London: Chatto & Windus, 1927), 18–26.
159. Wiener, Cybernetics, 160.
160. Ibid.
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Spinoza, Shulamith Firestone or Hermann Kafka’s flights from their oppressively
homogeneous community). Natural social homeostasis exists in small communities,
but it is not something those who value heterogeneity would desire.
As for the large society, the cosmopolitan city, since it lacks a common history,
level of intelligence, values, and memory, it has no inherent social homeostasis to speak of.
So it is with large industrial societies that the need to produce social homeostasis by
means of what Wiener calls the ‘artificial homeostasis’ of political institutions arises.161
Wiener reaches the same conclusion as Canguilhem, who writes of society imposing
on itself ‘historical inventions’ such as parliament in order to impose regulation, but
from a different and even contradictory route.
As an engineer in the 1950s Wiener worked on developing artificial homeostasis
apparatuses that would regulate the organism from the outside, such as an automatic
insulin dispenser, feedbacking prosthetic limbs and a ‘hearing glove’ for the deaf (an
‘artificial external cortex’) which would translate words into kinetic sensation like an
inverted vocoder; these as distinct from the rigid (homostatic) prosthesis of the ‘simple
peg leg’.162 Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline – cyberneticians working on bodysuits
which would automatically administer drugs to regulate the milieu intérieur of the
wearer to artificially perform extra-terrestrial homeostasis – would in 1960, as historian
Ronald Kline argues persuasively, rephrase ‘artificial homeostasis’ as ‘cybernetically
extended organism’, or ‘cyborg’ for short.163 A ‘cyborg’ is, according to this original
definition, that organism whose life depends on artificial homeostasis, a homeostasis
whose telos is designed to be the health of its wearer, as so defined by the engineer. This
concept, which we employ, is more specific than that employed by Donna Haraway,
whose definition of the cyborg as a ‘fabricated hybrid of machine and organism’ is too
broad.164 According to Wiener, Clynes and Kline, the mere occasion of prosthesis
does not qualify an organism to be called a cyborg: the cyborg’s prosthetic mechanism
must be self-correcting in respect of the host organism’s homeostasis. A homostatic
cyborg, for example, would make sense in Haraway’s definition, but in Wiener’s it
would be a contradiction in terms.
If we adopt this specific concept of a cyborg as an artificially imposed homeostasis,
161. It should be noted that Wiener xenophobically refers to indigenous peoples in this section not
merely as ‘primitive savages’, which even Lévi-Strauss uses at the time (albeit in a deconstructive and
anti-xenophobic sense) but as ‘barbarians’ with customs that may seem ‘strange and even repugnant to
… us.’ Wiener, Cybernetics, 160; Wiener, ‘Homeostasis in the individual and society.’
162. Wiener, Cybernetics, 25–26; Wiener, ‘The Concept of Homeostasis in Medecine’; Kline, The
Cybernetics Moment, 170.
163. Manfred Clynes says, ‘We were asked to present a paper on drugs for space flight … This would
have to be done automatically, of course, and this led us to applications of cybernetics to the problem.
From this we established a whole new approach based on adapting the man to the environment rather
than keeping him in a sort of environment to which he was naturally adapted.’ Kline, The Cybernetics
Moment, 171, and see 170–78 in general for a history of the early ‘cyborg’ concept.
164. Donna J. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (London: Free Associ-
ation Books, 1991), 149, 150.
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we could say that what Wiener means by government is a ‘social cyborg’ – a homeo-
stasis of the social organism by artificial means. In his article ‘On the Homeostasis of
the Individual and Society’ (1951) Wiener depicts the tripartite separation of powers
in this way, the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary each watching over the others’
excesses of power and thereby balancing the total quantity of power in the system
(not unlike Ross Ashby’s homeostat).
Now, one might construe a cybernetic Montesquieu to compliment Mayr’s cyber-
netic Smith but forWiener’s immediate denial of the effectiveness of this artificial social
homeostasis. The reasoning Wiener here provides is the difficulty for a large society
to cohere around a ‘national tradition’ that is not one by which it is (homostatically)
‘bound forever to decisions made in the past under what were perhaps irrelevant
circumstances.’165 The inherent homeostatic traditions of small societies, Wiener says,
are transmitted through the apparatuses handed down along generations. Wiener
gives the example of the inherited tools of a ‘Yankee basket maker’, wrought of bog
iron, whose production had been learned from ‘[American] Indians’ – these evoke in
him a ‘sense of the contemporary of the past’ (memory) and give him a sense of ‘the
possibility of the stabilizing mechanisms in the present.’166 This is to say, homeostasis.
Yet, Wiener continues, the populations of the ‘great cities, or in the esoteric hot house
of civilization of Southern California’ are too transitory for such a transmission of
homeostasis, ‘the span of social memory which is needed for the homeostatic action
of an historical sense is too great for transients and squatters.’167
I find this argument somewhat obscured by the flowery way Wiener puts his
argument, but my interpretation is that he is making an ecological claim that metro-
politan life implies, as he writes, a ‘defiance’ against nature (its external environment)
that endangers humanity’s ‘continued existence’. The social cyborg amplifies this
since its organism is largely rootless, so to speak. Whereas the basket maker adapts to
nature according to a direct and natural homeostasis, the social cyborg, in as much as
it is necessary, is constituted in opposition to nature and is therefore partial.168 This is
not just to say that large social homeostasis is partial because it is constituted against
nature in opposition to the human, but because it is not universal to the interests of
humankind itself : therein lies the fracture which makes large-scale social homeostasis
impossible. Whereas the homeostasis of the basket maker is continuous with a homeo-
stasis of nature, the artificial homeostasis of the social cyborg is at once homeostatic
with respect to the regulation of its power but anti-homeostatic with respect to the
165. Wiener, ‘Homeostasis in the individual and society.’
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid.
168. In a major public conference held at MIT in the early 1960s, Wiener similarly argues, ‘There
is a real danger that changes in our environment have exceeded our capacity to adapt. [We may be]
biologically on the way out … I think that the overall danger from the total situation is much greater
than the danger of any of its particular instantiations.’ Martin Greenberger, ed., Computers and the World
of the Future (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962), 27.
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regulation of nature. In large societies, homeostasis generates negative externalities.
It is not simply a collective process of learning to which everyone and everything
gains, as Cannon has it, but an increase in self-control of one at the expense of the
self-control of another. In the large society the homeostatic renders its other homostatic,
increasing its control while reducing that of its other. The logic of such a partial
homeostasis which is opposed to the homeostasis of others is found neither in the
writings of Cannon nor Mayr.
Remembering that Cannon, like Innis, considered canals, roads, rivers, trains, boats
and trucks to be the veins and vessels of the body politic,169 Wiener writes that since
every organism is constituted through its ‘possession of means for the acquisition, use,
retention, and transmission of information’ (its nervous system rather than capillary
bed) the large social organism is bound by its newspapers, books, television, radio, post,
theatres, cinemas schools and churches.170 The primary function of such institutions
is to establish the lines of communication necessary for a society to cohere. Wiener
asks rhetorically: ‘How then does the beehive act in unison, and at that in a very
variable, adapted, organized unison?’ The answer: ‘Obviously, the secret is in the
intercommunication of its members.’171
It seems undeniable that J. C. R Licklider, who participated in cybernetics work-
shops organised by Wiener in the 1940s, had this in mind when in the later-half
of the 1960s he envisaged an Interactive Multi-Access Geographically Distributed
(‘IᴍᴀGᴇᴅ’) network as having amongst its ‘purposes’ the creation of ‘ “coherence” and
“community” ’ amongst geographically distributed users, and announced that the
‘interconnection’ of the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ would establish no mere community but a ‘super-
community’.172 This would not be a rigid homostatic network, one, in Licklider’s
words, ‘pre-cast’ and ‘designed and programmed once-and-for-all at its outset’; but a
‘flexible’ and ‘adaptable’ homeostatic ‘labile network of networks – ever-changing in
both content and configuration.’173 Like a single organism, Licklider hoped that the
internet would create a single common body of knowledge whereby the programs
and data resources of the entire supercommunity would be common throughout.
Arguing this, Licklider follows Cannon’s belief in the wisdom of an inherent so-
cial homeostasis (or ‘learning’) and the belief that it is a beneficent to all, without
169. Cannon, The Wisdom of the Body, 313–315. See above, p. 58.
170. Wiener, Cybernetics, 160-61; See also Wiener, HUHBb, 18.
171. Wiener, Cybernetics.
172. Licklider, Memorandum: Classification of Computer Networks, 3, 6; Licklider and Taylor, ‘The
Computer as a Communication Device.’
173. Licklider,Memorandum: Classification of Computer Networks; Licklider and Taylor, ‘The Computer
as a Communication Device’; ‘Labile’ is how Sherrington describes the homeostatic living system, its
fragility making it more adaptable to its environment. As David W. Bates has noticed, the British
cyberneticist Ross Ashby recorded several passages of Sherrington’s on the organism as a ‘labile’ ‘moving
structure, a dynamic equilibrium’ into his notebooks. David W. Bates, ‘Unity, Plasticity, Catastrophe:
Order and Pathology in the Cybernetic Era,’ in Catastophe: History and Theory of an Operative Concept,
ed. Andreas Killen and Nitzan Lebovic (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 52–53.
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anti-homeostatic effects.
Yet Wiener warned precisely that under capitalism this primary function of
communication in the network would be ‘[encroached] further and further’ by
secondary functions related to their commodity and political value.174 The school and
church become home not only to ‘the scholar and the saint’ but ‘the Great Educator
and the Bishop’; the newspaper degenerates into a ‘vehicle for advertising and its
owner’s financial gain’, turning news into gossip, to ‘stereotyped “boiler plates” ’
instead of political commentary or serious features. As ever, ‘the man who pays the
piper calls the tune.’ That in a large community the ‘means of communication’ (notice
the slide from ‘means of production’) are owned by a ‘very limited class of wealthy
men’, the ‘Lords of Things as They Are’ who ruthlessly control their own publicity,
means that the media expresses the ideology (‘opinions’) of their class and attract those
with ambitions for ‘political and personal power’. Wiener writes that ‘Of all of these
anti-homeostatic factors in society, the control of the means of communication is the
most effective and most important.’175 Anti-homeostatic for society (or, he could
have written, pro-homostatic), although pro-homeostatic for the wallets and political
ambitions of the newspaper barons.
Again, notice there are multiple regimes of homeostasis at play here within the
social body. Not only is there the anti-homeostasis of an increasingly confused society
bombarded with gossip and marketing instead of long- and short-form news, there
is a homeostasis of profit margins which keeps the publisher solvent and profitable.
There is an anti-homeostasis of democratic representation but also a homeostasis
of power for the celebrity-cum-politician. This is to reiterate that the network of
the social cyborg is never the total society, and to emphasise that not only are the
homeostases of society’s internet partial, but they can be in antagonistic contradiction
to those of others. The ideal end of natural homeostasis may be the health of its
host organism, but the health of the corporation or a celebrity’s image may be the
antithesis of the health of the society as a whole. The end of artificial homeostasis is
merely whatever its host defines.
If this is a site of harmony or peace, then it is so through conflict. Wiener refers to
homeostasis as a process of ‘learning’, both phylogenetic and ontogenetic.176 I referred
in the last chapter to a ‘Wiener Test’, wherein a being is considered alive if it can play
a game of strategy against its creator, a game where its capacity to learn is at stake.
This identification of homeostasis with learning he takes from Cannon. Yet, breaking
with Cannon, he refuses to accept that learning (homeostasis/negative-feedback) is
necessarily beneficial for all. It is a constitutive conflict, of political warfare, that
concerns the struggle for a greater ‘learning’ than an opponent has of you. This is a
174. Wiener, Cybernetics, 161.
175. Ibid., 160-61. Emphasis added.
176. Ibid., 169.
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struggle of control: learning and stupidity, elasticity and rigidity, homeostasis and
homostatic, life and death.
What distinguishes Wiener’s account from that of the age of the steam engine is
the consistency of the homeostatic machine at stake. For Bernard the organism may
exist through the permeation of inner and outer environments, problematising its
identity. Yet its identity is always one. At stake in the operative image of the steam
engine is always the ontogenetic or phylogenetic individual. All the organs of the
milieu intérieur of a dog co-operate to preserve the liberty of the canine with respect
to its environment. Cannon stretches that single milieu intérieur onto the entire body
politic, exaggerating the image of the steam engine to the entirety of a nation, if not
humankind. In Wiener’s confrontation with Cannon, it is not that he re-atomises
the body politic into ‘liberal individuals’, as Hayles considers him to do, since he allows
for ‘collective’ homeostases of small societies and, say, the newspaper corporation.
Rather, in breaking with organic metaphors (the basket weaver of the small society)
he implies an overlapping of possible social homeostases such that every living thing,
every network, is multiple, is physically dislocated, is a network which overlaps
other networks, which assimilates into other networks and dislocates itself, whose
homeostasis or learning – control – enriches itself at the expense of another. The
image of the steam engine may be homeostatic, but it is also resolutely self-contained
and individual. It cannot figure the myriadic complexity of an internet, a nexus of
networks. It is not about individuals or collectives but rather shifting intersections –
it is about what Deleuze called ‘dividuals’.177
Over and again Wiener figures the conflict, the homeostasis, of control at stake
today in terms of a game of strategy. Regarding the media Wiener writes, ‘That
system which more than all others should contribute to social homeostasis is thrown
directly into the hands of those most concerned in the game of power and money.’178
He writes, ‘The whole nature of our legal system is that of a conflict. It is a conversation
in which at least three parties take part – let us say, in a civil case, the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the legal system as represented by judge and jury. It is a game in the
full von Neumann sense’.179 And, ‘The market is a game, which has indeed received a
simulacrum in the family game of Monopoly. It is thus strictly subject to the general
theory of games, developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern.’180
According to the Wiener Test, that which is living is defined by its capacity to
‘learn’ (homeostasis/negative-feedback) and thereby to play a game against its creator.
Hence, that which properly distinguishes the social organism is a logic which accords
to a ‘game of strategy’.181 To the relation of cybernetics and thereby the internet to a
177. Deleuze, Negotiations, 180.
178. Wiener, Cybernetics, 161. Emphasis added.
179. Wiener, HUHBb, 98. Emphasis added.
180. Wiener, Cybernetics, 159. Emphasis added.
181. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 3rd ed.
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theory of strategic conflict I now turn.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 5.1, 21.2.1. Von Neumann evades short introduction,
but to say that he was amongst many things a prominent participant in the Macy Meetings, and the
degree of Von Neumann’s association with Wiener was such that the two have been made subjects of
Steve J. Heims’ joint intellectual biography, John Von Neumann and Norbert Wiener: From Mathematics to
the Technologies of Life and Death (1980).
Chapter 4
(Chess)
In theHuman Use of Human Beings Wiener establishes that he holds to not one but two
theories of games.1 One relating to universal natural homeostasis, where the opponent
is the passive ‘Augustinian Evil’ of nature’s inherent entropy, its lack of the good,
information, truth. This type of game he specifically attributes to Benoît Mandelbrot,
and I argue that at stake is an analogy Mandelbrot makes between information theory
and Ferdinand de Saussure’s famous image of the chessboard. The other game concerns
a partial artificial homeostasis whereby the opponent is an active ‘Manichean Evil’ who
employs strategic manoeuvres to achieve whatever determinations they strive for.
This relates to John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s theory of games.2 Both
Augustinian and Manichean games revolve around learning, homeostasis, but they
have completely distinct domains. The former is the game of science, the latter,
society. In this chapter I shall argue that the internet must be understood as being
defined according to the Manichean Evil.
I shall start by depicting Mandelbrot and de Saussure’s theory of chess, before
setting this against Wiener’s game theory. I shall continue then to root this distinction
in Leibniz’s discussion of chess: its continuous reading by Michel Serres, and the
necessity of a discontinuous reading by Wiener.
The parenthesis of this chapter’s title are intended to emphasise that chess does not
constitute an operative image alongside the clock, the steam engine and the internet.
Rather, it is an analogy through which each can be read.
4.1 Structuralist chess
Benoît Mandelbrot and Roman Jakobson, Wiener argues, ‘consider communication
to be a game played in partnership by the speaker and the listener against the forces
1. Wiener, HUHBb, 82–83, 162–63.
2. Neumann and Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.
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of confusion, represented by the ordinary difficulties of communication’.3 As is too
often the case in Wiener’s books, no source is given for this claim, and he refers
only to an argument of Mandelbrot’s, who copy edited Cybernetics,4 not Jakobson,
despite being well acquainted with the latter personally.5 He continues, through
computations Mandelbrot shows how all natural languages seem to tend towards
an optimal distribution of word lengths, which implies that they have over time
undergone a process of natural selection. This, as opposed to artificial languages
such as Esperanto or Volapük in which no such optimal distribution of word lengths
is to be found. This natural ‘attrition of language’, a phylogenetic homeostasis of
words, implies that languages evolve towards a sort of ‘optimum form of distribution’
through the processes of guarding against confusion.
This being the case, Wiener argues, the ‘philosophical assumption’ of Mandelbrot’s
(and supposedly Jakobson’s too) ‘ordinary’ and ‘normal’ linguistic game theory is that
the ‘major opponent of the conversant is the entropic tendency of nature itself ’.6 In
the employment of language over time a speaker combats its tendency to naturally
degrade. Like the basket maker’s small society, natural languages pertain to a natural
homeostasis, minimising the distribution of their elements. The primary aim of the
game of normal communication is to reverse the natural tendency of all things to
entropy and convey information, this reversal of the second law of thermodynamics
being the basis of Wiener’s definition of information as the reversal of entropy.7
Wiener’s comments are fairly brief and, as mentioned, he does not reference any
specific text but, writing in 1953, it seems likely that he would have been referring to
Mandelbrot’s ‘Contribution à la théorie mathématique des jeux de communication’,
published the same year, or ‘An Informational Theory of the Statistical Structure of
3. Wiener, HUHBb, 82–83, 162–63. Emphasis added. This sentence goes on to suggest that
Mandelbrot and Jakobson consider normal communication to involve attempts to ‘jam’ communications.
For reasons explained below, this claim is inconsistent with Wiener’s argument, perhaps an editorial
error, and so I ignore it.
4. Both Benoît Mandelbrot and uncle Szolem Mandelbrojt were well acquainted with Wiener,
Szolem having invited Wiener to France for the trip in which he would be persuaded to write what
would become Cybernetics. It would be published in 1948 simultaneously in France (in English), by the
publisher who convinced him to write it, and the US., by MIT Press and Wiley & Co., who bullied and
bought their rights to it. See Geoghegan, ‘The Cybernetic Apparatus,’ 96–137, 166–67.
5. For the most sensitive reading of Jakobson’s theoretical and practical relation to cybernetics, see
ibid., 96–137 and ‘From Information Theory to French Theory.’ There is also Céline Lafontaine, ‘The
Cybernetic Matrix of ‘French Theory’,’ Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 5 (2007): 27–46, although, as
far as I am concerned it makes too much out of historical confluences and tends to violently reduce
all of post-War French philosophy to cybernetics. Lafontaine’s mistake is to not see that cybernetics
provides the operative image of the age to which all thought has to, to a certain degree at least, reflect
(as per Cartesianism in Early Modernity), rather than providing all of the philosophies themselves.
6. 82 Wiener, HUHBb.
7. Wiener, Cybernetics, 10–11; The initial model for the notion of information as the reversal of the
second law of thermodynamics is in, Leo Szilard, ‘On the Decrease of Entropy in a Thermodynamic
System by the Intervention of Intelligent Beings,’ in Maxwell’s Demon: Entropy, Information, Computing,
ed. Harvey S. Leff and Andrew F. Rex, trans. Anatol Rapoport and Mechthilde Knoller (Bristol: Adam
Hilger, 1990), 124–133.
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Language’, which was presented the year prior and also published in 1953.8 Unfortu-
nately, despite the pertinence of the French paper’s title, I have been unable to locate
a copy of it, but even though Mandelbrot’s English paper is not ostensibly a paper
on games and there is no mention of Esperanto or Volapük within it, there is reason
for believing that Wiener based his argument on it because of a certain footnote
contained within.
Mandelbrot’s footnote is assigned to his description of a linguistics which ‘[pushes]
de Saussure’s theory [of linguistics] to its logical limits’, a science of language on the
particular level of ‘what remains as consequence of a “grinding” process in which
individual “acts of speech” get averaged into all acts of speech of a single speaker,
then into all acts of speakers.’9 This would seem an apt source for what Wiener refers
to as an ‘attrition of language’. To add that Mandelbrot construes this equilibrium
of speech acts to be analogous to the ‘perfect gas of thermodynamics’ but with the
opposite meaning: instead of being the ‘worst’ case, it is the ‘best’ – a reference, surely,
to Shannon’s identification of entropy with information in opposition to noise.10
Now, Mandelbrot’s actual footnote to this argument itself reads:
De Saussure notes himself that the job of the linguist is similar to that of a man
trying to find out about the essentials of the game of chess by considering first
a single game, then a set of games by one man, and finally all games. This
assimilation of language to a game is very deep, as it will turn out that the tool
which will make possible a mathematical study of the decoding process will be
the modern theory of games of strategy as applied to one of the aspects of de
Saussure’s analogy.11
With this footnote Mandelbrot establishes an association between information theory
and Structuralism, by means of de Saussure’s figure of the chessboard in the Course in
General Linguistics (1906–1911).
‘A game of chess’ de Saussure famously writes, ‘is like an artificial realization of
what language offers in a natural form.’ His rationale is threefold.12
Firstly, the state of the board at any one moment corresponds to the state of a
language. The value of each piece depends on their relative position on the board
in the same way as the value of a word depends on its opposition to all others. Only
when ‘endowed with value and wedded to it’ is an element of chess or language made
real and concrete. One can break an ivory piece and replace it with a wooden one
8. Benoît Mandelbrot, ‘Contribution à la théorie mathématique des jeux de communication,’ Publica-
tions de l’Institut de statistique de l’Université de Paris 2 (1–2 1953); Benoît Mandelbrot, ‘An Informational
Theory of the Statistical Structure of Language,’ in Communication Theory, ed. Willis Jackson (London:
Butterworths Scientific Publications, 1953), 486–502.
9. Mandelbrot, ‘An Informational Theory of the Statistical Structure of Language,’ 488–89.
10. Ibid., 498.
11. Ibid., 489.
12. I read Saussure from, Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans., with an introduc-
tion by Wade Baskin (New York, Toronto & London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), 22–23,
81, 88–89 and 110.
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and it would be of the same value as far as the game is concerned, so long as it has
not moved square.
Second, though the value of a word varies moment to moment as does the value
of a chess piece (even the lowliest of pieces, the pawn, may be more valuable than
another depending on its position, say if it is primed for queening), both language
and chess depend on unchangeable conventions which pre-exist and persist every
game and conversation: the rules of chess and the constant principles of semiology. If
there were no queen, the ‘grammar’ of chess would be entirely different.
Third, in both language and chess, change occurs by the move of a single, isolated,
element: ‘there is no general rummage.’ These changes can ‘revolutionize the whole
game’ or they can have nil effect, it is impossible to foresee what their exact extent
will be. Every move is ‘absolutely distinct’ since it belongs entirely to the change
from one state to another.
On this basis de Saussure introduces his distinction between his own synchronic
linguistics, which concerns the arrangement amongst ‘language-states’, and the or-
thodoxy of diachronic linguistics, which concerns the past and future ‘evolutionary
phase’ and ‘historical grammar’ of a language. In chess, he argues, it only matters
what happened ten-moves prior in as much as this diachronic fact lead to the current
synchronic state of the game, which is all that matters to the player. If one arrives
mid-game, as in a newspaper’s chess puzzle, for example, one can just as much play.
In chess as with language, ‘elements hold each other in equilibrium in accordance
with fixed values, the notion of identity blends with that of value, and vice versa.’13
Now, de Saussure admits that his analogy between language and chess has one
‘weakness’: the need to imagine an ‘unconscious or unintelligent player’ of language
to who makes their moves like the player in chess.14 This ‘sole difference’ is a telling
exception to a supposedly sure analogy. It shows how for de Saussure the presence at
the table of an actual player and their opponent is not significant enough to break the
analogy. The opponent is relegated to a diachronic ‘external force’ as much as is the
previous move a ‘historical event’.15 Both are outside of the present, mathematically
describable synchronic state of the game.16 It is not that they are irrelevant, since ‘a
language can only be compared to the idea of the game of chess taken as a whole,
including both [synchronic] positions and [diachronic] moves’, but they are of a
separate class with purchase only on the past and the future but not the present
state of the game. ‘The synchronic and diachronic “phenomenon” have nothing in
common.’17 The player could be ‘unconscious’, ‘unintelligent’, ‘blind’ or gone fishing
13. Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 22–23, 81, 88–89, 110.
14. Ibid., 89.
15. Ferdinand de Saussure, Writings in General Linguistics, trans. Carol Sanders (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 143.
16. Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 23.
17. Ibid., 91.
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and the synchronic state of play would remain unaffected.
This is because to de Saussure the one who seeks to comprehend the state of play
– the linguist – is distinct from the players themselves. As distinct as the force behind
the metabolism of a plant, which when cut longitudinally, upwards along its stem,
reveals in its fibres its diachronic history, and when cut transversally, horizontally,
its synchronic arrangement.18 It is not that they are opposed by a player but that
the board and both players together are the linguist’s opponent. The entire board
is visible to the structural linguist so long as they are capable of shedding sufficient
light upon it. The actual game of chess for de Saussure has little to do with the two
players, but rather resides in the linguist’s understanding – their sight – of the field of
play. The opponent of this game is no more than natural confusion of ignorance, and while
‘[ignorance] plays a difficult game,’ in Wiener words, ‘he may be defeated by our
intelligence as thoroughly as by a sprinkle of holy water.’19
When Mandelbrot invokes de Saussure’s chessboard as an analogy of information
theory applied to linguistics, he invokes a form of game theory wherein strategy plays
no part. The game is in the challenge of decoding that which is originally encoded
but poses no resistance to the linguist.
This is not to say that the opponent can be fully ‘defeated’. In The History of Lynx
(1991) Claude Lévi-Strauss begins with the image of the chessboard. ‘Did myths not
already lose the game a long time ago?’ he asks.20 No, when ‘we play against myths’,
which may have come ‘from very far away in space or in time’, we should appreciate
that ‘they begin a new game each time they are retold or read.’ They have not been
defeated by science, which itself has to resort to creating its own myths to explain the
such problems as the emergence of life, the prior and after history of the universe, and
so on. The myth does not offer us ‘already-played-out games’ like a game of solitaire,
in which the player passively submits to certain constraints to bring the random
elements of the shuffled pack into order. It is rather like a chessboard, Lévi-Strauss
argues with implicit reference to de Saussure, in that its arrangement can never be
fully solved. With the chequered schema he draws out the Pacific Northwestern
territories of the Salish linguistic group, and moves his first pawn.21
What Lévi-Strauss is here arguing may seem to imply that the myth is an active
opponent who resists defeat, a Manichean opponent. But in fact, to continue the ana-
logy of chess and information theory (which Lévi-Strauss was profoundly influenced
by in the early 1950s, as Geoghegan has highlighted),22 what the undefeatability of
18. Ibid., 87–88.
19. Wiener, HUHBb, 34.
20. Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Story of Lynx, trans. Catherine Tihanyi (Chicago & London: University
of Chicago Press, 1995), xi–xvii. Emphasis added.
21. Ibid., 2–3.
22. Geoghegan, ‘From Information Theory to French Theory’; Geoghegan, ‘The Cybernetic Appar-
atus,’ 138–88.
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the myth signifies is the infinite quantity of information in any myth and chessboard.
This is fundamental to Wiener and Shannon’s definitions of information as having
infinite potential value. As Wiener puts it, ‘the information carried by a precise
message in the absence of a noise is infinite.’23 Lévi-Strauss’ ability to endlessly return
to the same board is inherent in the notion of an Augustinian game theory.
4.2 Cybernetic game theory
Prior to his cybernetic turn during WWII, Wiener’s approach to social ills was
characterised by what he would later call the struggle against Augustinian Evil. As he
wrote in a letter to the microbiologist Paul de Kruif on 3 August 1933:
Knowledge is a good which is above usefulness, and ignorance an evil, and we
have enlisted as good soldiers in the army whose enemy is ignorance and whose
watchword is Truth.24
To fight the war against Augustinian Evil is to shed light where there is darkness,
knowledge where ignorance, since according to it, ‘the black of the world is negative
and is the mere absence of white’.25 This is the struggle of the scientist where ‘the arch
enemy’ is honourable nature’s disorganisation.26 It accords to the universal homeostasis
in Cannon’s concept of ‘learning’.
As Peter Galison insists, as of Wiener’s wartime work on Anti-Aircraft Predictors,
he began to oppose (or, as Galison argues, compliment) this notion of evil with respect
to a Manichean concept, whereby ‘white and black belong to two opposed armies
drawn up in line facing one another.’27 The opponent of this game is a self-motivated,
dishonourable, wilfully malicious enemy who actively resists being rendered intelli-
gible while attempting to render their opponent, their enemy, intelligible for them.
This is an evil whose corresponding good is unrelated to truth or wisdom, but rather
the achievement of their own particular bounded homeostasis. This constitutes a
decisive break with Cannon’s concept of homeostasis as universal wisdom. It returns
to Bernard’s intimation of the concept of homeostasis as conflict, and Vernant, Loraux
and Agamben’s work on stasis as the constitutive dynamic in the establishment of the
political community.
In the Manichean game there is strategy: the decision to reveal information to
certain players and to attempt to hide it from others. The Augustinian game is not
strategic. It is organised around the general moral directive that any sharpening of
information is a good, since all entropy is evil. But this kind of decoding is tenable only
23. Wiener, Cybernetics.
24. Norbert Wiener, Letter to Paul de Kruif, Cambridge: MIT Archives MC22, box 2, folder 38,
August 3, 1933.
25. Wiener, HUHBb, 154.
26. Ibid., 33.
27. Wiener, HUHBb, 33; Galison, ‘The Ontology of the Enemy.’
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in peace, against a controlled and passive opponent like nature. Where the Augustinian
Evil is the opponent in the game of pure scientific interest, the Manichean concerns
the strategic ‘games’ of war, diplomacy, politics, law, business and the war-diplomacy-
politics-law-business of real science.28 Only the latter concerns the production and
control of human societies.
Where Augustinian Evil is expressed by Mandelbrot’s analogy of chess and Shan-
non’s information theory, the Manichean is rooted in von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern’s theory of games, and especially poker. The latter write that the funda-
mental questions essential to all ‘games of strategy’ are:
How does each player plan his course, i.e. how does one formulate an exact
concept of a strategy? What information is available to each player at every
stage of the game? What is the role of a player being informed about the other
player’s strategy? About the entire theory of the game?29
Victory in the Manichean game of strategy is achieved according to the ratio of
knowledge of one player with respect to the other.
If Mandelbrot’s Augustinian game worked from the concept of information in
Shannon’s ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication,’ in which a mathematical
definition of information is given with respect to its opposite, noise, then Wiener’s
Manichean game takes off from Shannon’s seminal paper of modern cryptology,
‘Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems’ (1946; declassified 1949) derived from
his wartime work to prove the security of Roosevelt and Churchill’s encrypted radio-
telephone vocoder system.30 Wiener’s argument can be read as following especially
from a footnote in this paper, too:
See von Neumann and Morgenstern, [A Theory of Games, Princeton, 1947].
The situation between the cipher designer and cryptanalyst can be thought as a
‘game’ of a very simple structure; a zero-sum two person game with complete
information, and just two ‘moves’. The cipher designer chooses a system for his
‘move’. Then the cryptanalyst is informed of this choice and chooses a method
of analysis. The ‘value’ of the play is the average work required to break a
cryptogram in the system by the method chosen.31
This is a game in which a third figure stands between a communicator and listener
who, aware of the rules of their communication, has the goal of ‘jamming’ them. In
the language of contemporary cryptology – the unified study of cryptography and
cryptanalysis – this is called a ‘man-in-the-middle’ attack, whereby a malicious actor
intercepts, modifies and thereby controls the communications between sender and
receiver for their own ends; at stake in this is the secrecy of their conversation, but
28. Wiener, HUHBb, 32–33.
29. Neumann and Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 5.2.1, p. 47.
30. See Kline, The Cybernetics Moment, 31–35.
31. C. E. Shannon, ‘Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems,’ Bell System Technical Journal 28, no.
4 (1949): 704 ft.
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also its ‘integrity’ and ‘authenticity’, the capacities for sender and receiver to trust the
end and origin of their messages.32 As the pre-eminent historian of cryptology David
Kahn writes, ‘if a general cannot rely upon the validity of messages that come out of
his cipher machines, the cryptosystem is worse than useless.’33 Wiener writes that in
order to prevent jamming, the communicator must ‘bluff’ to confound their attacker,
who most understand and adapt accordingly in order to then out bluff in suit. The
‘game’ is in their mutual bluffing and observation.
An everyday example of this that reaches beyond (Shannon’s) cryptographic-
signal engineering, Wiener writes, it that of the scientist who wishes to publish their
research but must play this game with the ‘detective-minded … lords of scientific
administration’ who preside over ‘the realm of official and military science’ who,
on both sides of the Iron Curtain, reduce their information to propaganda.34 (This
helps to explain ‘the barrenness of so much present scientific work.’)35 The precise
dynamics of the game are less important than the overall point, that in this second
kind of game the opponent is no longer the passive entropy of confusion which
confounds all things until they are actively inverted into clear and distinct pleats of
information, for as Shannon writes, ‘from the point of view of the cryptanalyst [who
tries to decipher a message without its key] a secrecy system is almost identical with
a noisy communication system.’36 The opponent of this game is a self-motivated,
wilfully malicious enemywho actively resists being understood by spreading confusion,
whilst trying to undo their own confusion as regards the player.37
This is no longer a ‘game of perfect information’, like that of Saussure, whereby
the positions of all pieces and the choices each player makes are known to both players,
who are thereby able to make rational decisions on the possible consequences of their
own future moves.38 It is more akin to card games, Kriegsspiel or Guy Debord’s Jeu
de la guerre where players have degrees of confusion clouding their knowledge of the
‘state’ of the opponent’s board. Seb Franklin has written that although Wiener was
concerned with machines which could play chess, he was so because he believed it
32. Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, 2nd (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), 48–49, 2.
33. David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966),
754.
34. Wiener, HUHBb, 164.
35. Ibid.
36. Shannon, ‘Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems,’ 685; Kahn, The Codebreakers, 751–52.
37. As Shannon says, ‘The word “enemy,” stemming from military applications, is commonly used in
cryptographic work to denote anyonewhomay intercept a cryptogram.’ See, Shannon, ‘Communication
Theory of Secrecy Systems,’ 657.
38. Von Neumann and Morgenstern introduce the notion of games with perfect information, with a
particular emphasis on chess, in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, §15, pp. 112–28. See also Anatol
Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press,
1966), 19–21, 62; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 75; and Duncan R. Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and
Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey (New York, London & Sidney: John Wiley & Sons, 1957),
41–43.
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could be ‘modelled and automated’, whereas poker, a ‘game of imperfect information’
and von Neumann and Morgenstern’s game par excellence, cannot.39 It is thus the
analogy of poker which best befits the Manichean evil, Franklin argues. While I on
the whole agree, I think it should be added that, given Wiener’s persistent return to
the analogy of chess throughout his cybernetic writings, he was concerned that given
sufficient computing power, certain ‘players’ may end up playing games of perfect
information while their opponents play games of imperfect information – or rather,
where their degree of information with respect to the state of play vastly exceeds
that of their opponent. This is why he depicted Dubarle’s machines à gouverner as a
terrifying ‘chess-playing machine grown up and encased in a suit of armor’,40 and at
the end of his life says of chess playing machines with both relief and trepidation that
‘as yet their complete theory has not been humanly worked out’.41 As I shall discuss,
this is how RᴀNᴅ theorists John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt would in the 1990s
strategise cyberwar: the acquisition by the State of a chess-like ‘topsight’ against a
Kriegsspiel-like ‘blind’ opponent.42 This highlights the logic of the Manichean game:
the player with greater degree of clarity over their opponent is the one in control.
Now, Wiener makes an important departure from von Neumann and Morgen-
stern’s game theory. He accepts the game theory definition of power by access to
degrees of information in respect to the opponent. But he rejects its concept of
subjectivity since, ‘Naturally, von Neumann’s picture of the player as a completely
intelligent, completely ruthless person is an abstraction and a perversion of the facts.43
This, as Franklin notes, is a common critique of game theory, but I shall argue that
there is more to his argument than meets the eye and that it relates to the control of
subjectivity as such.
In CyberneticsWiener says that in society there are ‘knaves’ and ‘fools’. ‘Where
the knaves assemble, there will always be fools;’ Wiener writes, and ‘where the fools
are present in sufficient numbers, they offer a more profitable object of exploitation
for the knaves.’44 The knaves study the psychology of the fool until they become as
malleable and predictable as ‘a rat in a maze.’ The point is that in this situation, only
the knaves act in their own ruthless self-interest ‘in the fashion of von Neumann’s
gamesters’. They do so for economic exploitation or political gain, employing a
‘policy of lies – or rather, of statements irrelevant to the truth’ (hence the Manichean
39. Seb Franklin, Control: Digitality as Cultural Logic (Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 2015),
51–57.
40. Wiener, HUHBb, 154. Emphasis added.
41. Wiener, God and Golem, Inc., 22–23; Wiener uses the occasion of his lecture and discussion at
the 1962 conference to further discuss the dangers of chess playing machines, notably with Hyppolite.
Le concept d’information dans la science contemporaine, Information et cybernetique (Paris: Comité des
Colloques philosophiques de Royaumont, Gauthier-Villars, 1965), 100–132.
42. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), 103–04.
43. Wiener, Cybernetics.
44. Ibid., 159–60.
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good does not concern truth) in order to sell a particular brand of cigarettes or ‘induce
[the fool] to vote for a particular candidate – any candidate – or to join a political
witch hunt.’ Wiener writes, ‘A certain precise mixture of religion, pornography, and
pseudo science will sell an illustrated newspaper.’ And further, ‘A certain blend of
wheedling, bribery, and intimidation will induce a young scientist to work on guided
missiles or the atomic bomb.’ But how do these knaves establish the recipes of their
special blends? Through ‘radio fan ratings, straw votes, opinion samplings and other
psychological investigations, with the common man as their object’. And who is
responsible for performing this research? Precisely those whoWiener refuses to extend
cybernetic methodology to at the end of Cybernetics: sociologists and economists.45
Let me rephrase this in more conventional cybernetic terms. Society consists of
people with lesser degrees of information in respect of their society (‘fools’) and greater
(‘knaves’), or more accurately greater and lesser degrees of both since ‘no man is either
all fool or all knave.’46 There is a degree of foolishness to every knave, just as there is
a degree of entropy in all information. The ‘players’ of a society (the networks of an
internet) embody the theory of information, each possessing a different degree of
information to which their control corresponds. Those with greater information have
the financial means to employ social scientists to feedback the behaviour of those with
lesser information to them, in order that they can better target them with messages that
make them accord with the interests of the sender, the one with more information.
These messages have no connection to truth because their intention is to convince
those with lesser information to behave in a certain way whilst maintaining the
lie of their being unconditioned. This degree of control is successful according to
the discrepancy between the degree of information of the controller and that of the
controlled. Hence, not only does the controller have an interest in refining their
quality of information with respect to the controlled, but also in degrading the quality
of information of the controlled. To feed the controlled back entropy allows the
controller to extract wealth from the controlled (through the sale of their brand of
cigarettes) or extract power, for to amass power is to extract it from another, according
to this zero sum logic. The wealth and power of the controller can be fed back into
further social research, and as such the controllers act increasingly for themselves
whilst the controlled act increasingly for their controller, with an increasingly entropic
and confused capacity to understand who their controller is. This society has no
single homeostasis. It has the homeostasis (negative feedback) of the entrepreneur and
celebrity-politician’s accession at the expense of an anti-homeostasis (positive feedback)
of the confused and controlled consumer, the ever-greater fool who is increasingly
mistaken in their belief that they act for their own interests.
Expand the rules of this game to a cosmos of politicians and capitalists (‘Lords
45. Wiener, Cybernetics, 162–63.
46. Ibid., 160.
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of Things as the Are’) and consumers, and one gets a starkly different image of a
society governed by communication, a society in the image of the internet, than
one does from Cannon’s ‘social homeostasis’ or Licklider’s ‘supercommunity’. This is
the Manichean game which defines the conflict of power on the internet between
networks by means of control.
4.3 Leibniz’s jest
The distinction between an Augustinian evil and Manichean can be read in a more
nuanced way by distinguishing the heterogeneity of the elements (the problem of the
One and theMany) as ensuing from the problem of translation, for the Augustinian evil,
and control, for the Manichean. This would be a distinction based on an affirmative,
continuous reading of Leibniz’s theory of games, as Michel Serres has done, and a
discontinuous, critical variant by Wiener.
Preempting von Neumann and Morgenstern, Leibniz proposed an (unrealised)
‘comprehensive study of games, dealt with mathematically’: first of all a study of ‘all
the games which rely on numbers’, then ‘the games which also involve position, such
as backgammon, checkers and especially chess’; and lastly ‘the games which involve
motion, such as billiards and tennis.’47 He contributed to the Prussian Academy’s first
scientific study of games and held Fermat, Pascal and Huygens’ pioneering studies of
‘games of chance’ [de aléa] in high regard, writing, ‘Games themselves deserve study,
and if a penetrating mathematician were to investigate them, he would find many
important truths, for men never show more spirit than when they are jesting.’48
Leibniz preempts de Saussure by using chess to illustrate the relationality of space
as the relative place of bodies in relation to one another. Where de Saussure writes
how, as with language, the internal state of the board is dependent on the singular
relation of the pieces to one another such that ‘the fact that the game passed from
Persia to Europe is external’,49 Leibniz already in the New Essays (1705) invokes
the image of Arabs ‘playing chess on horseback by memory’ to illustrate how ‘place’
is determined either in particular with respect to other bodies or universally with
respect to the universe, even if those relations are imagined within the mind.50 The
roving chess-speaking Arab condenses into one the structuralist analogy of chess and
language, place as relationality and relationality as sign.
The employment of chess as a model of relationality and the idea that games
47. Cited by the editors of G. W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. and trans. Peter
Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), lxiv–lxv.
48. Leibniz, ‘Reply to the Thoughts on the System of Pre-established Harmony Contained in the
Second Edition of Mr. Bayle’s Critical Dictionary, Article Rorarius’, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 584.
Also Loemker’s Introduction, fn. 39, p. 61.
49. Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 22.
50. New Essays on Human Understanding, 148–149
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exhibit the divinity of a mind coincide in the notion of the échantillons architectoniques,
the operative image. To re-enter Leibniz’s system through the Theodicy’s section
T147 to which he refers the reader of the Monadology’s paragraph M83 which I
discussed earlier on in respect of the ‘operative image’, and mentioned in respect of
the Leibnizian-Hobbesian monster with which I began our discussion:51
Here is another particular reason for the disorder apparent in that which concerns
man. It is that God, in giving him intelligence, has presented him with an image
of the Divinity. He leaves him to himself, in a sense, in his small department,
ut Spartam quam nactus est ornet. He enters there only in a secret way, for he
supplies being, force, life, reason, without showing himself. It is there that free
will plays its game: and God makes game (so to speak) of these little Gods that he
has thought good to produce, as we make game of children who follow pursuits
which we secretly encourage or hinder according as it pleases us. Thus man is
there like a little god in his own world or Microcosm, which he governs after his
own fashion: he sometimes performs wonders therein, and his art often imitates
nature.52
How does this game, this totality of rules herein defined by Leibniz, work? God,
whose omnipotence is matched by his omniscience and perfect benevolence, who
knows everything to its infinitely clear and distinct degree, God for whom nothing
is secret, sneaks secretly into the chambers of the universe in which humans reside,
their minds. The game God plays is like a speculative Hide and Seek subject to the
Law of Continuity. He enters ‘in a secret way … without showing himself’, and
through his cryptographic fulgurations he (re)creates the world at each moment,
choosing according to his perfect wisdom the best possible variant. As échantillons
architectoniques humans finitely imitate his knowledge, power and will, but given that
these are encoded in an infinite series of cryptograms, this imitation game involves a
cryptanalytic decipherment.53 The game that is played is played between God and
mind is that of cryptology, of God’s encipherment and of the mind’s decipherment.
Games, Leibniz tells us, improve the ‘art of invention’,54 and this is so because to
invent is to imitate God’s own machines, through the operative image, and thereby
become a little divinity of a microcosm. In order to imitate one needs to decipher,
one needs to see what is already there but hidden. Leibniz envisages a deciphering
machine, the art of combinations, an algebra for all things, a complex alphabet of
arithmetically arrangeable concepts.55 Not only would this be applicable for mere
51. See pp. 32–35 above.
52. T147. Translation from G.W. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man
and the Origin of Evil, ed., with an introduction by Austin Farrer, trans. E. M. Huggard (Bibliobazaar,
2007).
53. It is common to confuse cryptography, as the enciphering of a message, with cryptanalysis, as the
deciphering of message. Deleuze makes this mistake when he writes in The Fold, ‘A “cryptographer”
is needed, someone who can at once account for nature and decipher the soul, who can peer into the
crannies of matter and read into the folds of the soul.’ Deleuze, The Fold, 3.
54. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, §466.
55. Leibniz depicts his arte combinatoria for his disputation for the philosophical faculty at Leipzig, and
4.3. LEIBNIZ’S JEST 93
arithmetic, logic and music but for ‘various games’, and also cryptography as well
as its opposite, the ‘[analysis of] what has been compounded’, what is today called
cryptanalysis.56
Now, as Lucie Mercier has written in her thesis The Inside Passage (2017), Michel
Serres developed for Structuralism a cybernetic reading of Leibniz which pivots
around cryptology for his own doctoral thesis, Le Système de Leibniz et ses modèles
mathématiques (1968).
Recognising that representation involves for Leibniz a ‘passage from confusion to
truth’, Serres conceives of the understanding as a layered and confused ‘palimpsest’
through which knowledge, says Mercier, ‘becomes an operation of decipherment.’57
To resolve through Leibniz’s calculus an equation is to ‘[reproduce] the operations of
perceptions but via symbols’. This is, in Serres’ words, a progressive ‘decomposition
of the cryptogramme, extraction of the resolving element.’58
When Mercier writes that Serres ‘does not address mathematical idealities as mere
givens, rather he adopts a genetic perspective on them’, we are called to rethink
Socrates, Meno and his unnamed slave’s rediscovery of the doubled square in a twice
Leibnizian sense: since he deciphers a knowledge that was inside of him all along
but occluded, but also, as we learn following Socrates’ first question, because he speaks
Greek:
Serres considers the translational origin of geometry from the perspective of a
regular dialogue between two interlocutors. For communication to take place,
‘two persons need to know the same graphic, they need to know how to code
and decode a meaning by means of the same key.’59
Like the soil in which Meno’s slave draws his square, like the infinite other variations
of possible vocables, the cryptogram’s key is established through the distinction
and separation of ‘background noise’. As de Saussure says of the chessboard, its
configuration is unique, and what is moreso than a monad, subject to ‘Leibniz’s
law’ of the identity of indiscernibles whereby any two things that are not absolutely
alike cannot be one and the same thing. (M9) The deciphered key is the image in
the sand with all its contours and irregularities, its image is not the ideal form but
the Dissertatio de arte combinatoria, also written in 1666, is an expansion of his thesis. Philosophical Papers
and Letters, 73–84.
56. In his ‘Letter to Walter von Tschirnhaus’ (May 1678), Leibniz writes, ‘Cryptography is also a part
of this science, although the difficulty here lies not so much in compounding as in analyzing what
has been compounded, or in investigating its roots, so to speak. What a root is in algebra a key is in
cryptographic divination.’ Philosophical Papers and Letters, 192–93, See also, ‘On Universal Synthesis
and Analysis, Or the Art of Discovery and Judgment’, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 233.
57. Mercier, ‘The Inside Passage,’ 106. Serres’ thesis Le Système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques
(1968) still awaits translation and has received little Anglophone engagement, and as such I rely fully on
Mercier’s account of it. To avoid added confusion I may simply refer to Serres’ reading of Leibniz as
such, whereas in truth I rely on the tripple ‘translation’ of Mercier’s reading of Serres’ reading (plus of
course my own reading of Mercier). Make of this palimpsest what you will.
58. Ibid., 107.
59. ibid., 153, emphasis added; Plato, Meno, 81–82.
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only a model, in as much as all monads but God express the universe from their
own perspective of varying degrees of distinction and confusion. As Mercier writes,
‘only the understanding of each topography’s specific lineaments, can provide a
comprehensive universality.’ For Serres, the passage from local to universal calls for
a ‘method by models’ and a ‘philosophy of the example’, whereby the example is
concretely an image. Irreducible to one another, these échantillons archetectoniques
have no single universal language and communicate through translation amongst
languages, model to model, image to image. This is a communication governed by
decipherment, of a refining of the key. Leibniz, says Serres, ‘deciphers their languages
as two different languages designating a single meaning, translatable into one another
by a common law: the translation from centre to centre.’60
This affords a productive and critical potential. As every monad reflects every
other, everything can be translated, everything can be rendered analogous, every lan-
guage bears a parallelity, but all of this only to a degree since, though the cryptogram
is progressively decomposable (broken down), the monad itself is ultimately indecom-
posable: there is no universal language but that of the combinatorial arts, which is a ‘system
of faithful translations’. That everything appears through combinatorial translation is,
for Serres, Leibniz’s own ‘transcendental’.61 The Structuralists can describe so many
‘languages’, Lévi-Strauss can endlessly play chess against a single myth. There are as
many operative images as there are operations in need of modelling.
This jars with Wiener’s cybernetics, for which, I seek to argue, there is a single
language, a single operative image for every age, which for ours, I am arguing, is
the internet. For which there is a metaphysical language which does not translate
transcendentally at all but describes according to a single historically situated ontology,
a ‘fundamental science’ in Heidegger’s words,62 which is heterogeneous because the
homeostases of its networks conflict. This construes the entire social life of humans
according to a single cybernetic-game theoretical vocabulary of conflict and control,
which Serres’ universal translatability is incapable of accounting for and, moreover,
engaging politically with.
Wiener’s position parallel’s Bruno Latour’s depiction of how, ‘Serres abandoned
Leibniz. Serres did his thesis on Leibniz, the reconciliator par excellence. But then he
slowly realized that the sciences were not a way to limit violence but to fuel it.’63 In
Wiener’s transition to the problematic of Manichean evil he too abandons Leibniz.
Wiener would have also agreed with Latour that with the internet,
60. Mercier, ‘The Inside Passage,’ 182.
61. Ibid., 118. Emphasis added.
62. Martin Heidegger, ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,’ in On Time and Being,
trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York, San Francisco & London: Harper & Row, 1972), 58.
63. Bruno Latour, ‘The Enlightenment Without the Critique: A Word on Michel Serres’ Philosophy,’
in Contemporary French Philosophy, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989), 92.
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There are neither wholes nor parts. Neither is there harmony, composition,
integration, or system. How something holds together is determined on the
field of battle, for no one agrees who should obey and who command, who
should be a part and who the whole.
• There is no pre-established harmony, Leibniz notwithstanding, harmony is
postestablished locally through tinkering.64
In the next chapter I shall show that Wiener indeed himself abandoned Leibniz,
the ‘patron saint for cybernetics’, whose philosophy more than any other profoundly
influenced him in his formative youth, and which provides the foundation from
which Wiener could critically re-calibrate Leibniz’s system into cybernetics and the
operative image of a Manichean internet. This would be his monstrous Hobbesian
fusion.
64. Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambrdige, MA
& London: Harvard University Press, 1988), 164.
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Chapter 5
Internets
5.1 Back to the Neo-Kantians
Of all the aspects of Leibniz’s system that could be emphasised, from Wiener’s ‘prodi-
gious’ youth onward he seemed to have gravitated to the fact that, as he wrote in his
entry on Metaphysics for the 1918-1920 Encyclopedia Americana, ‘Leibniz regarded
the monads as possessing ideas of various grades of clearness and distinctness, and
believed that matter was made up of those with the vaguest ideas.’1 This is to the
extent that among his other philosophical entries for the Encyclopedia (Soul, Substance,
Mechanism-Vitalism, Dualism, Postulates, …), which he considered ‘fresh … original
and good’ still after Cybernetics to the extent of having ‘toyed’ with the prospect of
republishing them,2 there is, surprisingly, an entire entry on ‘Apperception’. That
is, the term which Leibniz invents in 1700 to institute a distinction between per-
ceptions and the act of perceiving [apercevoir] from the self-conscious apperception
of the content of perceptions themselves [s’apercevoir de], which in theMonadology
he describes as ‘the consciousness or the reflective knowledge of this internal state’
(M14).3 Leibniz’s distinction between apperception and mere perception would afford
in the nineteenth century the distinction between perceptions which are conscious,
and those which are unconscious, and it is within this context that Wiener situates his
Encyclopedia entry. Further, this distinction furnishes the basis of the older Wiener’s
concepts of information and entropy, for a cybernetics premised on a precise break
with the monadology.
Wiener introduces apperception as ‘a psychological term referring to higher con-
sciousness’ which has come under ‘considerable confusion’ in Anglophone psychology
1. NorbertWiener, ‘Metaphysics,’ inNorbert Wiener: CollectedWorks, ed. P. Masani, vol. 4 (Cambridge
& London: MIT Press, 1918), 939.
2. Wiener, Ex-Prodigy, 251.
3. See, Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, 161–62, xlix; ‘Principles of Nature and of
Grace’, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 637; R. McRae, Leibniz: Perception, Apperception and Thought
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976); and Deleuze, The Fold, 98–99.
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such that the Encyclopedia’s intervention (rather than exegesis) is called for. Returning
to Leibniz, he writes that the ‘ “windowless” monad’, which every human soul is,
‘develops by an inner unfolding’, and when this unfolding reaches a ‘point of clear
self-conscious being’, he writes, it attains ‘apperceptive consciousness’. But, ‘[if] this
development is only partial, if its states are vague and only partially self-conscious’,
then the monad has only attained a ‘level of perceptive consciousness.’ As Leibniz
says, ‘we always have an infinity of minute perceptions [petites perceptions] without
being aware of them. We are never without perceptions but are often without
apperceptions, namely when none of our perceptions stand out.’4 Wiener continues,
‘Thus for Leibniz the terms perception and apperception designated simply different
degrees of clearness and distinctness of consciousness … with no reference whatever
to the apprehension of external things.’5
It is striking that Wiener makes no mention in ‘Apperception’ of his teacher
Bertrand Russell’s venerable A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (1900).
This, given that the book resuscitated Leibniz scholarship in English and that Wiener
wrote his 1913 doctoral thesis on Russell and Whitehead’s mathematical logic, that he
studied under Russell at Trinity College in 1914 and wrote in 1915 a lengthy paper
on ‘Bertrand Russell’s Theory of the Nature of Reality’. The intersection in Russell
of the great reader of Leibniz and symbolic logician of the age seems in retrospect
obvious for someone who would go on to write,
just as the calculus of arithmetic lends itself to a mechanization progressing
through the abacus and the desk computing machine to the ultra-rapid comput-
ing machines of the present day, so the calculus ratiocinator of Leibniz contains
the germs of [Turing’s] machina ratiocinatrix, the reasoning machine.6
But Wiener in a section of the 1918 Encyclopedia Americana’s ‘Metaphysics’ entry en-
titled ‘The Metaphysics of the Technical Philosopher’ casts Russell aside as ‘essentially
a Humian in spirit’ and therefore the ‘recrudescence of British empiricism … [which]
is off the main stream [sic] of philosophical development during the latter part of the
18th century and the entire 19th.’7 With respect to Russell’s logic Wiener consistently
takes a parallel position in his later cybernetic writings, effectively dismissing his logic
as rigid and homostatic, unlike Gödel and Turing’s.8
4. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, 162.
5. Norbert Wiener, ‘Apperception,’ in Masani, Norbert Wiener: Collected Works, 4:951–952.
6. Wiener, Cybernetics, 141. Turing himself said: ‘I expect that digital computing machines will
eventually stimulate considerable interest in symbolic logic…The language in which one communicates
with these machines … forms a sort of symbolic logic.’ Martin Davis, The Universal Computer: The Road
from Leibniz to Turing (New York & London: W. W. Norton, 2000), 3-20, 199.
7. Wiener, ‘Metaphysics,’ 939.
8. In a manuscript from 1952 entitled The Book and the Church Wiener recollects how he considered
Russell and Whitehead’s attempt to provide a ‘complete set of postulates covering all of logic’ in actual
fact only a mere ‘written codification of a process which was actually employed in thinking’, an
observation he recalls having received – surprisingly – ‘scant support from Mr. Russell’ when put to
him in Cambridge whilst writing the Principia Mathematica. Wiener would carry this view through his
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To Wiener the source of ‘main steam’ modern European philosophy is Kant, and
in ‘Apperception’ he turns from Leibniz instead to the Neo-Kantians – the fourth
generation post-Kantians whose works flourished until the end of WWI.9 Specific-
ally, to Johann Friedrich Herbart and Wilhelm Wundt, who instituted the use of
‘apperception’ in psychology.
How didWiener encounter Neo-Kantian psychology? For one, there is a straight
passage of ideas toWiener from the Neo-Kantian philosopher Rudolf Hermann Lotze,
whom Gillian Rose reminds us was widely considered in the late-nineteenth century
to be on a par as a philosopher with Kant and Hegel.10 During Wiener’s PhD at
Harvard between 1911-1913 (he completed at eighteen years of age) Wiener took a
course with George Santayana, who not only left onWiener a lasting impression ‘that
philosophy was an intrinsic part of life, or art, and of the spirit’, but who wrote his own
doctoral thesis on Lotze.11 The youngWiener also attended two-years of seminars on
scientific method under Josiah Royce, who himself studied under Lotze, supervised
Santayana’s thesis, and would have, had health permitted, supervised Wiener’s too;
these seminars would be recalled by Wiener as having given him ‘some of the most
valuable training I have ever had.’12 But I would argue that the most important
conduit to the Neo-Kantian ideas of Herbart and Wundt would have been William
James, himself highly indebted to Lotze, whose books Wiener ‘devoured’ as a child,
being taken less by James’ pragmatism than his psychological writings wherein ‘his
insight showed itself in every paragraph’.13
James’ major textbook The Principles of Psychology (1890) makes good use of all
three Neo-Kantians and singles out Wundt’s apperception (he quotes Wundt on it at
length with reference to Leibniz) for apparently being identical to his own concept
of ‘adjustments’, the results of sensorial and ideational processes discharging into the
life, conforming it to Gödel’s insistence on the incompleteness of logical systems: ‘Logic is an account
of a process which goes beyond its formal rules … incompleteness belongs to the nature of logic itself’.
(The Book and the Church, pp. 1–3) In A Treatise on Cybernetics, another manuscript penned the same
year, he similarly writes that Russell and Whitehead’s classical mathematical logic ‘has arrived at a sharp
consciousness of its own limitations through the work of Gödel and Turing, and Turing’s work is more
particularly associated with the machina ratio sinatrix.’ (p. 2) The Book and the Church extends this to
Wiener’s (unfortunately cliché strewn) description of the ‘Bible of Marx’ and the ‘Church of Stalin’ from
the conclusion of HUHBa. The point is that Russell and Whitehead’s work presents logic as rigid and
homostatic, whereas Gödel, Turing and thereby the digital computer opens the field to infinite variety
and change. See also Ex-Prodigy, 193.
9. Nicolas deWarren and Andrea Staiti, ‘Introduction: towards a reconsideration of Neo-Kantianism,’
inNew Approaches to Neo-Kantianism, ed. Nicolas de Warren and Andrea Staiti (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2015), 5–6, 10; Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft, eds., Neo-Kantianism in
Contemporary Philosophy (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010), 1.
10. Gillian Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology (London: Athlone Press, 1995), 5.
11. Wiener, Ex-Prodigy, 164–66, 171.
12. ibid.; Wiener mentions Lotze in his Encyclopedia entry on ‘Soule’, and references him in ‘Meta-
physics’; For introductory remarks on Lotze, see: Manfred Kühn, ‘Interpreting Kant Correctly: On the
Kant of the Neo-Kantians,’ in Makkreel and Luft, Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, 124–26.
13. Wiener, Ex-Prodigy, 109–10.
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brain, body or environment.14 The ‘nuclear self’, James writes, is not a single and static
being but ‘adjustments collectively considered’. Wiener quotes from The Principles of
Psychology in his ‘Apperception’ entry to invoke James’ image of a baby’s perceptions
being ‘one great blooming, buzzing confusion’, a ‘chaos’ of little perceptions which
education shall distinguish and render rational ‘cosmos’, albeit in a non-progressive
fashion.15 Though James is never mentioned in the older Wiener’s works, it seems
likely that this early encounter had a special influence on him given his cybernetic
depiction of self-regulation as ‘adjustment’,16 life itself as ‘metastability’ and death as
‘stability’.17 James’ emphasis on living individuality as collective adjustment has its
philosophical roots in Leibniz, for whom life and death are distinguished by varying
degrees of activity in perception and ‘every monad is adjusted … that its perceptions
will always accord with every other created monad.’18 Yet for Leibniz the accord of a
monad’s perceptions with another’s occurs not through their actual adjustment with
each other but through their pre-established ‘adjustment’ by God. For James as for
Wiener, young and old, adjustment is rooted in Leibniz’s concepts of perception and
apperception but read specifically through a Neo-Kantian rejection of pre-established
adjustments. We shall return to the profound consequences of this for cybernetics.
Wundt, the young Wiener writes, adopted the distinction between ‘apperception’
for mental process that are clear and distinct and under the ‘control’ of volition and
‘uncontrolled’ or obscure ‘perception’. It is this distinction which English psychologists
have become confused over, he writes, since in English ‘perception’ implies an already
clear and self-conscious recognition of things. These English psychologists are like
Cartesians, in Leibniz’s words, ‘who have given no thought to perceptions which
are not apperceived.’ (M14) The emphasis on control in respect of the degree of
apperception is striking with hindsight, but more so is his depiction of Herbart:
With Herbart all mental acts are but the interaction of ideas. When a new
idea enters the mind it causes a connection among the ideas already present. It
disturbs the equilibrium. It is welcomed by the ideas akin to it, and opposed
by those which are not. When it finally becomes adjusted and settled into its
proper position among pre-existing ideas the new relation thus brought about is
the result of apperception.19
He continues,
As the bodily organism separates and assimilates only such elements of the food
taken into it as are needed for growth and repair, so in some what similar manner
does the mind select and appropriate only such of its presentations as manifest a
14. William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1931), vol. I, 302–03.
15. Wiener, ‘Apperception,’ 951–52; Wiener quotes from, James, The Principles of Psychology, vol I,
488.
16. Wiener, Cybernetics, 181.
17. Ibid., 58.
18. M51, M69.
19. Wiener, ‘Apperception,’ 951.
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certain kinship to what is already consciously and vitally present, and rejects the
rest.20
Through Herbart’s reading of apperception the young Wiener seems to have already
struck on the tenet of what he would call ‘cybernetics’. That a mind is no more than
the interaction of its ‘ideas’ (messages); that an idea ‘enters the mind’ (communication)
and thereby disrupts its ‘equilibrium’ (metastability), forcing it to change (control); that
the mind automatically adjusts itself to a condition of equilibrium by assimilating
certain ideas and expelling others (homeostasis, negative feedback, self regulation); that
the organism (life), functions analogously to cognitive systems (thought) in this respect,
selecting from its environment what gives it life and expelling that which does not. To
read the conclusion of ‘Apperception’ that, ‘The point is that in all perception there is
more or less apperception’, may not be striking in itself a reading of Leibniz, but when
the same writer would invent the modern concept of information a quarter-century
later as the ‘negative logarithm’ of confusion and entropy, that ‘Entropy is a measure
of disorder, information a measure of order’, the correlation of apperception and
information, and likewise perception and entropy, becomes hard to ignore.21 That as
there are infinite degrees of clear and distinct apperceptions and infinite degrees of
confused and indistinct perceptions for Leibniz, for information theory there is an
infinite quantity of information and as much for entropy.
The sense in which Herbart and Wundt are not a ‘recrudescence of Leibniz’ for
the young Wiener may be illustrated by W. T. Harris’ introduction to Herbart’s
A Text-Book in Psychology (1891), in which Kant is described as importing ‘almost
exactly’ Leibniz’s apperception into the transcendental unity of apperception.22 This
is, of course, not exactly the case, neither because Kant’s use of apperception is so true
to Leibniz’s nor because the Neo-Kantians are so to Kant. Although the central role
apperception plays for the Critique of Pure Reason is a reason Kant could characterise
the first Critique as ‘the genuine apology for Leibniz’ contra his Cartesian ‘partisans’,23
the apperceptive self-consciousness that Leibniz intended appears in the CPR only
as ‘empirical apperception’, that is, the ‘inner sense’ and ‘consciousness of oneself
in accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception’. (CPR
A106) This apperception is, for Kant as for Leibniz, episodic; Leibniz writes: ‘we
are nothing but empiricists’ – lacking in apperceptive self-consciousness – ‘in three-
20. Ibid.
21. HUHBb, 102. In Cybernetics, 64, he makes the famous definition: ‘we have said that amount of
information, being the negative logarithm of a quantity which we may consider as a probability, is
essentially a negative entropy.’
22. Johann Friedrich Herbart, A Text-Book in Psychology, ed. William T. Harris, trans. Margaret K.
Smith (New York: D. Appleton, 1891), xv.
23. Immanuel Kant, The Kant-Eberhard Controversy: An English Translation Together with Supplementary
Materials and a Historical-Analytic Introduction of Immanuel Kant’s on a Discovery According to Which
Any New Critque of Pure Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One, trans. Henry E. Allison
(Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1973), 250, 160.
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quarters of our actions.’ (M28) Kant’s empirical apperception, which corresponds
to Leibniz’s apperception, is preceded by the ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental’ apperception
which, ever-present, grounds the possibility of unifying intuitions and the concepts of
the understanding into judgements.24 For Kant, transcendental apperception, unlike
empirical apperception, is the undetermined source of its own determinations. It
gives rise to the cogito, the original ‘I think’ which allows the synthesis of intuitions to
be the property of a subject.25
But for Leibniz it is precisely what he derides as the ‘Scholastic prejudice’ of
the Cartesians with their determining spirit’s cogito – its being substantially separate
from the body-machine – which his apperception is deemed to annul. (M14) For
Leibniz the reflexivity of apperception allows a mind to discover innately within itself
necessary metaphysical notions such as God, being, substance and infinity, and as
such allow it to think an ‘I’ from which all these are contained and derived.26 Kant’s
use of apperception cannot be read as an ‘almost exact’ import of Leibniz’s since Kant
distinguishes an originary, pure and persistent sense (the transcendental apperception)
from a determined and intermittent sense (empirical apperception). A consequence
of this is a shift in emphasis from Leibniz’s degrees of perception and apperception of
any and every substance to, in the CPR, the architectonic of the possible knowledge
of the human alone (although in the Critique of Judgement and Opus Postumum the
problem of non-human cognition would return to trouble him27).
As concerns theNeo-Kantian employment of apperception, Michel Fichant argues
in his Dictionary of Untranslatables entry on ‘Perception/Apperception’ that Herbart’s
use of apperception construes it to be the observation of already-formed perceptions,
the ‘I’ (or ‘ego’) is thereby not the origin of apperception, as per both Leibniz and
Kant (in their distinct ways), but the result.28 Following Nicolas de Warren and
Andrea Staiti, one might say that when Fichant dismisses Neo-Kantianism as ‘the
end of the philosophical use of the term “apperception”,’ he resonates the two typical
24. Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1995), 81–83.
25. B132–141. Herbart himself rejects the spontaneous combination of the manifold on the basis
that combination results from the ‘immediate unity of the soul’ rather than by a spontaneous act. Also,
because he sees the combination of the manifold as dependant on the external condition of the way in
which intuitions meet. He also asserts that spontaneity cannot be supported by empirical psychology
(which is surely one of Kant’s arguments for it, but anyway.) Herbart, A Text-Book in Psychology, 50–51.
26. M30 and ‘Principles of Nature and of Grace’, Philosophical Papers and Letters, §5, 638.
27. In the CJ Kant is moved to reflect on nature in terms of purposiveness, although he recoils from
depicting it in terms of inner determination and restricts natural purposiveness to the ‘as if’ of empirical
determinability. (CJ 195–97) Varela and Weber argue in ‘Life after Kant’ (2002) that this renders his
Newtonianism tenuous and thereby introduces an ‘unstable middle position’ which allows, in the form
of a ‘work in progress’ pursued into the OP, the concept of self-organisation or autopoiesis to emerge.
Interesting as this argument may be especially to Kant scholars, to me it seems that we can already look
towards Leibniz for a philosophy which accounts for the self-production of organisms, and that what of
this problem is found in Kant can be traced back to a Leibnizian problematic rather than his original
invention.
28. Fichant, ‘Apperception’, Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon, ed. Barbara Cassin
et al., trans. Steven Rendall et al. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014), 767.
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responses to Neo-Kantianism among philosophers since its fall to oblivion after
WWI.29 First, that expressed by Lukác’s characterisation of Neo-Kantianism as being
a bourgeois academic philosophy isolated from the concrete dialectical forces of world
history, and thereby being ‘totally insignificant for the evolution of philosophy’.30 And
Heidegger’s 1929 characterisation of Neo-Kantianism as a mere ‘theory of knowledge’
[Erkenntnistheorie] that effectively legitimises the natural and social sciences’ claim to
dominion over all realms of knowledge and absconds philosophy from metaphysics
and the ontological problem of being.31
A century on from its post-WWI collapse, efforts are now underway to restore
legitimacy and interest in the movement through emphasising its under-recognised
effects on twentieth century European thought.32 Warren and Staiti’s edited volume
points to the crucial role Neo-Kantianism played in the ‘ “pluralisation” of rational-
ity’ into disciplines such as art history, sociology and, not least, cognitive psycho-
logy. They argue that if the universality of philosophy is construed in the sense
of philosophy’s capacity to speak productively to disciplines other than itself, then
Neo-Kantianism represents one of philosophy’s last universal frameworks.33 Rudolf
A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft’s volume rebukes the construal of Neo-Kantianism’s
rendering of philosophy the ‘handmaiden of the sciences’ by emphasising its parti-
cipants’ lasting contribution to the philosophy of culture, and moreover the hidden
dependencies of many of Neo-Kantianism’s contesters on its own affirmations, or
at least their negations thereof, whether phenomenology, critical theory or other
philosophies born of the interwar crisis of German culture and science.34
It is within the context of the contemporary reappraisal of Neo-Kantianism
that a rereading of Wiener’s cybernetics contextualised by it might take place. For
example, that the Neo-Kantians considered developments in the exact sciences to be
challenges for philosophy to bridge, rather than positivistic existential threats to be
29. The reasons for Neo-Kantianism’s decline were not just limited to philosophical debates, although
one might argue they were reflected in them. It failed to recruit new members as members passed
away in the 1920s, and was significantly effected by the rise of antisemitism given that many Neo-
Kantians, including Ernst Cassirer and Richard Hönigswald were Jewish, as was the founder of the
Marburg School, Hermann Cohen, who died in 1918. In Nazi exile their network became fragmented
and their output and reception suffered. As Makkreel and Luft argue, even though Cassirer enjoyed
success in American exile after 1933, his works there were introductory and he was received more as
a classical historian of ideas rather than the creative philosopher of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.
Makkreel and Luft, Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, 7; Warren and Staiti, New Approaches to
Neo-Kantianism, 8.
30. Georg Lukács, The Destruction of Reason, trans. Peter Palmer (London: Merlin Press, 1980), 322;
Warren and Staiti, ‘Introduction: towards a reconsideration of Neo-Kantianism,’ 4–5.
31. Warren and Staiti, ‘Introduction: towards a reconsideration of Neo-Kantianism,’ 6–15; Martin
Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 5th ed., trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington, Indiana:
Indiana University Press, 1997), 193–194.
32. These take off from the only major history of the movement in English, Klaus-Christian Köhnke’s
The Rise of Neo-Kantianism (1991), whose Kuhnian study ends in 1900.
33. New Approaches to Neo-Kantianism, edited by Warren and Staiti (2015).
34. Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Makkreel and Luft (2010).
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dismissed, seems to be also fundamental to the older Wiener’s outlook. The Neo-
Kantian framing of philosophy in systematic terms to concrete human subjectivity,
lending itself as it does to ethical, political, pedagogical and theological considerations,
resonates through Wiener’s critical reflexivity with regards to the use and dangers
of cybernetics for human society and, in his final book especially, with respect to a
relation to God. And negatively, perhaps Heidegger’s attacks on the Neo-Kantians
from the outset of his project to develop a fundamental ontology could be reread
through his twilight lamentations of cybernetics having become the ‘universal science’
of the age.35 These are possibilities whose investigation lies beyond the scope of this
thesis, but which I raise as possible avenues for untouched research (so far as I am
aware).
For now, I leave things by posing that Wiener’s early encounter with the Neo-
Kantian psychologists’ reading of Leibniz by Wundt, Herbart and James was a form-
ative moment in the development of cybernetics and that Wiener’s Leibnizianism
shares with them certain qualities. An emphasis on apperception in the sense of
a subjective principle of knowledge formation rather than a mode of discovery of
innate ontological truths. Apperception construed not only in terms of the conscious
perception of inner ideas but also that of sense-impressions, since as Herbart writes,
‘the inner perception is analogous to the outer.’36 Consequently, that substances, contra
Leibniz, have windows. The capacity to refer to the cognitive capacities of non-human
animals, unlike the Kant of the CPR and as per Leibniz’s Principle of Continuity
(‘nature never makes leaps’37) since for Herbart all animals share the ‘lower’ faculties of
‘imagination’ and ‘sensuous pleasure’ but humans, crossing the threshold of conscious
apperception, are capable of higher ‘understanding’ and ‘aesthetic feeling’.38 With
Wiener’s science of control and communication in animals and machines this would
of course continue to be the case.
To pursue this argument would be to counter such claims as Heidegger’s student
Hans Jonas, that cybernetics is ‘out to capture’ philosophy.39 Rather, it would be to
position cybernetics within the context of, as Makkreel and Luft say, the ‘prematurely
silenced’ field of Neo-Kantianism.
35. Heidegger explicitly turns to cybernetics as of the mid-1960s, in End of Philosophy and Task of
Thinking (1964), the Der Spiegel interview (1966), the Zollikon (1967) and Heraclitus (1966) Seminars
and his birthday address to Eugen Fink (1966). Unfortunately several dimensions of translational
problems afflict a reading of these, and not only for the usual reasons of traduttore, traditore do they
exemplify Wiener’s claim that ‘any transmission of, or tampering with, messages decreases the amount
of information they contain, unless new information is fed in.’ (HUHBb, 84)
36. Herbart, A Text-Book in Psychology, 30–31.
37. As formulated in the New Essays, §56. Leibniz rephrases the axiom differently throughout his
work. In the Monadology, §13 he writes: ‘every natural change takes place by degrees’. In his letter
to Burcher De Volder of March 24/April 3 1699: ‘no transition is made through a leap’. The principle
holds that there is an infinity of points between any two given points, whether spatial (‘compound’) or
otherwise. Philosophical Papers and Letters, 515
38. Ibid., 38, 45.
39. Jonas, ‘Critique of Cybernetics,’ 190.
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5.2 Wiener’s determinations
To Leibniz the distinction between apperception and perception accounts for every
substance being an entelechy, or, as Hermolaus Barbarus translated this Aristotelian
concept into Latin (having apparently consulted none other than the Devil), a perfecti-
habia. Substances – entelechies and perfectihabias – lack nothing since they actively
realise their own potency, a ‘complete specification’ (M12) which is pre-established by
God according to his perfect wisdom, but which is only apparent to the created sub-
stances themselves according to their singular degree of self-reflective apperception,
the continuum of greater or lesser perceptions which are also their degree of perfec-
tion. Implicit in this is that Leibniz denies inter-substance causality (M7) that monads
have ‘windows’, since all action is the progressive unfolding of an essential inner
intra-substantial causation. Monads do not act on one another. Their perceptions and
apperceptions are of themselves. Although ‘we say that’ one monad acts on another,
especially in the spatial realm of extended (or rather ‘compounded’) substances, this,
Leibniz holds is never truly the case. What we mean when we say that one monad
acts outwardly is that it has a greater degree of perfection and apperception, that it
has a greater explanatory power than that which we say is acted upon.40 The monad
of the mind can be said to cause the monads of the fingers and toes to swim in the sea
because, although the digits perceive the infinite ripples and contours of the water,
the mind has a greater degree of clear and distinct perceptions than the confused little
digits and it can thereby offer a better explanation. The mind, in this situation, has a
greater degree of ‘action’ than the fingers and toes, which have a greater degree of
‘passion’. The calculus is implicit in this: the differential of the mind’s apperceptive
activity with respect to the perceptive passivity of the digits constitutes the degree
of what we may say is the mind’s causal power over the toes. A fish can be said to
have been caught on the spear because it was more confused than the hunter. But
the mind has also its degree of confusion, the waves crashing on the distant shore are
confused and indistinct to it, and when, back on the boat, sleep takes over, the ways
of the waves lose even more clarity and distinction.41 There is only one substance
which is pure of all confusion and indistinction at any and every moment – God –
whose infinite perfection and apperception in respect of the world allows us to say
that all things are his effects and none are his cause.42 God is the apex of a pyramid of
perceptions and thereby power which cascades down through all beings.
To phrase this differential of causes and effects in Leibniz’s monadology inversely,
the degree to which one being is secret to another is the degree to which it can be
40. Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone
Books, 1990), 328.
41. Leibniz employs his famous image of the crashing waves in ‘Principles of Nature and of Grace’,
Philosophical Papers and Letters, §13, 640.
42. See, M19/20 and Strickland’s explanations pp. 111–13.
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said to be in control.
Where for Leibniz the active but unconscious striving of all things towards perfection
is an hermitic affair, an undulating continuum of cryptological perceptions pre-
established by God at the outset of time and continuously recreated, for the Wiener
of cybernetics, it is a cryptological communion of the Godless little gods. Where
for Leibniz the fundamental substance of the universe is the monad, for Wiener it is
the ‘black box’, a machine whose output can be predicted by means of its input, but
whose internal transformations are yet unknown.
In Cybernetics Wiener situates his main engagement with Leibniz within the
context of a history of automata, the rational explanation and reduplication of the
mechanisms by which nature operates. The problem of the three operative images:
the clock, the steam engine and the cybernetic machine (the internet). For the Early
Moderns after Descartes this question centres around the means by which the soul
and body maintain unison despite their substantial differences, and it is in respect of
this problem that Leibniz liked to employ his figure of ‘two clocks or watches which
are in perfect agreement’.43 Wiener’s argument here in Cybernetics rehearses that
made in his Encyclopedia Americana ‘Metaphysics’ entry, working through Descartes
to the Occasionalists Malebranche and Geulincx and then onto Spinoza and Leibniz.
These in turn echo Leibniz’s argument from ‘A New System of the Nature and the
Communication of Substances, as well as the Union Between the Soul and the Body’
(1695) and his following letter to Basnage de Beauval (1696).44 In these Leibniz treats
the mind-body problem (‘how the body causes anything to take place in the soul, or
vice versa, or how one substance can communicate with another created substance’45)
with analogy to relations of force in material systems, and thereby, like Geulincx
before him (whether he knew so or not), invokes the image of the two clocks which
keep in perfect concordance because the master clockmaker God has coordinated
their internal principles of change in advance such that they can act ‘entirely as if they
were mutually influenced or as if God were always putting forth his hand’.46 Leibniz
(and not Hobbes, as for Otto Mayr) is rendered the representative of the Age of the
Clock when Wiener writes:
Leibniz considers a world of automata, which, as is natural in a disciple of
Huygens, he constructs after the model of clockwork. Though the monads
43. Leibniz, ‘A New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances’, Philosophical Papers
and Letters, 459.
44. Compare, for example, Wiener, Cybernetics, 40–44, to ‘Metaphysics,’ 938–39, and ‘A New System
of the Nature and the Communication of Substances’, Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 454–60.
45. Ibid., 469.
46. Ibid., 457; Arnold Geulincx, Ethics, ed. Hans van Ruler, Anthony Uhlmann, and Martin Wilson,
trans. Martin Wilson, with a comment. by Samuel Beckett (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2006), §19, p. 232.
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reflect one another, the reflection does not consist in a transfer of the causal
chain from one to another. They are actually as self-contained as, or rather more
self-contained than, the passively dancing figures on top of a music box. They
have no real influence on the outside world, nor are they effectively influenced
by it.47
It is Leibniz’s image of the clock which is succeeded in the nineteenth century by
those for whom the body is a heat engine (by implication, Claude Bernard and Charles
Darwin). Their model is in the twentieth century overturned by the communication
theorists, by cybernetics.
This is not a linear evolution. For one, because clocks and heat engines, like
those of their respective Ages still retain a use value in a way that, for example an
Intel 386 CPU from 1989 would no longer do today. But moreover because the
problematic which Leibniz established is the same which Bernard and Darwin and the
cyberneticists in turn have attempted to answer. Wiener writes, ‘I may be pardoned
the fancy of thinking that if Leibniz were alive today, he would adjust himself rather
readily to the present modes of thought. Even though the answers which we now
give differ from the Leibnizian answers, the questions posed are very similar.’48 And in
HUHBb, ‘My views in this book are very far from being Leibnizian, but the problems
I am concerned with are most certainly Leibnizian.’49 This is not just to say that
Leibniz contingently shared today’s interests, that ‘even in his computing machine,
Leibniz’s preoccupations were mostly linguistic and communicational’;50 but that
with his operative image of nature Leibniz provides the foundation for the cybernetic
ontology.
This can be shown by comparing the foundational cybernetic text, ‘Behavior,
Purpose, Teleology’ (1943) by Wiener, Rosenblueth and Julian Bigelow (chief engin-
eer to be of von Neumann’s MᴀNIᴀᴄ), to Leibniz’s own first mature philosophical
publication, ‘Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas’ (1684).51 Both texts are
similarly attempts to delimit series of recursive sets of categories delineating infinitude
such that their structures are homomorphic conceptual trees, which I have reproduced
on p. 111. The design of both trees is defined by the negativity of knowledge and
power on the lower-left and their positivity on the upper-right, both of which signify
an infinity of degrees. I wish to argue that the cyberneticians’ reanimation of Leibniz’s
ontological system can be discerned through an overlaying of these two schemas,
together with a subsequent paper by Wiener and Rosenblueth, ‘The Role of Models
in Science’ (1945), which draws out an implicit aspect of their 1943 work to explicitly
invent, I believe, the modern philosophical concept of information.
47. Wiener, Cybernetics, 41. He repeats the image of the music box in HUHBb, 22–23
48. Wiener, Prolegomena to Theology, 60.
49. Wiener, HUHBb, 20.
50. Ibid.
51. Collected in, Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 23–27.
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The root of the tree in ‘Behavior, Purpose, Teleology’ is behaviour, defined as ‘any
change of an entity with respect to its surroundings’.52 By this definition the paper’s
schema can be read as one of control, since Wiener will soon define control as ‘nothing
but the sending of messages which effectively change the behavior of the recipient.’53
Behaviour (or control) is conceptualised through the model (or substance) of the
box, whose output is a ‘change produced in the surroundings by the object’, and
input is ‘any event external to the object that modifies this object in any manner.’54
Now, behaviour can either be active or passive, and there is an infinite degree of each.
This is the first set the authors give, although they write that it could be extended
further to the negative – there is no limit to how passive behaviour can be. Active
control is that in which an object is the source of its own output. Passive, where
the input ‘energy’ (to later become ‘message’: cybernetic concepts are still presented
in ‘Behavior, Purpose, Teleology’ in a thermodynamic vocabulary) is the source of
its behaviour, where another is in control. A number of axioms are already implicit
here. The terms of this discussion are those of servomechanics, implying the model of
‘boxes’ which take inputs and outputs. The box is in an environment. It is, one might
say, an ‘open system’ which means that the question of its activity or passivity is not
binary and simple but is determined deferentially, box-to-box and boxes-to-boxes.
There can always be a greater degree of energy running into the box’s output stream
than the box is capable of engaging itself, and vice versa.
The concept of activity is refined according to a further continuum: purposivity
and non-purposivity (or randomness). Something with a degree of activity can be said
to have purpose if its ‘act or behavior may be interpreted as directed to the attainment
of a goal.’55 Key here is may be interpreted, almost apologetically invoked, which
signifies that this schema is an epistemology concerned with possible knowledge,
rather than absolute classification, and that the subject of knowledge is distinct from
its object. The behaviour of something does not equate to its having selected for itself
that purpose. This is as much as to say in the Aristotelian taxonomy of causes that the
final cause cannot be reduced to the efficient, except it goes further: one can only
interpret the presence of the efficient causes from a final cause, and this interpretation
is always subject to more or less certainty. In this way it breaks free of the strict
delineations Aristotle imposed over what kind of being could have purpose. The
roulette wheel is designed for purposelessness, they write, but their argument implies
that any serious gambler would study the wheel for flaws that might imply patterns
52. Wiener, Rosenblueth, and Bigelow, ‘Behavior, Purpose, Teleology,’ . Given this paper’s five-page
brevity I hope the reader may excuse me from referring to individual pages in what follows.
53. Wiener, HUHBa, 8. Emphasis added.
54. Wiener, Rosenblueth, and Bigelow, ‘Behavior, Purpose, Teleology,’ 1.
55. Ibid.
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and thereby purposes in its results. This emphasis on the determinability of an entity’s
purposivity is crucial, as we shall soon see.
Continuing along the taxonomy. There is a kind of purposivity which is guided
by negative feedback, whereby ‘the signals from the goal are used to restrict outputs
which would otherwise go beyond the goal.’56 On the opposite spectrum there is
non-feedback, an example given being a frog who shoots their tongue towards a fly and
cannot alter course when away it moves. Again these are not absolutes, but infinities:
non-feedback can be seen as the vacillation of a positive feedback which has become so
extreme as to render it altogether entirely without feedback in any meaningful sense.
The self-regulating negative feedback can in turn be predictive or non-predictive. It
can feed its inputs and outputs through a store of memory and extrapolate a prediction
of a future relevant to its intended purposive behaviour, a prediction which, by
definition of the future’s uncertainty, can always be improved and can therefore
always be rendered for the worse.
Along this axis, the Cyberneticists argue, all things can be classified according
to their perceived behaviour. If, as for Leibniz following Aristotle, the entelechy of a
being is defined according to its capacity to strive towards its own ends, then this is a
scale by which the ‘perfection’ of every being can be assessed. The axis defines their
ontology.
What distinguishes this from Structuralism is that it posits a single ontology: one
continuum for all things, all situations, all machines. Whilst it can be used for analogies,
between a roulette wheel and a frog for example, there is no translation between
models: only a universal grammar. This becomes even more apparent in Wiener and
Rosenblueth’s subsequent paper, ‘The Role of Models in Science’ (1945), in which they
discuss the ‘progressive concretization of a theoretical model’ (a formulation befitting
of Simondon) from a state of simplicity to one which ‘asymptotically [approaches] the
complexity of the original situation.’57 ‘The best material model for a cat’, they write,
‘is another, or preferably the same cat.’58 ‘The only completely satisfactory map to
scale of a given country [is] that country itself.’59 ‘The ideal formal model would be
one which would cover the entire universe, which would agree with it in complexity,
and which would have a one to one correspondence with it.’60 Whoever could ‘grasp
the universe directly as a whole … would possess the third category of knowledge
described by Spinoza.’ The ultimate concretisation of the model is that by which
56. Ibid., 2.
57. Norbert Wiener and Arturo Rosenblueth, ‘The Role of Models in Science,’ Philosophy of Science
12, no. 4 (October 1945): 320.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
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knowledge is eternal and anticipates all, which ‘knows all the things that can follow’,
in which an eternal mind agrees in essence with all essences including God.61
But Spinoza’s third category of knowledge (tertium cognitionis) is ruled out (or at
least ‘probably’). Rather we live with partial models, since ‘the main tool of science
is the human mind and that the human mind is finite.’ Once again, Wiener may
have already decided on this during his PhD.62 If that is the case then, as with his
Encyclopedia entries, with cybernetics Wiener finally gave his own answer to the
question of the rational organisation of substances. But this would not be complete
without its key category, information.
Wiener and Rosenblueth’s ‘Models’ paper begins with the observation that ‘the
scientist behaves dualistically, [but] his dualism is operational and does not necessarily
imply strict dualistic metaphysics.’63 Their reference to metaphysics might be surpris-
ing in the paper with which Wiener first expounds the modern concept information,
that is, in the guise of ‘operational dualism’.
Like the ‘Behavior’ paper this paper is also replete with such dualisms. Simple
systems and complex systems. Factual and abstract problems. The specifics of lower
levels like the effect of a drug on nerves and higher levels which evade testability.
These are all quite quotidian until they describe material models as distinct from formal
models. The former being, ‘the representation of a complex system by a system
which is assumed simpler and which is also assumed to have some properties similar
to those selected for study in the original complex system’.64 At the very least the
material model would change a scale, like studying a blue whale by means of a dolphin.
The formal model is ‘a symbolic assertion in logical terms of an idealized relatively
simple situation sharing the structural properties of the original factual system.’65 The
vocabulary does not yet exist, but this dualism seems to suggest the distinction between
analogue and digital computers, which Wiener formally presents to the world in
Cybernetics.66 The ‘analogy machine’, as he there calls it, the pinnacle of which being
Vannevar Bush’s differential analyser which tended to be built of rods, wheels, disks,
61. Wiener and Rosenblueth, ‘The Role of Models in Science.’ Spinoza, Ethics, V P31–33, Complete
Works, 376–77.
62. Wiener submitted an entry to Harvard’s prestigious Bowdoin Prize in 1912 in which he discusses
the occasional presence of self-consciousness and concludes: ‘The knowledge of relations, then, is the
beginning, the end, and the whole of true knowledge. It is all that we have, and it gives us all that we
need for science. Our knowledge is an imperfect and incomplete map of reality, drawn to scale, which
can be improved and corrected as time goes on, though the material on which it is written is a matter
of indifference.’ – information is information, not matter or energy – ‘The task of science is to explore the
unknown parts of existence, and to survey and plot its known parts.’ The Place of Relations in Knowledge
and Reality, 25.
63. Ibid., 317.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. For a palpable sense of the ‘shock of the new’, see the Le Monde review of CyberneticswhichWiener
translates the concluding paragraphs of for inclusion in HUHB. It especially focuses on the invention in
the USA of the new kind of computer. Pierre Dubarle, ‘Une nouvelle science: la cybernétique. Vers la
machine à gouverner...,’ Le Monde, December 28, 1948,
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Behavior

Active

Purposeful

- Feedback/
Teleological

Predictive/
Extrapolative
Non-Predictive/
Non-Extrapolative
Non-Feedback/
Non-Teleological
Non-Purposeful/
Random [clock]
Non-Active/
Passive
Figure 5.1: Schematic diagram provided in Wiener et al., ‘Behavior, Purpose, Tele-
ology’, p. 3. Braces added.
Knowledge

Clear

Distinct

Adequate
{ Intuitive [∞]
Symbolic/
Blind
Inadequate
Confused
Obscure [-∞]
Figure 5.2: Diagram representing the schema of Leibniz’s ‘Meditations on Knowledge,
Truth, and Ideas’.
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belts, spheres and other mechanical elements (Meccano versions were constructed
in Britain67), represents its object on ‘some continuous scale’ to a degree of accuracy
determined by its size, like a slide rule. The ‘numerical machine’ represents arithmetical
and logical algorithms by means of (preferably binary) numbers, giving potentially
infinite degrees of accuracy.68 As Wiener says, ‘The former measures. The latter
counts.’69 If the material model and analogue computer (analogy machine), and formal
model and digital computer (numerical machine) can be aligned, then we see that for
Wiener the distinction between the machines is no more than methodological, hence
his claim in 1961 that ‘the difference between the digital and the analog machine is a
matter of inconvenience in technique, and not of great philosophical importance.’70
The dualism of the material model (analogue computer) and formal model (digital
computer) ensues from the more fundamental dualism whose grammar is established
by their distinction between an open box and a closed box problem.71
This distinction between an open and closed box in effect rephrases the purposive
and non-purposive behavioural distinction from their ‘Teleology’ paper, which, we
recall, concerns not exactly whether a thing seeks after its own end or not but rather
the degree to which this can be ‘determined’. The open and closed box are ideas, they
stand for the capacity to determine an entity’s activity, purposivity, self-regulation,
predictability and extrapolability – which is to say, its self-determination. The terms
‘open box’ and ‘closed box’ would be respectively replaced by white box and black
box,72 thereby avoiding confusion between ‘open systems’ and ‘closed system’, systems
which are open to external influence, and avoiding the confusion of thinking that
a model could be completely open or closed to the observer, pitch black or pure
white. Every real box appears to be a shade of grey, to others and to itself. Black is its
indetermination, its perception, its passion; white its determination, its apperception,
its activity. In the ‘Models’ paper Wiener and Rosenblueth write:
There are certain problems in science in which a fixed finite number of input
variables determines a fixed finite number of output variables. In these, the
problem is determinate when the relations between these finite sets of variables
are known. It is possible to obtain the same output for the same input with
different physical structures. If several alternative structures of this sort were
inclosed in boxes whose only approach would be through the input and output
terminals, it would be impossible to distinguish between these alternatives without
67. Wiener says that of all the possible physical quantities the analogue computer could measure,
such as ‘currents or voltages or the angles of rotation of shafts or quantities of still different sorts
… the form to which [Bush’s differential analyser] gravitated was a form of meccano set’. I Am a
Mathematician, 136. On differential analysers actually built of Meccano in the UK in 1930s see, William
Irwin, ‘The Differential Analyser Explained,’ Auckland Meccano Guild, July 2009, accessed August 20,
2018, http://amg.nzfmm.co.nz/differential_analyser_explained.html.
68. Wiener, Cybernetics, 116–32, especially 117–19.
69. Wiener, I Am a Mathematician, 137.
70. Wiener, Prolegomena to Theology, 60.
71. Wiener and Rosenblueth, ‘The Role of Models in Science.’
72. Wiener, Cybernetics, 180.
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resorting to new inputs, or outputs, or both. For instance, a given electrical
impedance as a function of frequency can be realized with many different
combinations of resistances, capacitances and inductances. As long as closed
boxes containing such elements are only tested for self and mutual impedances
across the terminals, their accurate internal structure cannot be determined. To
determine that [internal] structure additional terminals would have to be used.
The more terminals available, the more open the system. An entirely open system
would need an indefinite number of terminals.73
Their use of ‘determinacy’ here is double. As a verb concerning inputs (‘any event
external to the object that modifies this object in any manner’) which determine –
in the sense of a restriction (de-termino, ‘of limits’) – behavioural outputs (‘change
produced in the surroundings by the object’). This is to say, control its behaviour.
And as an adjective that designates the possibility of determining knowledge in the
sense of imposing boundaries on the continuum of otherwise indefinite possibilities,
possibilities which otherwise appear a ‘homogeneous chaos’, to use a phrase ofWiener’s
from 1938.74 A closed box is one whose internal structure is indetermined, which
could be constituted by an infinite number of possible functional arrangements even
though its output behaviour corresponds to any other. A dog may exhibit as much
pleasure as a human when fed chocolate, but without imposing further types of inputs
(‘terminals’) on it, the chocolate’s poisonous effect on its organs will be indeterminable.
By employing more terminals it becomes more of a white box to me. The black box’s
inner determinations become lighter, but there is no pure white since an indefinite
(infinite) number of terminals would be thereby needed; for the same reason there is
no completely closed box either.
Now, the more open a box becomes to me, the more my determination of it
increases, the more I am able to determine its behaviour. Hence the opening words
of Wiener and Rosenblueth’s paper: ‘The intention and the result of a scientific
inquiry is to obtain an understanding and a control of some part of the universe.’75
Understanding and control, knowledge and power, cannot be separated, they are one
and the same. This is why cybernetics is the science of communication and control. Why
it being named after Watt’s governor is so appropriate: the governor is a device which
continuously determines the engine in both the sense of determining a communicative
understanding (input) and determining its behaviour (output).76
73. Wiener and Rosenblueth, ‘The Role of Models in Science,’ 318–19. Emphases added.
74. Norbert Wiener, ‘The Homogeneous Chaos,’ American Journal of Mathematics 60, no. 4 (October
1938): 897–936.
75. Wiener and Rosenblueth, ‘The Role of Models in Science,’ 316. Emphasis added.
76. A recent paper by physicists Jordan M. Horowitz and Massimiliano Esposito, ‘Thermodynamics
with Continuous Information Flow,’ Physical Review X 4, no. 3 (July 2014) (2014) attempts a ‘tweezing
apart’ of the ‘continuous coupling’ of input and output in autonomous systems such as the thermodynamic
governor and homeostatic organism, in order to quantify their information. It is striking that though
aware of Szilard’s rendition of Maxwell’s Demon, a milestone of information theory, the authors seem
oblivious to the paradigmatic cybernetic history of their problematic, as though completely forgotten.
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The statistical terms into which ‘determination’ would concretise fails to capture
this unity. ‘Information’ and its negative logarithm entropy were first propounded in
Wiener’s Cybernetics77 and equivalently in Shannon’s ‘A Mathematical Theory of
Communication’ (and it seems that Shannon, who almost always takes the concept’s
credit today, was far more under Wiener’s influence than vice-versa78). Information
and entropy (or ‘noise’) bear no semantic relation to one another and so encourage,
certainly in popular discourses at least, tendencies to, firstly, treat information and
entropy as two separate concepts; secondly, to forget that both information and
entropy are infinite quantities; and thirdly, to fail to realise the dual meaning of
them as both communication and control. One might argue that this has encouraged
the recrudescence of Cartesianism, of knowledge and body as distinct from one
another. Information has been identified with the message itself, with the total
possible epistemological determination of a communication, occluding the necessary
indeterminacy of every viewpoint; it renders finite the possible determinability of
knowledge and power; and it reimposes the notion of an immaterial knowledge and
knowing substance distinct from the body and its dynamic forces.
While Léon Brillouin’s neologism ‘negentropy’ perhaps dampens the first two
problems above, it still fails to speak for the third and moreover it further occludes
the concept’s philosophical genealogy.79 Instead, retaining the vocabulary of determ-
inability and indeterminability and their various cognates helps situate the concepts
of information and entropy within not only Wiener and Rosenblueth’s pre-1948
writings but also the history of philosophy, without reducing their mathematical
novelty. Doing so emphasises that the problematic Wiener and Rosenblueth refer to
originates in Aristotle’s famous discussion of whether a determination of there being
a naval battle tomorrow necessarily determines its occurrence.80 And it helps reveal
the concepts in Leibniz’s system, since as Nicholas Jolley argues, it was the ancient
and medieval Aristotelian tradition of the problem of determinism with respect to
truth that Leibniz was most interested, rather than that of causal determinism as per
77. Wiener, Cybernetics, 10-11, 58, 62, 64.
78. Bigelow recalled: ‘In the time I was associated with Wiener [at MIT], Shannon would come
up and talk to Wiener every couple of weeks and spend an hour or two talking with him…Wiener
would exchange ideas with him in a most generous fashion, because Wiener had all the insights of what
information theory would be like and he spewed out all these ideas and his comments and suggestions to
Shannon.’ (Kline, The Cybernetics Moment, 31–32) As Kline charts, they both formulated the statistical
definition of information at roughly the same time, Wiener in respect to time series and neural nets
and Shannon in respect of cryptology. Despite the much vaunted fact that Wiener defined information
as negative entropy and Shannon as positive entropy, they considered their definitions functionally
identical. (ibid.) Shannon himself wrote a footnote in ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication’
stating that ‘Communication theory is heavily indebted to Wiener for much of its basic philosophy and
theory.’ (p. 34ft).
79. ‘Negentropy’ is first employed in Leon Brillouin, ‘The Negentropy Principle of Information,’
Journal of Applied Physics 24, no. 9 (24 1953): (1952).
80. Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 18b17–19b1.
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contemporaries like Hobbes.81
For Leibniz this is expressed in his principle of sufficient reason, or as he refers
to it in the Theodicy, the ‘principle of determinate reason’ [le principe de la raison
déterminante],82 one of the two ‘great principles’ which grounds reason – the other
being the principle of non-contradiction (or principle of identity) which stakes that,
‘We judge false that which includes a contradiction, and true that which is opposed
or contradictory to the false’83, or ‘A is A and cannot be non-A’.84 The principle of
determinate reason stakes that ‘nothing happens without a reason why it should be so
rather than otherwise’,85 or as in the Theodicy,
that nothing ever happens without there being a cause or at least a determinant
reason, that is, something that can serve to explain a priori why it is existent
rather than non-existent, and why it is thus rather than any other way. This
great principle holds for all events, and a contrary example will never be given:
and although most often these determinant reasons are not well known to us, we
nonetheless sense that there are some.86
The principle states that there is a determinate reason to the existence of all
things, the occurrence of every event and the necessity of all truths. This is to say,
a cause which determines every effect, but a cause which is grounded in reason, or
more specifically, in the being with the greater clarity of reason since, as Deleuze
says of Leibniz, ‘Causality always moves not just from the clear to the obscure, but
from the clearer (or more-clear) to the less-clear, the more-confused.’87 In every
monad but God’s, every created substance, there is an infinity of such causes, an
indeterminate quantity of determinations. As not only cause but also effect, we minds
are ‘insufficiently acquainted’ with our determinations, ‘most often these reasons
cannot be known to us’, (M32) but the faculty of reason and moreover our knowledge
of the existence of the ‘universal determining cause’ (God)88 depends on the acceptance
of the principle of determinate reason. And our limited apperception with respect to
our predetermination by God, our ‘complete specification’ which we unfold from
creation on, is what allows us to consider ourselves free. We can consider ourselves
free because we cannot apperceive our infinite predeterminations. What of our
little perceptions we do apperceive, we do by degrees, which is to say limitedly,
but also in terms of discreet quantities, like the differentiation of a curve whose
precision tends asymptotically towards precision, or as Wiener and Rosenblueth say,
81. Jolley, Leibniz, 126.
82. Leibniz, Theodicy, §44.
83. M31
84. Second letter to Caroline and Clarke, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 677; See also his ‘Letter to
Herman Conring’ (19 March 1678), Philosophical Papers and Letters, 187.
85. Second letter to Caroline and Clarke, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 677.
86. Ibid., §150. Strickland’s translation, from the Appendix to his translation of the Monadology.
87. Deleuze, The Fold, 134.
88. ‘On What is Independent of Sense and of Matter: Letter to Queen Sophia Charlotte of Prussia’
(1702), Philosophical Papers and Letters, 552
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‘asymptotically [approaches] the complexity of the original situation.’89 Leibniz’s
principle of determinate reason grants minds the possibility to ever ascend or descend
the ladder of determining causes.
Leibniz’s system contains a taxonomy of this asymptote which is functionally equival-
ent to that in Wiener, Rosenblueth and Bigelow’s ‘Behavior, Purpose and Teleology’,
in which one never constructs a perfect model (or a perfectly base one) for if one
did it would be, as per the principle of non-contradiction, the same thing entirely.
As Wiener and Rosenblueth argue, ‘Lewis Carroll fully expressed this notion in an
episode in Sylvie and Bruno, when he showed that the only completely satisfactory
map to scale of a given country was that country itself.’90 Leibniz’s taxonomy is laid
out in his ‘Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas’ (1684) wherein he elaborates
on the argument that:
knowledge is either obscure or clear, and again, clear knowledge is either con-
fused or distinct, and distinct knowledge either inadequate or adequate, and
adequate knowledge either symbolic or intuitive: and, indeed, if knowledge
were, at the same time, both adequate and intuitive, it would be absolutely
perfect.91
I have drawn this out into a tree diagram on p. 111.
The problem which gives force to Leibniz’s schema is Descartes’ depiction of
truth as being in ideas that are inseperably clear and distinct, such that they cannot be
doubted, as opposed to the falsity of the confused and obscure.92 For Descartes these
are binary categories. An idea is clear if it is ‘present and accessible to the attentive
mind’, distinct when clear and also ‘so sharply separated from all other perceptions that
it contains within itself only what is clear.’93 Methodologically, Descartes separates
knowledge which is confused and obscure, such as that provided by the immediate
senses, from knowledge which is clear but not distinct, such as pain, from knowledge
which is clear and distinct, such as the cogito, the three substances (mind, body, God),
duration, order, number, and so on. The obscure and confused, the clear but confused,
and the clear and distinct are the three degrees of knowledge for Descartes. The third
degree pertains to those truths which are universally accessible to every mind.94
With the Meditations on Truth and Knowledge Leibniz retains the Cartesian phrase
‘clear and distinct’ but construes it within a continuum of an infinity of degrees such
that one can have certain degrees of clear and distinct perceptions simultaneously to
89. Wiener and Rosenblueth, ‘The Role of Models in Science,’ 320.
90. Ibid., 320. Wiener and Rosenblueth are referring to vol. I, ch. 11 of Carroll’s final work.
91. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 24.
92. Descartes, Discourse on Method, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I, 130.
93. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I, 207–08.
94. Principles of Philosophy, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I, 208, 211.
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having an infinity of degrees of confusion, an unfathomable proposition for Descartes.
Where for Descartes the clear and distinct emerge from God while the confused and
obscure ‘participate in nothingness’,95 for Leibniz, as Deleuze says, ‘clarity emerges
out of obscurity by way of genetic process’,96 through an inversion or fold. This
system allows him to attribute varying degrees of clarity and distinction, confusion
and obscurity, to every substance (not only minds) at any given moment, and present
them as reflecting the entire universe of substances but from a haecceitic perspective
and degree, each a differently clouded mind, such that every monad can be situated
singularly with respect to one another.
Further, to Descartes’ diad of clarity and distinction Leibniz adds adequacy and
intuition, and to both an inverse form. His tetralogy of positive terms (clear, distinct,
adequate, intuitive) does not merely add two new categories but reconfigures their
entire system to be concerned with knowledge as an infinite quantity which emerges
out of its inverse, as determination from indetermination.
Leibniz conceives of the obscure as analogous to the one who cannot recognise in
the flower before them the flower of their memory, or who (the Schools be thanked)
cannot sufficiently grasp Aristotle’s concept of entelechy or the Four Causes. The clear,
‘when I have the means for recognizing the thing represented’, is either confused
or distinct. Such recognition itself is either confused or distinct, and this depends
on what degree it is enumerable into individual ‘marks’ [nota] or not. Hence we
cannot explain the colour red to a blind person if it is only clear to us, but if we can
distinctly ‘enumerate’ it like a assayer would of gold, then we would, through the
conceptual language of mathematics. A distinct knowledge of simple notions is one
thing, but with respect to composites, it is either inadequate or adequate, the latter
being approached by ‘the knowledge of numbers’ – an allusion perhaps to his calculus
of reason. The adequate in turn is either symbolic (or blind) or intuitive, the latter when
every aspect of a notion is considered in all of its complexity, the former when its
sense ‘appears only obscurely and imperfectly to the mind’.97
Deleuze, referring to Serres’ 1968 dissertation and Yvon Belaval’s Leibniz cri-
tique de Descartes (1978), describes the various aspects as ‘filters’ [filtre] of obscurity,
confusion, inadequacy and blindness.98 Any clarity or adequacy that a monad has is
only so because it has emerged out of its opposite, its determinations filtered from its
indetermination. Mercier, writing on Serres, writes of the progressive decomposi-
tion of a cryptogram as an ‘application of successive filters’.99 A filter is an apparatus
95. Discourse on Method, 38.
96. Deleuze, The Fold, 90.
97. Leibniz, ‘Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas’. Like the cyberneticians’ ‘Behavior,
Purpose, Teleology’, this is a very short text, just over four pages long, and so I refer to the paper in its
entirety not individual pages.
98. Deleuze, The Fold, 90–91.
99. Mercier, ‘The Inside Passage,’ 107.
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which encodes, in output mode, and decodes (in input), a modulator-demodulator
‘modem’ that is a fundamental model for both Wiener and Shannon’s communic-
ation theories, Wiener writing of it ‘transmitting power of the entire complex’ of
a sequence of communication.100 Perhaps a thinking in terms of lens filters could
give sense to Wiener’s odd reading that Leibniz conceived of his windowless monads’
perception ‘largely in optical terms’, that ‘interaction really becomes nothing more
than a subtle consequence of optical interaction’.101 Deleuze, Serres and Mercier
intimate the repetition of Leibniz’s schema in the cybernetician’s ‘Behavior, Purpose
and Teleology’.
But not to a sufficient degree. The filter may be a model for communication but,
once again, not for control. The trajectory Leibniz pursues in his schema is that from
a determination of the mere effects of things, the infinite obscurity and passivity of a
blade of grass, to a determination of their causes, the infinitely intuitive, absolutely
perfect knowledge and activity of God. What the schema charts is not only degrees
of perception and apperception conceived as communication, but of power, since the
monad with the greater causal power is that with the greater degree of apperception.
A monad’s level of activity and passivity, its degree of acting or being acted upon,
is an attribute of its degree of knowledge with respect to another monad. Leibniz’s
taxonomy is a cascading pyramid of determination in its double sense of knowledge
and power, with the primitive monad of God at its apex, the bare monads of minerals
and plants at its base, and animal souls and minds vacillating in between across all the
aspects to various degrees. This is not only a pyramid of knowledge but also one of
power. But of course, only by analogy since there is no inter-substance causality.
5.3 Breaking the pyramid
From Wiener’s reading of the Neo-Kantian psychologists onward, substances are
construed as actually intercommunicating, no longer by mere analogy. As de Saussure
might have said, this one change alone ‘revolutionizes the whole game’. Yet the
Structuralists do not grasp the extent of this revolution, which does not just shift the
grammar of the pieces but adds a very real opponent – it shifts the very nature of the
game itself.
To ‘play’ against God in Leibniz’s monadology is to decipher that which appears
obscure within oneself, to reverse one’s own passivity. This is obviously a single
player game not a game of strategy, a game of science not of politics or war. To play
the game as a scientist in the cybernetic schema is to decipher that which is inside or
100. Wiener, HUHBb, 149. The modulator-demodulator is the model for Shannon’s ‘A Mathematical
Theory of Communication,’ and his theory was developed with respect to his work on the cryptographic
vocoder system employed by Roosevelt and Churchill duringWWII. See, Kline, The Cybernetics Moment,
31–32
101. Wiener, HUHBb, 19–20.
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that which is outside but determined by the ‘absence of a conscious or purposeful’
opponent.102 Wiener was fond of Einstein’s formulation, ‘God may be subtle, but he
isn’t plain mean’ to depict the opponent of science, but his system implies that not only
is God subtle, he is infinitely weak and passive: in accordance with the second law
of thermodynamics, God’s universe degrades towards a final heat death.103 Leibniz
vehemently opposed any notion of the universe being imperfect when he argued
against the Newtonian belief (at least that so characterised by Leibniz) that ‘force does
naturally lessen in the material universe’ such that ‘God Almighty wants [i.e. needs] to
wind up his watch from time to time; otherwise it would cease to move.’104 Whether
Leibniz would understand cybernetics or not, as Wiener believed he would, he would
have certainly despised it: not only is the universe so deficient as to persistently wind
down but there is even no God to wind it back up again. Instead the universe is only
‘wound up’ locally by beings (machines, animals, humans, boxes, forms of life) which
act as ‘little gods’ in that they represent ‘pockets of decreasing entropy in a framework
in which the large entropy tends to increase.’105 This is so because in homeostasis
they have sufficient activity to determine their own adaptation instead of passively
letting the universe determine it according to its natural death drive. They act as
Maxwell demons which locally reverse the second law of thermodynamics by sensing
and sorting (determining in both senses of communication and control) the entropic
tendencies of their environment. So long as these substantive demons can decipher
and distinguish the palimpsest of atoms distinctly enough, they can determine by
means of adaption their own behaviour, maintaining a ‘metastable’ equilibrium. To
fail to distinguish these sufficiently is to die. Wiener writes: ‘as Leibniz says of some
of his monads, it receives a large number of small impressions, until it falls into “a
certain vertigo” and is incapable of clear perceptions. In fact, it ceases to act as a
Maxwell demon.’106
What structure does this then take, if the God who pinches Leibniz’s pyramid
together at the point of infinity no longer exists? André Robinet – scholar of early
modern philosophy, editor of the collected works of Nicolas Malebranche, cyberneti-
cian – employs a profound expression to depict the structure of a cybernetic society: ‘a
102. Ibid., 163. Wiener’s translation.
103. Ibid.
104. Letters to Caroline and Clarke, I.4, V.100.
105. Wiener, HUHBb, p. 31. In the introduction he writes that, ‘while the universe as a whole, if
indeed there is a whole universe, tends to run down, there are local enclaves whose direction seems
opposed to that of the universe at large and in which there is a limited and temporary tendency for
organization to increase. Life finds its home in some of these enclaves. It is with this point of view at its
core that the new science of Cybernetics began its development.’ (p. 15).
106. Wiener, Cybernetics, p. 58. This would seem to be a reference to M21 in which Leibniz depicts
death as a ‘un vertige’ in which a monad is unable to distinguish its perceptions: ‘But when there are a
vast number of little perceptions [petites perceptions] in which there is nothing distinct, we are stupefied
[étourdi], as happens when we continuously spin around the same direction several times: this makes us
dizzy [il vient un vertige], which can make us faint and prevent us from distinguishing anything at all.
And death can put animals into this state for a time.’
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tangle of interconnected myriagons.’ [un enchevêtrement de myriagones interconnectés]107
This alludes to the famous problem of imagining complex shapes posed by Descartes,
to which Leibniz responds. Descartes uses the ease of understanding the difference
between a chiliagon (a figure bounded by a thousand equal lines) from a myriagon
(one bounded by ten-thousand) to distinguish the faculties of the understanding from
the imagination, given the impossibility of imagining (visualising) in the ‘mind’s eye’
any difference between such complex figures. Whereas in understanding the mind
‘turns’ inward to ‘inspect … ideas which are within it’, with imagination, Descartes ar-
gues, it ‘turns’ outward to bodies and ‘looks at something in the body which conforms
to an idea understood by the mind or perceived by the senses.’108 To Leibniz this
implies an incursion of confused senses on the clarity of the polygon’s idea. When
considering a chiliagon, Leibniz argues, the mind proceeds by a combinatorial logic
in which words (side, equality, thousandfoldedness) are used in place of ideas which
would be too complex and confused for it to handle at once: ‘in place of the ideas I
have of these things, since I remember that I know the meaning of those words, and
I decide that explanation is not necessary at this time.’109 The properly distinct idea
of a myriagon is therefore blind, or obscure sensation, and symbolic.
It is precisely Leibniz’s procedure of seeking clarity through bounding confusion in
abstract concepts whichWiener and Rosenblueth depict in their paper on ‘Models’: the
closed (black) box, whose interior I am effectively blind to, allowing for determinations
of the otherwise infinite and unwieldy white box, which computer scientists have
since named the procedure of ‘black box abstraction.’110 Themyriagonwhich Robinet
depicts is therefore an asymptotically black box, and the structure of the cybernetic
system is a ‘tangle’ [enchevêtrement] of such black boxes: a network, but one whose
very relationality eludes clear determinability, whose every relation is effectively a
black box.
This is the very opposite of Leibniz’s pyramid, where however obscure a percep-
tion is, one can always be certain that what is, what has happened and what is true, is so
because it has descended from divinity above. One might jump to call the cybernetic
situation horizontal or equal, as Hardt and Negri do. Yet the fact that cybernetic
relations themselves are black boxes ensures that this cannot be clearly known to be
the case. Moreover, and contra any sense of utopianism, that the relations between
107. ‘L’univers pyramidal de la fin de la Théodicée prend l’allure d’un enchevêtrement de myriagones intercon-
nectés.’ André Robinet, Le Défi Cybernétique: L’automate et La Pensée (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), 114. My
translation.
108. Descartes, Sixth Meditation 72–73.
109. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 24–25; Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, 261–62.
110. In their classic programming textbook, Abelson, Sussman and Sussman write: ‘it is crucial that each
procedure accomplishes an identifiable task that can be used as a module in defining other procedures.
For example, when we define the good-enough? procedure in terms of square, we are able to regard
the square procedure as a “black box.” We are not at that moment concerned with how the procedure
computes its result, only with the fact that it computes the square.’ Structure and Interpretation of Computer
Programs, 26
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the black boxes are constituted through determination in its double sense means
that these relations, these cryptological lines of communication, are each relations of
power, of determining determinations. To deign their equality is to focus on their
epistemologico-communicational sense alone (information) as though it could be
distinguished from control, to dematerialise and depoliticise it. The cybernetic system
is not a pyramid but a myriad of pyramids. A myriad of hierarchies in every direction.
Its shape is a myriagon.
Ideally, for the scientist, the structuralist, the philosopher, this new shape does not
necessarilymark a noticeable shift to them, since their opponent nomore than passively
resisted them in the first place. Such scientists sustain themselves through a homeostasis
of knowledge, their existence dependant on their deciphering determinations of
distinct knowledge from their opponents: nature and the known body of human
literature. As of Anaximander, who ‘opened the doors of nature’ as Pliny said,111
‘science’ is a phylogenetic homeostasis which determines the adaptive evolution of
the species, the ‘we’; the student is the one who survives through adapting themselves
to their environment through ontogenetic homeostasis, the ‘I’. There have been great
hopes that cybernetic networks would reconcile the individual and species. Licklider’s
Library of the Future, his hope that the interconnection of his internet ‘will make
available to all the members of all the communities the programs and data resources
of the entire supercommunity.’112 Gene Youngblood and the post-’68 Teilhard de
Chardinesque ambition of the New Communalist Video Artists to create a global
‘videosphere’ of human minds through cybernetic communication media, which
repeated itself in the 1990s utopia of ‘cyberspace’.113 Hardt and Negri’s multitude
whose singularities act in common. These still assume the functionally equivalent
passive Augustinian evil which Leibniz strove against. The scientist can ‘black box’
their environment such that theirs and Leibniz’s are functionally equivalent, the fact
that truth descends from all sides rather than from above being ignorable. But what of
politics, war, law, business? Of science in its real instantiation in the politico-martial-
financial economy where determination in the sense of power, specifically control, is
at stake?
To control another is to have a greater degree of determinate perfection in
the cybernetic schema in the triple sense of epistemology (information), teleology
(purpose), and force (control) over one’s actively resisting Manichean enemy. The
game whereby epistemological determinations are actively shared strategically for
the advantage of the player, not naturally, or hidden for the same ends. This is a
homeostasis where the ‘I’ can be a ‘we’, so long as the ‘we’ is not a single phylum, but
111. Cited by, Carlo Rovelli, The First Scientist: Anaximander and His Legacy, trans. Marion Lignana
Rosenberg (Yardley, PA: Westholme, 2011), xviii.
112. Licklider and Taylor, ‘The Computer as a Communication Device,’ 31–32.
113. Gene Youngblood, ‘The Videosphere,’ Radical Software 1, no. 1 (1970): 68, 159.
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rather a myriad of phylae with shifting, labile ‘I’s. Canguilhem argues that there can
be no social homeostasis of the entire human species since it has no collective purpose,
no inherent determination according to which it strives. What cybernetics proposes
is not inconsistent with this. It agrees that a socius is that in which determinations
are shared equally. What it establishes is a system for determining these overlapping,
myriadic socii, or internets.
5.4 Heterarchy
This is to say that instead of a simple pyramidal hierarchy, there is instead a myriagonal
heterarchy.
This concept has been employed in three relevant recent works: Fred Turner’s
From Counterculture to Cyberculture (2006), David Stark’s ‘Ambiguous Assets for Un-
certain Environments’ (2001) and Benjamin Peters’ How to Not Network a Nation
(2016). Turner depicts as ‘heterarchical’ the multiple competing value systems at play
in the paradigmatic computer networks through which Silicon Valley’s culture would
gestate. On the Whole Earth ’Lectronic Link (WELL), and Global Business Network
(GBN), both founded in the mid-1980s and heavily participated in by persons active
in the ‘New Communalist’ counter-culture of the decade prior, Turner writes how
users characterised their postings as of a horizontal social register premised on the
unrequited exchange of informational gifts, whilst simultaneously ignoring and re-
cognising the degree to which by doing so they were instituting a new ‘informational
economy’ which they individually profited from. The heterarchy of such a com-
munity is in its contradictory public and private investments.114 Turner borrows the
concept from Stark, who uses the term to depict the paradigm of the post-Communist
‘modern firm’: neither characterised by the horizontality and independence of the
free-market nor the hierarchy and dependence of a centrally-planned economy, but
rather relations of interdependence. Such firms have the ‘properties of networks’, the
network is no longer a property (‘social capital’). They ‘distribute’ authority to every
unit and render each accountable to one another; the increased interdependencies
ensures that the coordination of their ‘feedback loops’ cannot be managed from above;
they are ‘adaptive systems’ since they are sites of competing and coexisting value
systems – they survive in order to innovate (adapt) and not vice versa; they ‘court
and even create ambiguity … they speak in many tongues’, eroding accountability
and locatable authorship; they blur the boundary between public and private and
the very boundaries of the firm.115 Stark makes not a single mention of cybernetics,
114. Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and
the Rise of Digital Utopianism (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 153–59,
189–90.
115. David Stark, ‘Ambiguous Assets for Uncertain Environments: Heterarchy in Postsocialist Firms,’
in The Twenty-First Century Firm: Changing Economic Organization in International Perspective, ed. Paul
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he needs not: its operative image is ether. Peters’ book on the failed attempts to
create civilian computer networks in the Soviet Union employs heterarchy, after
Stark,116 to describe the informally competitive, nonlinear and nonhierarchical ar-
rangements of institutions within the structure of the centralised and rigid hierarchy
of the post-Stalin command economy, the ‘presence of ambiguities that result from
competing formal regimes of evaluation’.117 While he follows Stark in his reading
of heterarchy as an ambiguous ‘third way’ between hierarchy and horizontality, his
historical deployment of the concept is somewhat opposite: whereas Stark reads it to
be the future of firm, Peters reads it as the very reason why attempts to realise Soviet
Internets failed: ‘heterarchies of conflicting private interest stalemated virtuous attempts
to reform the hierarchical economic bureaucracy. If the [American] Internet is not a
thing but an agreement, as the phrase goes, perhaps the Soviet Internet is not a thing
but a disagreement.’118 This reintroduces the dichotomy between the horizontality
of agreement, as in the US where capitalist institutions supposedly ‘behaved liked
socialists’ to realise the ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ, and the hierarchy of disagreement, as in the USSR
where ‘socialists behaved like capitalists’.119 What Stark’s heterarchy surely signifies is
the disagreement in agreement (rather than against it) as much as hierarchy within
horizontality. Hence Turner’s locating it within the American counter-cultures sur-
rounding the early Internet and Stark’s own study of it (as within post-socialist firms)
having taken inspiration from ‘high-tech’ and ‘new media’ firms in America.120 This
is to argue that the Internet that exists has always been heterarchical, in accordance
with Stark’s formulation.
Peters makes the prescient observation that, despite Stark’s belief to have coined the
term,121 ‘heterarchy’ had already been coined in an early cybernetic paper by Warren
McCulloch,122 whose concepts of neural networks were the model of Paul Baran’s
survivable packet (‘block’) switching network which characterises today’s Internet
architecture.123 McCulloch’s short paper ‘The Heterarchy of Values Determined
by the Topology of Nervous Nets’ (1945) questions the possibility of locating the
source of purposive behaviour within a neural network, or to locate a ‘drome’ (a
feedback loop of two neurons) whose ‘value’ hierarchically determines the behaviour
of all other ‘dromes’ in an organism. McCulloch derides hierarchy according to
DiMaggio (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 74–101.
116. Benjamin Peters, How to Not Network a Nation: The Uneasy Story of the Soviet Internet (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2016), 22.
117. Ibid., 22–24, 74–78, 173.
118. Ibid., 193.
119. Ibid., 2.
120. Stark, ‘Ambiguous Assets for Uncertain Environments,’ 75.
121. Ibid.
122. Peters, How to Not Network a Nation, 18, 22–24.
123. The founding paper of neural networking having been, Warren S. McCulloch and Walter Pitts,
‘A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity,’ The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 5,
no. 4 (December 1943): 115–133 (1943).
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its etymology (hierós, holy + arkhía, rule, origin), as implying ‘a kind of power or
importance which culminated in the notion of the sacred or holy’ and the structure
of the Church whereby ‘the many ends are ordered by the right of each to inhibit
all inferiors.’124 Calling this ‘Platonic’ – though it would equally suit the Platonism
of Leibniz – he argues that in a network where at least three feedback loops are
connected into a greater loop – the same number of connections Baran considers
to create a ‘distributed’ network – not only does the ‘consistency’ of the network’s
interrelation become of ‘a higher order than had been dreamed of in our philosophy’
but it becomes ‘sufficiently endowed to be unpredictable from any theory founded
on a scale of values.’125 There is no Leibnizian chamber into which God whispers his
messages, nor anything akin to Descartes’ pineal gland from which a soul controls its
body. Instead of such ‘hierarchies of values’ there is ‘a heterarchy of values, [which] is
thus internectively too rich to submit to a summum bonum.’126 Heterarchical networks
such as the nervous system, or after Baran, the Internet, have a greater consistency,
are unpredictable and they defy hierarchy.
Unfortunately McCulloch does not elaborate more than this. Clearly concerned
with retaining a sense of arkhía, rule, through difference or otherness (héteros), he
could simply mean that purpose is immanent equally through an entire network,
or he could mean, in a richer sense like Stark’s, that the locus of its hierarchies are
obscured by its uniformity, it being ‘anywhere but here’, such that it is, in Peters’
words, a ‘third way’. Either way or otherwise, McCulloch’s brevity certainly opens
the possibility of productive readings. Along with Stark’s theory of heterarchy, I
conceive it as a signifier of the paradoxical interrelations amongst networks, adopting
the term ‘heterarchy’ perhaps unorthodoxically with respect to McCulloch (who one
imagines hardly vaunted orthodoxy either).
Yet it seems to me the dynamism of the term is still lacking. Why do internetworks
have this paradoxical and obscure status with respect to hierarchy and horizontality,
the peace of agreement and the war of disagreement? Beyond descriptors and at its
most abstract level, what dynamism makes this so? What logic makes the Internet
not singularly horizontal but myriadically heterarchical?
5.5 The rules of the game
To answer this one must carefully distinguish the various modalities of communicative
determinations with respect to determinations of control, the various possible moves
that the heterarchical game of communication and control allows for.127
124. Warren S. McCulloch, ‘The Heterarchy of Values Determined by the Topology of Nervous Nets,’
The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 7, no. 4 (December 1945): 227–227.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
127. Dedicated to CH, without whom this section could not have been written.
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The simplest element of a network is a node, but these cannot be thought in
isolation since to do so is to establish a network of communication between them. To
observe is to effect, hence determinations are the lines which connect vertices into a
network. A network of nodes is the most simple structure that can be thought. I
define a network as having a common purposive determinacy, a community. Now,
a network may intersect with other networks whose determinacies are distinct and
contradictory to the network itself, especially when real. A reductivist example: a
familial network may intersect with a school network, a work network, a migration
support network, a network of immigration bureaucrats and networks immigration
police, each of whom has a distinct purposive determination. I call this determinate
multiplicity of intersecting networks an internet. The virtual totality of all internets
is the Internet, the absolutely indeterminate system that eludes determinate thinking
but establishes its possibility. The Internet corresponds to Leibniz’s ‘universe’, an
internet to a ‘world’ (of which God chooses the best compossible variant), a network
to a ‘monad’.
That every network can intersect with any other into an internet means that
real networks are not primarily connected and disconnected through translation.
What distinguishes these networks is not that their languages deny translatability, an
Augustinian problematic, but that they possess contradictory purposive determinations.
When there are contradictory purposes at stake, the distinction between one net-
work and another, or self from other, is maintained by a fracture of communication
channels, by the determinative control over access to informational determinations.
These determinative controls can either have a primary quality that is positive or
negative, aimed at increasing the determination of its own network or decreasing the
determination of another. In a strategic competition, one would only seek to increase
the informational and controlling determinacy of one’s own network, whereas one
would seek only to reduce the determinacy of an opponent. Given that control is
determined relatively by whichever network has the greater differential of inform-
ational determination with respect to another, to aim to decrease the opponent’s
determination may have the equivalent effect of increasing one’s own determination.
But not necessarily. To increase one’s own determination may have the secondary
effect of increasing the opponent’s – such as the USSR developing atomic weaponry
after the US demonstrated its possibility, and to attack the opponent’s determination
may induce an entropic ‘blowback’ effect on the determination of one’s own.
I count six types of possible determinations in a cybernetic system, as depicted in
the Table of Determinations (fig. 5.3). These are presented as philosophical concepts
not everyday terms.
Cryptography involves the capacity encrypt a message and legitimately decrypt
it. To encrypt a communication to a specific set of networks, one or finitely many,
is to establish them within one’s own network, aligning their purposes with one’s
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Sender/Author Recipient Determinate effect
Encode My network Either Either
Encrypt (Encipher) My network My network Increases determinacy of my network
Disinform My network Other network Decreases determinacy of other network
Decode Either My network Either
Decrypt (Decipher) My network My network Increases determiancy of my network
Cryptanalyse Other network My network Increases determinacy of my network &
decreases determinacy of other network
Figure 5.3: Table of Determinations
own as against another’s. Wiener writes of ‘bluff’ and ‘jamming forces’.128 To send an
encrypted message is to consolidate an internet into a network. An encrypted message
(a cryptogram) contains a plainly encoded message like a shell to a hermit crab. The
purpose of transmitting a cryptogram is to increase the informational determination
of one’s own network and not that of the enemy, for, if this strategic concern was
not relevant, there would be no need to encipher the message and one would instead
merely encode it such that it could reach any network, increasing, decreasing or having
no effect on their determinations. Not every message is actually of strategic relevance,
but every message is of potential strategic relevance given a certain opponent. Every
active being knows it must encrypt. Even a silverfish knows that it must hide or play
dead when a human approaches, encrypting its presence. Only extremely passive
networks – a luminous star, a deeply comatose animal – would under all circumstances
only encode and not encrypt their messages. Wiener’s distinction between objects
which can be subjected to cybernetic analysis and those which would suffer from the
‘close coupling’ of observer and observed could be reread as being premised on the
distinction between a being which is too passive to resist observation and that with
sufficient activity to encrypt itself.
Now, to be capable of decryption, a cryptogram is to be legitimately received
within the same network as its sender and to therefore share their determinate purpose
against the networks which have been excluded. A message intended strategically for
one’s own network would contain a positive informational content and therefore by
deciphering it one increases the determinacy of the network as a whole. By decoding
an encoded message that has not been encrypted, one may increase, decrease or
not effect the determinations of one’s own networks, as could the opponent. Every
decoded message loses a degree of its original encoded message and this provides a
rule for the entire game of determinations: as Stuart Hall argues in ‘Encoding/Decod-
128. Wiener, HUHBb, 162.
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ing’ (1980), a broadcaster’s desire for ‘perfectly transparent communication’ will be
partially inflected or wholly rejected by the decoding recipient. This allows Hall to
conceive of a resisting ‘politics of signification’. But with Hall’s model being tradi-
tional broadcast media (television, radio, newspapers, etc.), he does not conceptualise
the capacity for a transmitter to improve their capacity to increasingly ‘target’ the
recipient with communications that would agree with them; he has no concept of
a homeostatic network which learns from observing the recipient’s behaviour what
would strategically accord with their purposive determinations.
Such observation takes place by means of the mirror of cryptography, cryptana-
lysis, to break open a cryptogram from which one’s network was intended to be
excluded. Forms cryptanalysis can take include mathematical ‘codebreaking’, es-
pionage, surveillance, cracking (what passes for ‘hacking’ in popular discourse129)
website tracking, voyeurism, or the tracking of an enemy aircraft as with Wiener’s
anti-aircraft predictor. It is the mirror of cryptography in the sense of being a form
of writing secrets, since the cryptanalysand is not to have sufficient informational
determinations as to the fact that their opponent is covertly within their community,
or how to expel them, and a form of decryption in that it raises the informational
determinacy of the cryptanalyst with respect to their enemy, the cryptanalysand. As
David Kahn says, cryptanalysis is an aggression, a bellicose act.130 Not only does it
enrich the informational determinacy of the cryptanalyst’s network, but if discovered
by a cryptanalysand unwilling to acquiesce to their loss of control it ruptures the
purposive determination of their community, since their capacity to communicate and
thereby act strategically with respect to the cryptanalyst is rendered redundant. The
best solution of the cryptanalysand is to remove the cryptanalyst, which might entail a
counter-cryptanalysis in kind to discover who they are, but because absolute security
would require an infinite determination (hence Bruce Schneier’s dictum, ‘Security is
a process, not a product’131) the ‘minimax’ outcome would be that defensive mode of
resistance which cryptologists call ‘resilience’: the capacity to contain the impact of
failure and to adapt to changes in circumstance.132
The Manhattan Project’s pioneering ‘compartmentalization’ of knowledge into
access-defined micro-networks – which as historian Matthew Connelly argues has
since become the model of governance in general and a cause for the vast arcana at
the heart of the modern State133]galison-2004-remov-knowlgalison-2010-secrec-
129. ‘A cracker is an individual who attempts to access computer systems without authorization.’
Internet Users’ Glossary, RFC 1392 (1993). See also Eric S. Raymond’s Jargon File entry ‘Cracker’,
http://www.catb.org/~esr/jargon/html/C/cracker.html.
130. Kahn, The Codebreakers, 758.
131. Bruce Schneier, ‘The Process of Security,’ Schneier on Security, April 2000, accessed June 7, 2018,
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2000/04/the_process_of_secur.html.
132. Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensible about Security in an Uncertain World (New York:
Copernicus Books, 2006), 119–32.
133. Matthew Connelly, ‘The Cold War and the Culture of Secrecy,’ January 2015, accessed May 15,
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three-acts – is a realization of resilience, preventing the crypytanalyst from stealing
informational determinations of the whole network by dividing it into smaller net-
works based on more direct purposive determinations (‘Need to know’), thereby
producing plethoras of internets. Baran and Licklider’s ‘survivable network’, the
ARᴘᴀNᴇᴛ-Internet, pertains to the same logic: in order to ensure the cryptanalytic
indeterminability of the capitalist communication infrastructure as a whole, subdivide
and overlay the existing communication networks such that any ‘attack surface’ is
limited. Schneier contrasts ‘resilient’, ‘dynamic’ and ‘heterogeneous’ systems to ‘brittle’,
‘static’, ‘homogeneous’ ones, systems which contain ‘too many secrets’ for whom attack
or failure can constitute its catastrophe.134 The heterogeneity of the resilient internet,
he writes, implies a greater capacity for adaptability to changes of circumstances, less
encumbered by the need for a consensus of purposive determinations across a wider
network. The resilience of a system is, positively, to employ a cybernetic vocabulary,
its degree of homeostasis, or rather, considered negatively, its degree of homostatics.
Hence in a strategic conflict where cryptanalysis is a threat, homeostasis not only
implies a horizontal decentring of organs but their cryptographic stratification, the
engendering of networks with greater and lesser degrees of determinations: obscure
hierarchies of control. This renders it implausible to speak of internets as equal in
control.
It also raises a great problem: if a network with a single informational determin-
ation is fractured into a myriadic internet, how does it maintain a single purposive
determination, a single end, let alone distribute sufficient informational determina-
tions across its thresholds? The cohesion of an internet depends on networks which
rationally overlap, which ‘bring everyone together’. The production of individuals
through surveillance which Foucault wrote of is antiquated according to such a logic,
which truly is a logic of heterogeneous ‘dividuals’, as Deleuze termed it, ‘made up of
codes indicating whether access to some information should be allowed or denied’.135
The cybernetic game of strategy poses another type of determination. By dis-
informing I intend the strategic transmission of entropy not to one’s own network, since
this would be contradictory to one’s purposive determination, but to the opponent’s.
The purpose of disinformation is to degrade the opponent’s determinacy. This is
distinguished from ‘misinformation’ which designates the accidental and non-strategic
transmission of entropy. Unlike the confused phrase ‘fake news’, which should be
avoided,136 disinformation has a clear signification and a resolutely twentieth century
2015, http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/events/events/2015/15-01-13-M.-Connelly3.aspx; Daniel
Nemenyi, ‘Submarine State: On secrets and leaks,’ Radical Philosophy, September–October 2015, 5; [.
134. Schneier, Beyond Fear.
135. Deleuze, Negotiations, 180.
136. The guidelines of the House of Commons’ Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee’s
Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Interim Report (2018) are sound on the matter of rejecting the term ‘fake
news’. They argue that what became Donald Trump’s signature phrase lacks clarity of definition, and
its multiple meanings include ‘a description of any statement that is not liked or agreed with by the
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history.
If defected secret service officers from the Soviet Union are to believed, the term
‘disinformation’ is itself a product of an act of disinformation since it translates the
strange Russian noun ‘dezinformatsiya’ whose un-Slavic peculiarity derives from the
attempt to portray it as French in origin – by none other than Joseph Stalin himself.137
Disinformation has been a weapon of both sides of the Cold War, as well as industries
(e.g. the fossil fuel, tobacco and pharmaceutical industries funding of disinformative
research conducive to their profits). Its aim is not necessarily to replace the information
it counters (and thereby to increase the community of the disinforming network),
but to divide the target network against itself so as to render the resulting internet
incapable of purposive determination. As a former Czechoslovak intelligence officer
has written, Soviet propaganda attempted to promote ‘positive images of the Soviet
Union’ but they were also designed by the KGB ‘for internal demoralization and
erosion of power in target countries.’138 Whereas cryptanalysis can be said to do this
‘passively’, forcing the hand of the other network to dissolve itself into a internet,
disinformation is, as the KGB called it, an ‘active measure’ which does this directly.139
Given today’s cybernetic communication infrastructure, disinformation has become,
as a recent RAND study argues, extremely cheap to wield on massive scales, in terms
of both technical costs and likely repercussions.
Yet the same authors are only capable of posing as its ‘antidote’ ‘compelling factual
evidence supplied in a timely manner.’140 Similarly, the recent interim report on
disinformation by the UK House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
Committee, which construes disinformation to be a threat to the ‘very future of
democracy’, recommends in conclusion that Ofcom, the British telecommunication
and broadcast regulator, be granted powers to enforce content standards online as
it does for television and radio – a rather measly antidote given Ofcom’s abject
failure to counteract, for example, climate change disinformation in the traditional
media.141 Such toothless redetermination campaigns, which might be openly encoded
or encrypted, are at the disadvantage of always being reactive to disinformative
manoeuvres which can attack far faster than can be defended, if only since a lie is
easier to make than to disprove. Further, they miss the point that disinformation is an
attack on the very consistency of the network that it would want to furnish. Which
reader.’ (p. 7–9). Instead, they advise the use of ‘disinformation’ and ‘misinformation’.
137. Ion Mihai Pacepa and Ronadld J. Rychlak, Disinformation (Washington DC: WND Books, 2013),
4–6, 34–39.
138. Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider’s View (Washington: Pergamon-
Brassey, 1985), 2.
139. Ibid., ix–x, 1–4.
140. Linda Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses (Santa
Monica: RAND, 2018), 229–33.
141. Damian Collins MP et al.,Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Interim Report, Report (House of Commons
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Trump or Brexit supporter would be convinced by a network claiming to proffer
‘official’ evidence of their fallacies? Such a network would already be an enemy.
Whereas resilience at least allows a network to structurally decompose itself into an
internet in such a way that its networks may overlap with one another through a
rationally arranged internet, disinformation targets the very rational network itself.
The purpose of disinformation is to disperse a network into an incoherent, confused
and passive internet.
Through injecting indetermination into the opponent’s network, disinformation
increases the aggressor’s degree of control with respect to the victim. Yet reducing
the determinacy of an opponent’s network, shattering it into myriadic internets, is not
without risk. Can the consequent networks be determined as intended – known and
controlled? ‘Blowback’ is the US intelligence jargon for unintended consequences.
By reducing the indetermination of the opponent, the determination of the Internet
itself has been reduced, and it may take no small effort on the part of the aggressor to
ensure that their own network is not degraded in turn, that the release of entropy
loses its cryptographic limitations. Heterarchy is not a zero sum game: the Internet
consists in an infinite possibility of determination as well as indetermination.
These six types of determination constitute the possible manoeuvres of a network
on their most abstract level, as I have been able to count them. These are the operations
by means of which it can attempt, through cunning, to survive the homeostatic conflict
that is life, that defines every network with respect to their internets. They are not
mutually exclusive, they can be used in combination and by degrees. When Wiener,
Rosenblueth and Bigelow transpose over Leibniz’s taxonomy of knowledge, truth
and ideas their taxonomy of behaviour, purpose and teleology, they establish as the
greatest determination the life of that network, not its wisdom and goodness. This is
why Wiener argues that human society is not engaged against the Augustinian evil
for universal truth, but defined by the struggles against Manichean evil whereby the
opponent positively exists and actively seeks control.
5.6 Cyberwar and Netwar
In the 1990s and early 2000s, RAND researchers John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt
invented two major concepts for depicting such conflicts: cyberwar and netwar. The
latter would become fundamental for Hardt and Negri, who write in a chapter on war,
‘After the end of the cold war, nation-states no longer cloud our view and network
enemies have come out fully into the light. All wars today tend to be netwars.’142 My
argument is close to this concept, and so I should relate it.
Cyberwar and netwar, Arquilla and Ronfeldt write in 2001, ‘encompass a new
142. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude (London: Penguin, 2005), 55.
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spectrum of conflict that is emerging in the wake of the information revolution.’143
The authors phrase the difference between cyberwar and netwar as being one of degree
rather than kind – the former marks the ‘mostly military’ end of this spectrum, the
latter its ‘lower-intensity, societal-level counterpart.’144 I am not convinced that they
can be distinguished into military and civil domains as the authors claim, especially
since netwar is said to ‘blur’ the boundaries of peace and war.145 But if one takes
cyberwar to be the emphasis of their first collaborative publication, ‘Cyberwar is
Coming!’ (1993), in which both ‘cyberwar’ and ‘netwar’ are invented, and netwar
representative of their subsequent post-1994 works, and if one notices a shift in the
authors’ reading of the concepts between these works, then cyberwar and netwar
could be distinguished as representative of the authors’ initial 1993 argument and
their argument from 1994 onward, respectively, rather than the purportive distinction
between military and civilian domains.
Why 1994? Because of two events. As the year opened the North Atlantic Free
Trade Association (NAFTA) came into force and the indigenous Ejército Zapatista
de Liberación Nacional (EZLN or the ‘Zapatistas’) declared war on the Mexican state
and neoliberalism in general, employing an apparently new form of organisation
which Arquilla and Ronfeldt would take to be paradigmatic of a revised concept
of netwar.146 This concept would draw heavily from the other event in 1994 to
have profoundly shaped their writings, the publication of Kevin Kelly’s widely read
Out of Control: The Rise of Neo-Biological Civilization, wherein the concept of the
swarm is invented. The RᴀNᴅ researchers overlaying of these two events into their
theory of netwar would provide the break from their initial cyberwar concept, and this
would be almost transparently adopted by Hardt and Negri for their own theory of
revolutionary action, despite the resolutely statist motivations of Arquilla and Ronfeldt
and, moreover, the new age and neoliberal perspective of Kelly. As opposed to the
authors of Multitude, it is with Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s earlier, effectively abandoned
concept of cyberwar that my argument bears closer affinity.
Their initial 1993 paper ‘Cyberwar is Coming!’ aptly begins by quoting Clause-
witz: ‘Knowledge must become capability.’147 This refers to Clausewitz’s contention
that the mind and life of the distinguished commander is so totally assimilated in the
fluid circumstances of the battlefield that they practice an art of war [Kriegskunst] not
143. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy
(RAND Corporation, 2001), ix.
144. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, ix, 2–5; and, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt,
‘Cyberwar is Coming!,’ in In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, ed. John Arquilla
and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 28.
145. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar, 13, 99–103.
146. They would feature throughout their writings, and would make the direct subject of a book-length
work from 1996, David Ronfeldt et al., The Zapatista: Social Netwar in Mexico (RAND Corporation,
1998).
147. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, ‘Cyberwar is Coming!,’ 23.
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a science [Kriegswissenschaft], hence ‘Das Wissen muß ein Können werden’, scientific
knowledge must become artful capability (Kunst being etymologically derivative of
Können).148 Clausewitz derides the commander who approaches war as a science for
employing ‘a mental process not of his own invention, of whose logic he is not at the
moment fully conscious’, whereas knowledge for the Napoleonic commander – an
artist – is so ‘absorbed into the mind that it almost ceases to exist in a separate, objective
way’ and his ever ‘appropriate decisions’ are an ‘expression of his own personality.’149
To phrase this argument using the grammar of this thesis, this would accord to the
highest grade of knowledge in Leibniz’s taxonomy, intuitive knowledge, the divine
clarity of apperceptions with none of their complexity obscured; or in Wiener, Rosen-
blueth and Bigelow’s taxonomy, the predictive and extrapolative behaviour of a being
with such a high degree of determination as to perceive the battlefield in the lightest
shade of whiteness, for whom the battlefield is an extremely white box.
This aligns with Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s concept of cyberwar (by which, again, I
mean their earlier pre-1994 work) to the extent that they too consider cyberwar to
be ‘war about “knowledge” – about who knows what, when, where, and why, and
about how secure a society or a military is regarding its knowledge of itself and its
adversaries.’150 ‘It means turning the “balance of information and knowledge” in one’s
favor, especially if the balance of forces is not.’151 This seems to have been a lesson
particularly impressed by the First Gulf War, for as the inventor of the internet’s
TCP/IP protocol Vint Cerf remarks in a History Channel documentary,
If you knew where things were, and you knew what was available, better than
your opponent did, then you can organise your offensive. And I think we
learned that pretty clearly in the 1992 Gulf War, where we clearly knew where
things were better than our opponents did.152
Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue, like Wiener, that the model of contemporary warfare
is not a game of perfect information like chess, where the positions of all pieces are
known to both players, but instead a game of imperfect information like kriegsspiel ‘in
which both players start “blind” to their opponent’s position’.153 Perceptive advantage
is the main factor of victory, so knew the Mongols who ‘relied almost entirely on
learning exactly where their enemies were while keeping their own whereabouts a
secret until they attacked.’154 Arquilla and Ronfeldt focus on what I call cryptography
and cryptanalysis above, but they also touch on disinformation, degrading the enemy’s
knowledge, too:
148. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, with an introduction by
Beatrice Heuser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 97–98.
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It means trying to disrupt, damage, or modify what a target population “knows”
or thinks it knows about itself and the world around it. … It may involve public
diplomacy measures, propaganda and psychological campaigns, political and
cultural subversion, deception of or interference with local media, infiltration
of computer networks and databases, and efforts to promote a dissident or
opposition movements across computer networks.155
Hence with cyberwar (their initial concept of cyberwar and netwar from 1993)
Arquilla and Ronfeldt conceive of a type of conflict not inconsistent with what I have
attempted above to philosophically show is contained in cybernetics.
It is not exactly that this consistency ceases to be the case, but that their emphasis
subtly shifts to what would become a more popular, but to me less convincing ground.
Their next collaborative work The Advent of Netwar (1996) marks the start of their
shift to a topological theory of conflict premised on a linear theory of the ‘evolution
of societies’ across four ‘basic forms’. First, the tribal form, headless, concentric and
based on relations of kin, is incapable of large agriculture and is vulnerable to clan
feuds. This began to emerge five thousand years ago. That this imitates Hobbes’
state of nature myth is reflected in its nefarious modern instantiations, ‘dynasties,
old-boy networks, mafias, ethnonationalists, urban gangs,’ and perhaps surprisingly,
‘diaspora’.156 Secondly, the institutional form with its top-down hierarchy excels
where the tribal form fails: constructing armies, enforcing laws, creating empires
and pursuing other large undertakings. It allows for ‘rival hierarchies’ to coexist,
but only if they ‘stay out of each other’s terrain.’157 The limitation of this pyramidal
form which emerged in ancient empires is its capacity to ‘process complex exchanges
and information flows’.158 This flaw is most pronounced in the economic realm,
hence the third ‘basic form’, the capitalist market which follows Adam Smith and
the Physiocrats (the ancient Agora does not count for them as a ‘philosophical and
organizational concept’) ‘enables diverse actors to process diverse exchanges and other
complex transactions’.159 The market limits the institutional form to the state and
in combination with it allows for greater complexity of political democracy. Its
weakness is its propensity to facilitate socio-economic inequality.160 Finally, Arquilla
and Ronfeldt’s fourth ‘basic form’ is the network, which came into its own only
recently and is adept at dealing with social inequality such that it ‘may thus result in
vast networks of NGOs’, a ‘global civil society’, but it may also result in an ‘uncivil
society’ of criminal gangs and terrorist groups: those both of the Right, such as white
supremacists, and the Left, the exemplar given being Hamas ( ! ).161
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Arquilla and Ronfeldt attribute the network form with three topologies: a chain
network (‘as in a migration or smuggling chain’), a star network (‘as in a franchise or a
cartel’), or an all-channel or full-matrix network, in which all members are ‘highly inter-
netted’ to one another, ‘as in a collaborative network of militant peace groups where
everybody is connected to everybody else.’162 The network itself is ‘nonhierarchical’
although hierarchical organisations may comprise its nodes, resulting in a ‘hybrid’
network.163 Even the star network, while centralised, is considered nonhierarchical.
This is because hierarchy is constituted for them through having a centre of command,
or in the military, through the doctrine of Command, Control, Communication and
Intelligence (C3I). Networks are distinguished from hierarchies in that they have no
central leadership or command structure, and therefore, woe, ‘they defy counterlead-
ership targeting (i.e., “decapitation”)’.164 But the network form is also distinguished
from the similarly acephalous tribal form165 in that it is capable of exerting large,
even planetary-scale control. As a wargame, the models of chess and kriegsspiel
are on the way to the footnotes – netwar is structured like Go whereby ‘victory is
achieved not by checkmate, as there is no king to decapitate, but by gaining control
of a greater amount of the “battlespace.” ’166 Although the depiction of warfare as
‘epistemological’ or ‘neo-cortical’ will not completely vanish,167 the focus of their
1993 cyberwar paper on the US ‘blinding’ their opponents and maintaining ‘topsight’
over them (or, they play kriegsspiel, we play chess)168 will become less than secondary
to the form of battle essential to their new theory of networks.
In Swarming & the Future of Conflict (1999) – published in the wake of the Battle
of Seattle and the formal start of the Alter-globalisation movement169 – Arquilla and
Ronfeldt contend that four doctrines of strategy have been developed throughout
history; these clearly correlate to their four ‘basic forms’ of society: the chaotic
and weak melee (tribes), large-scale massing (institutions), smaller-scale manoeuvres
(markets) and finally today the network swarm.170
Swarming is seemingly amorphous, but it is a deliberately structured, coordinated,
strategic way to strike from all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of
force and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off positions.171
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The swarm is resilient, it rushes to threatened nodes like antibodies, it is adaptable,
redundant, difficult to defeat as a whole, it blurs offence and defence, war and peace.
RᴀNᴅ’s institutional unconscious speaks through Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s work.
Though never cited, their attribution of intelligence, resilience and adaptability to the
network form speaks from Paul Baran’s theory of a redundant network which has a
‘modicum of intelligence somewhere within the system’,172 such that it can route its
messages autonomously, unpredictably and without hierarchy. Arquilla and Ronfeldt
distinguish star and all-channel ‘Bucky Ball’ (geodesic) networks: Baran distinguished
‘star’ and ‘mesh’ networks, and described chains as the most basic and least redundant
network topology too.173 Arquilla and Ronfeldt even describe the network design as
not a hierarchy but a ‘heterarchy’, although since all the nodes ‘know what they have
to do’ they consider ‘panarchy’ more befitting.174
But the major source of the shift to their post-‘Cyberwar is Coming!’ argument
would seem to be the publication of Kevin Kelly’s Out of Control: The Rise of Neo-
Biological Civilization (1994). A beekeeper,175 Kelly argues that a swarm intelligence
or ‘hive mind’ is emergent in the increased complexity of networks:
More is different. Keep adding grains of sand to the first grain and you’ll get
a dune, which is altogether different than a single grain. Keep adding players
to the Net and you get … what? … something very different … a distributed
being, a virtual world, a hive mind, a networked community.176
Employing the language of cybernetics, Kelly writes that swarms are adaptable,
evolvable, resilient, boundless and generative of novelty (unpredictability).177 They
are boundless because they sport ‘positive feedback loops’ which he believes lead to
increasing order: ‘Life begets more life, wealth creates more wealth, information breeds
more information, all bursting the original cradle.’178 Kelly’s reading of the ‘network
effect’ as a simple positive feedback loop is mistaken: positive feedback means an
incapacity to realise an intended telos because the effects of one’s behaviour which are
inconducive to achieving the ends are not counteracted (are left undetermined). The
exponential growth of a network is a negative feedback loop for the one who wants it to
interface every human and non-human on the planet; it may be a positive feedback loop
from another perspective. Kelly sees in the exponential growth of networks nothing
but a simple good, in interview adding: ‘I do think of technology as a form of life.
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And in general, I think, the more life we have the better.’179
From the perspective of the State, the exponential growth of an ‘out of control’
network intelligence is a threatening proposition. Arquilla and Ronfeldt adopt Kelly’s
argument that swarm intelligence is a necessary evolutionary step for humanity
but construe its beneficence to be contingent on its relation to State. Whereas
according to Kelly, the State is at best a force of restriction to the single, global, swarm
intelligence – ‘No one controls the Net, no one is in charge. … The Internet is …
the largest functioning anarchy in the world.’180 – to the RᴀNᴅ theorists this self-
governance and resilience to hierarchical military control presents, as their Zapatista-
supportive correspondent Harry Cleaver was perhaps the first to notice, the spectre
of ‘ungovernability.’181 This new irresistible form of power lead to Arquilla and
Ronfeldt’s realisation that ‘It takes networks to fight networks’ and that the military would
need to reorganize itself, as Cleaver puts it, ‘in ways homologous to the organizational
forms used by its “enemies.” ’182 The hierarchical military would need to overcome
its reliance on the doctrine of ‘massing’ and adopt the doctrine of swarming, or rather
‘battleswarm’, becoming a network in order to render networks such as the Zapatistas
governable.183
This ‘radical restructuring of the traditional military apparatuses and the forms of
sovereign power they represent’184 furnishes the paradigm of Hardt and Negri’s
tetralogy. For them not only must the military ‘become [rather than simply use] a
full matrix, distributed network’ but the institution of power in which the military
apparatus is embedded must itself become a ‘network power’, transforming itself
from imperialism to Empire, a global form of sovereignty whose power is effected
through distributed, modulating networks of command.185 Following from Cleaver’s
(a translator of Negri) depiction in 1996 of ‘the emerging class war in cyberspace’ as
one whereby the State adapts to and feeds, vampire-like, off of ‘forces that had escaped
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180. Kelly, ‘Out of Control,’ 389.
181. Harry Cleaver, ‘The Zapatistas and the Electronic Fabric of Struggle,’ 1995, accessed February 9,
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their command’,186 Hardt and Negri posit the Multitude as the ‘new proletariat’ whose
constituent power precedes Empire and is subjected to its imitation, exploitation and
control:
The multitude is the real productive force of our social world, whereas Empire
is a mere apparatus of capture that lives only off the vitality of the multitude – as
Marx would say, a vampire regime of accumulated dead labor that survives only
by sucking off the blood of the living.187
The ‘image’ of the Multitude is ‘the Internet’.188 Citing Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Hardt
and Negri write of it having a ‘swarm intelligence’ that is ‘based fundamentally on
communication’.189 It is leaderless, open, polycentric (decentralised) or distributed,
self-governing and impervious to hierarchy.
Ostensibly, the distinction which Hardt and Negri assert between their swarm and
Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s is that the RᴀNᴅ theorists apparently assume a homogeneity
of agents or particles, whereas theirs is ‘composed of a multitude of different creative
agents’: this is a shift from the Kantian categories of universal and particular quantities
of judgement to the singular.190 ‘They remain different in terms of race, sex, sexuality,
and so forth.’191
The collective intelligence of this multitudinous swarm of singularities derives
not from its having a pre-established identity but through its creation of the common
by means of its inter-communication, its ‘collaborative social interaction’ in the ‘space
between’ its members, not from a central point of command. The Multitude’s produc-
tion of the shared common through which it is self-constituted is its economy.192 Its
revolution or resistance with respect to centralised and dictatorial command creates
within it a nonhierarchical democratic network of collaborative relationships; this
constitutes its politic.193 In short, the multitude is ‘an open network of singularities
that links together on the basis of the common they share and the common they
produce.’194
Approaching a cybernetics, Hardt and Negri write that this network is like a brain
whereby ‘[there] is no one that makes a decision … but rather a swarm, a multitude
that acts in concert.’195 There is no Cartesian hierarchy of control, no transcendent
mind ruling over the body, thought is emergent from ‘billions of neurons in a coherent
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pattern’, or so ‘the scientists tell us’.196 Which scientists? Hardt and Negri’s source
is both uncontroversial and telling: the eminent neurobiologist Antonio Damasio’s
work Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (2003). When Hardt
and Negri write that ‘the human body is itself a multitude organized on the plane of
immanence’197 one knows that the philosopher of their swarm and of the ‘cybernetic
revolution’198 – who Haraway supposedly also carries the flag of by ‘breaking down
the barriers we pose among the human, the animal, and the machine’199 – is not
Leibniz, but, of course, Spinoza.
Spinoza is the philosopher of the ‘network of networks’ because he furnishes a
way to conceive of the ‘multitude of multitudes’ as able to ‘act in common as one
body’,200 the body which, as Hardt and Negri quote from the Ethics, ‘is composed
of many individuals of different natures, each of which is highly composite.’201
‘Spinoza provides an ontology whereby the immanence of the body and immanence
of democratic politics coincide completely.’202 This is not the place for a detailed
analysis of the democratic Spinoza of ’68 which resurfaces here since I have already
presented my case that Wiener’s Leibniz is the foundation of the Internet and society
of control. I shall therefore restrict what follows to a short comment.
Spinoza, like Leibniz, proffers a system of determination in indetermination such
that Wiener and Rosenblueth could invoke him (albeit negatively) in ‘The Role
of Models in Science’, where they introduce the modern concept of ‘information’
(though not the word itself or mathematical definition). The accuracy of their reading
of Spinoza aside, it points to a potential for an alternative reading of information and
entropy from the starting point of Spinoza instead of Leibniz (although not, perhaps,
its non-contradictory possibility). As Deleuze emphasises, the model of the body
which Spinoza proposes in the famous claim that ‘no one has yet determined what
a Body can do’203 does not overcome the Cartesian superiority of mind over body
by an inversion of its hierarchy, but rather through establishing a parallelism such
that the indetermination of body is an indeterminism of the mind: not only does
the body surpass our knowledge of it, but ‘thought likewise surpasses the consciousness
that we have of it.’204 We have thoughts of which we are not conscious, unconscious
thoughts, and these perceptions could be interpreted as the entropic indeterminations
from which our informative determinations (apperceptions) come through.
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Hardt and Negri describe this original indetermination as a ‘state of poverty’
with all of poverty’s associations implied: negatively the misery, fear, servitude,
isolation and evil of the ‘state of nature’ but also the positive tension of a desire for
liberty, security, sociality, the absolute and the good – a desire for multitude. Desire
is of this trajectory because of the ontological definition of singularities themselves:
they are nonindividual since they are modes of a common ontological substance
(God or Nature), yet because this eternal substance is haecceitic, so they too are
irreducibly singular, and they live and transform in ‘an interindividual rapport’.205
The nature of this rapport is love, since the intuitive knowledge of commonality, the
third category of knowledge (tertium cognitionis), is internal to their ethical praxis.
In the metamorphosis of becoming capable of civil life they do not join another’s
community by relinquishing their liberty through a social contract but produce a more
powerful democratic common existence. Epistemologically they create and share in
‘common notions’ which constitute rationality and increase the power of clear and
distinct thought, or what might be called ‘information’. Ethically they are oriented
with their backs to common evil and towards the common good. Politically their
common power is democratic since it is produced by those who have constituted it,
and as such it shirks hierarchy.206 Construing the internet to be ‘the prime example
of this democratic network structure’,207 Hardt and Negri hear Spinoza’s voice in
Subcomandante Galeano’s (née Marcos) concluding declaration of the founding
meeting of the Alter-globalisation movement:
We declare: That we will make a collective network of all our particular struggles
and resistances. An intercontinental network of resistance against neoliberalism,
an intercontinental network of resistance for humanity.
This intercontinental network of resistance, recognizing differences and ac-
knowledging similarities, will search to find itself with other resistances around
the world.
This intercontinental network of resistance is not an organizing structure; it
doesn’t have a central head or decision maker; it has no central command or
hierarchies. We are the network, all of us who resist.208
Arquilla and Ronfeldt assert that ‘netwar has two faces, like the Roman god Janus’,
a tension between war and peace, chaos and order, ‘individual self-assertion and the
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progress that comes with integration into larger, ultimately global groupings’.209
Hardt and Negri take this duality of netwar seriously. They write in the preface
to Multitude, ‘You might say, simplifying a great deal, that there are two faces to
globalisation.’210 Janus is the threshold which distinguishes, on the one face, the
hierarchical network of Empire that divides, isolates, wars, subjects to servile labour
and reduces to the evils of poverty; while, with the other face, the nonhierarchical
network of multitude whose singularities constitute through the praxis of love the
epistemological, ethical and political common. As god of doors and gates, departures
and returns, beginnings and ends, Janus, the RᴀNᴅ theorists argue, ‘was the god
of communications, too.’211 This is consistent with his being a symbol of modern
communication theory if chaos and order are conceived as indetermination and
determination. But is an ontology of conflict premised on Spinoza consistent with
communication theory per se?
5.7 Leibniz contra Spinoza
I believe the closeness of Spinoza and Leibniz’s respective systems, coupled perhaps
with a desire to find the Spinoza of ’68 realised in our times, has lead Hardt and Negri
to mistakenly project onto the internet a Spinozistic ontology when what is at stake,
as deduced from Wiener’s writings, is rather a post-Leibnizian one.
The properly cybernetic critique of Hardt and Negri is implicit in Leibniz’s
own objections to Spinoza’s metaphysics. Though Leibniz considered Spinoza’s
metaphysics his monadology’s only true competitor,212 he renounced it on the basis
that it, in Loemker’s words, ‘denied power, and therefore existence, to individuals’.213
While Leibniz and Spinoza are both ‘monists’ in the sense of denying Descartes’
dualism of substances by affirming a single substantive kind, Leibniz emphatically
pluralises his substances into the infinity of monads, whereas Spinoza recognises only
the single substance of God or Nature through which an infinity of affections or
modes are conceived. Leibniz ridicules Spinoza for holding that ‘there is only one
substance, God, who thinks, believes, and wills one thing in me, but who thinks,
believes, and wills an entirely contrary thing in someone else’.214 To suggest with
Spinoza that ‘the whole universe is merely one substance’ is to misconstrue the concept
of substance and render it a ‘misnomer’.215
At stake in this critical difference are the two philosophers’ respective notions of
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singular substances, or the problem of the One and the Many. In the Ethics Spinoza
argues that, ‘In the universe there cannot be two or more substances of the same
nature or attribute’.216 Leibniz himself also accepts this principle of the identity of
indiscernibles, writing in the Monadology: ‘For in nature there are never two beings
which are perfectly alike, and in which it is not possible to find a difference which is
internal, or based on an intrinsic denomination.’217 But he construes the consequence
of the axiom differently, arguing that while any two substances may share the same
perception (since each reflects the entire universe within themselves) their situations
and therefor degree of clarity and distinction of apperception necessarily differ. Hence,
‘every monad is different from every other.’218 Leibniz’s is a philosophy of equivocal
expression whereby all monads are unified by the harmony of their perceptions but
distinguished from every other by their singular clarity and confusion over any given
perception; Spinoza’s is a philosophy of univocal expression whereby ‘adequate’ ideas
which are freed from obscurity and confusion cannot be expressed clearly if another
can only express it in confusion. Whereas Leibniz poses signifying expressions,
Spinoza poses common forms.219
Agreeing with Spinoza that any substance must be self-caused or ‘prior to its
affections’220 but departing from his attribution of such substantiality solely to God,
Leibniz construes the infinity of monads as substances who cause themselves. Not
only do they have perceptions, but they also have internal principles of change that
themselves brings about the passage from one perception to another, or appetition.221
The confused sensible appetitions which animal souls cannot transgress are their
passions, whereas the clearer appetitions from the mind’s reason are their will.222 In
will, minds are little Gods who determine their universe, creating their échantillons
architectoniques by deciphering the universal palimpsest. Immanence is not a quality
shared among minds but within each mind in its capacity of willing, its ‘inherent force
of producing immanent actions’.223 Ours is the ‘best of possible worlds’ because it
derives not merely from God’s being, as per Spinoza, but from his active determining
choice.224 Every monad is, so to speak, its own author, even if according to an
ascending ontological hierarchy the ultimate author is God. According to Leibniz,
by denying the power of such an internal principle of change, Spinoza strips the very
existence away from the individuals he designates as ‘modes’.
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Wiener’s secular monadology (his cybernetics) is opposed to Hardt and Negri’s
ethology on an equivalent basis to Leibniz. Hardt and Negri’s only true network
is the multitude itself since only the multitude has a purpose: the constitution of
the common. The singularities who strive against poverty do so not for their own
enrichment or that of any other network’s but the wealth of the multitude itself. The
constitution of the common is driven by universal love. Nothing else. Every partial
desire is that of Empire, the dissolution and division of the common. Singularities
only raise their own determination (information, purpose, control) as an effect, a
secondary consequence, of raising the multitude’s. In this sense there really are only
two faces to netwar for Hardt and Negri, or better, precisely one substance in flight
against its own entropic indetermination.
Wiener’s cybernetics construes an infinity of such substances. To each network, its
own determination, its own activity. Hardt and Negri mistake Maxwell’s demon for
Janus. There is not a single double-faced head governing all things but an infinity of
Maxwell’s demons, each with a face turned towards the chaos of their indetermination
and another turned to the order of their determination. The flight from poverty has
no necessarily democratic tendency. There is no wisdom to the body. It is rather
a contingent game of strategy in which the player with the greatest determination
wins.
This kind of conflict bears more affinity to Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s initial concept
of cyberwar, which is to say, prior to their adoption of the concept of ‘swarm’ from
Kevin Kelly and their application of it to the Zapatistas. That said, in Arquilla and
Ronfeldt’s ‘Cyberwar is Coming!’ there is already a nascent sense that despite the
terms of contemporary conflict including disinformation and cryptanalysis, certain
networks are pre-established and forever consistent, notably the State. The concept
of a ‘swarm’ reinforces this through its connotations of nonhierarchy from below: the
RᴀNᴅ theorists are ultimately interested in strategising ‘counternetwar’ on behalf of
the State. Kelly’s theory plays a pivotal role in establishing the basis for this transition.
One can follow a ‘paper trail’ of footnotes back from Hardt and Negri to Arquilla
and Ronfeldt225 and then from Arquilla and Ronfeldt to Kelly,226 but the authors
of Multitude not once make the latter connection between themselves and Kelly,
conveniently writing as if the notion of swarming is simply a RᴀNᴅ military doctrine.
The same is true for Cleaver. This means Hardt and Negri structure their project
around a concept whose origins and meaning they fail to appreciate, but assume to
be essential to the ‘cybernetic revolution’. They fail to ask the question, Who is Kevin
Kelly?
225. Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 368–69, 373.
226. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar, 11; Ronfeldt et al., The Zapatista: Social Netwar in
Mexico, 15, 45, 79; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Swarming & the Future of Conflict, 48; Arquilla and Ronfeldt,
Networks and Netwars, 12, 177.
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Whole Earth Catalog editor, founder of the WELL network, founding executive
editor ofWired magazine, born-again Christian and reader of second-order cyber-
netics. Alongside John Perry Barlow of the Grateful Dead and ‘Cyberspace, a new
home of Mind’227 and along with Silicon Valley journalist and venture capitalist
Esther Dyson, Kelly played a major role in realising the networks around Stewart
Brand’s vision of computer technology liberated from corporate and governmental
contexts.228 After Out of Control, in which Kelly invents the terms swarm and ‘hive
mind’, he publishes the article (subsequently expanded into a book) ‘New Rules for
the New Economy’ (1997, 1998) which Turner describes as being ‘one of the most
widely read business manuals of the 1990s’.229 In these works the New Economy
of computer-savvy network entrepreneurship (the ‘Network Economy’) is natural-
ised according to ‘logic of the net’ whereby the successfully adaptive organism and
the profitably commercial firm are construed to be equivalent.230 This ontogen-
etic homeostasis functions on a phylogenetic level too: Silicon Valley itself is ‘one
large, distributed company’ with the benevolent aim of ‘advancing technology’ for
humanity, the interests of each company and their industry as a whole lacking any
particularity.231 Kelly is a first-rate second-order cybernetic neoliberal, an exemplar
of Turner’s theory of the hippie-radical hyper-capitalist, and his concept of swarm
relates fundamentally to the intelligence of the market free of State intervention: ‘[the]
free-market economy – a swarm if there ever was one’.232 The unsparing editors of
Mute Magazine (the ‘anti-Wired’), would write: ‘Like most neoliberals, Kelly hides his
rampant free market thinking behind a barrage of unsubstantiated clichés about the
natural order of things.’233
Is this neoliberalism already intrinsic to Kelly’s Out of Control, whose central con-
cepts of swarming and ‘hive mind’ are at the heart of Hardt and Negri’s understanding
of networks? In an essay also published by Mute, Luciana Parisi argues so. Parisi
contends that Kelly’s theory of a nonhierarchical ‘control without control’ furnishes
the neo-Darwinian analogy whereby ‘the self-organisation of natural systems mirrors
the increasing development of the free market.’234 As Kelly argues in Out of Control,
only the ‘grand mesh’ of the network – not the ‘chain, pyramid, tree, circle, hub’ –
can possibly ‘contain true diversity working as a whole. This is why the network
227. John Perry Barlow, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,’ Electronic Frontier
Foundation, February 8, 1996, accessedMarch 28, 2016, https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
228. Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture, 14, 131–140.
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231. Kevin Kelly, New Rules for the New Economy: 10 Radical Strategies for a Connected World (New
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is nearly synonymous with democracy or the market.’235 To say ‘it takes networks
to fight networks’ – as Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Hardt and Negri all insist – is as much
to say that only the market can control the market. This law attains the value of an
ontological truth because it is backed by Kelly’s neo-Darwinian determinism: all
other forms of organisation apart from the horizontal self-regulating network have
become redundant.
Hardt and Negri may attempt to distinguish the capitalist market from the concept
of democracy but otherwise Kelly’s naturalised second-order cybernetic principle
of self-governance thrives in their work; that is, Cannon’s social homeostasis. Parisi
seems to notice this for without mentioning the relevant ‘paper trail’ between Kelly
and Hardt and Negri (via Arquilla and Ronfeldt) she moves straight from her attack
on Kelly’s biological determinism – its taking determinant, unitary forms as exem-
plary of all organisations – to a critique of Hardt and Negri.236 Parisi observes that
in conceiving of the multitude as a naturally creative, communicative, networked
intelligence of humans and machines and Empire as its parasitical and destructive
web of capture, Hardt and Negri re-impose the binarism of organic and inorganic,
life and death, which the singular plane of nature of Spinoza’s monistic ethology
rejects. As Deleuze writes, Spinoza’s single plane of immanence distributes affects to
‘all bodies, all minds, and all individuals’ without distinguishing between ‘artificial’
or ‘natural’ arrangements.237 Characterising capital as monopolistic and exhaustive
of potential for invention and production, Hardt and Negri miss the ‘fluctuating
coexistence’ on the single plane of consistency of, not an individual body, but the
collective desire (conatus) which ‘expands its infinite potential through encounters.’238
By focusing on the molar (Empire, multitude) they ignore the molecular mutations
which constitute the hierarchical organisation within, Parisi argues. She borrows her
concept of hierarchy from Manuel DeLanda239 for whom markets and unplanned
cities constitute instances of ‘self-organized meshworks of diverse elements’; and for
whom bureaucracies and planned cities constitute ‘hierarchies of uniform elements’.240
Not only do meshworks and hierarchies coexist and intermingle, DeLanda argues,
but they give rise rise to each other and are in constant interaction. It is not that
hierarchy is parasitic: it is that hierarchies and meshworks are mutually symbiotic.
This is, effectively, DeLanda and Parisi’s non-agonistic conceptual alternative to
heterarchy. Parisi argues that Hardt and Negri therefore miss the ‘endosymbiotic
merging of heterogeneous machines of connection parasiting onto each other.’241
235. Kelly, ‘Out of Control,’ 26. Emphasis added.
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I agree with Parisi that Empire and multitude constitute a substantive dualism
and that such a dualism need be rejected in order to differentiate the many pluralities
within, but it seems to me that she inadequately describes the nature of hierarchies
of control within heterarchies, how they can be identified, why they function as
they do, and how to strategically act with them. Not only does she naturalise power
itself, which is fine by me, but she too naturalises the real instantiations of power.
She leaves us trapped within the hierarchies that are anyway becoming networks and
the networks which are anyway becoming hierarchies. Along with DeLanda, she
precludes all exteriorities.
5.8 Caught in the web
Parisi’s critique of Hardt and Negri’s take on the society of control intimates another
reading of the contemporary dispositif premised on immanent networks of commu-
nication: Ewald’s welfare state capitalism which ‘we do not have the choice not to
play.’242 Another theory of games. Foucault’s student, assistant and executor, Ewald
has been characterised by Negri as a ‘Right Foucaultian’ for his rejection of Marx and
his intellectual defence of the French insurance industry and France’s major employer’s
association, Medef.243 According to Ewald’s reading, our dispositif constitutes an
‘absolute communication’ network which cannot be resisted precisely because it is
not merely disciplinary but ‘interdisciplinary’, a network of networks, ‘homogenising
social space even if it does not unify it.’244 Our society is defined by a ‘power without
exterior’, a description of a network which evokes Hesiod’s depiction of Pandora as ‘a
sudden trap from which there can be no escape’.245 Ewald, and perhaps Parisi too,
depicts a network in which resistance is impossible.
Why is this so? Disciplinary society, Ewald argues, pertains to a diffusion of
disciplines, ‘ubiquitous and liberated’, which create a society by means of ‘a sort of
common language between all sorts of institutions’.246 Describing this as only a sort of
common language emphasises that the network is heterogeneous, its elements not exactly
self-same. This heterogeneous language is one of ‘absolute communication’ which
makes it possible ‘for everything to communicate with everything else according
to an interplay of redundant elements and infinite homologies.’247 It is a distributed
full-matrix network.
Themechanism of the common language throughwhich absolute communication
242. Michael C. Behrent, ‘Accidents Happen: François Ewald, the ‘Antirevolutionary’ Foucault, and
the Intellectual Politics of the French Welfare State,’ The Journal of Modern Histor, 82 2010, 623.
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takes place, according to Ewald, is the norm: ‘The norm is precisely that by means of
which and through which society, when it becomes a disciplinary society, communic-
ates with itself.’248 It ‘presented to modern society its true picture of itself’249 – a true
picture which, following Foucault, is grounded not in ontology but in the production
of power. The norm links disciplinary institutions of production, of knowledge [sa-
voir], wealth and finance and makes them interdisciplinary, homogenising social space
even if it does not unify it.’250 It grounds the possibility of communication between
the heterogeneous elements of the network whilst preserving their difference.
The norm, that through which a society communicates with itself, functions not
through repression, forbidding or blockades but through producing, intensifying,
raising value and such positive ‘mechanisms’. What it produces are individuals. But this
‘individualisation’ is not an absolute process, rather, the norm is simultaneously ‘the
link, the principle of unity – of communication – between these individualities.’251
At the centre of disciplinary society is no longer the king but the norm.
This is not the same kind of centre of a network as in Baran, Arquilla and Ronfeldt,
it is not a centre which can be ‘knocked out’; rather, this is the kind of topological
centre that Vernant shows Anaximander attributed to Greece in the Earth and Earth
in the universe: the dominating ‘common mediator … through which all elements
are related’ which institutes an order of equality and equilibrium upon all beings.252
The throne of the ‘Sun King’ around which revolved the entire sovereign society,
lit only by their living God’s reflection, is taken over by the norm which, in Foucault’s
words, ‘inverts economy and visibility into the exercise of power’.253 In the sovereign’s
absence, the objectivity through which the self can judge themselves in respect of
their individualisation becomes architecture. Architecture cedes being just an expres-
sion of power, now ‘it is the power itself.’254 It gives meaning to meaning, value to
value, communication to communication. The architecture of normative space brings
everything to visibility but the norm itself. ‘The shade becomes the light’, the negative
becomes positive, hence the norm’s productivity. The exterior becomes the interior:
‘the norm makes ceaseless individualisation possible and creates comparability.’255 The
only relationship the group has is to itself, without an exterior, without the otherness
of an above or below. ‘The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go
beyond it – nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to
be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other.’256
248. Ewald, ‘A power without an exterior,’ 170–71.
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‘The exception is within the rule.’257 Ewald refers to the influence upon Foucault of
Canguilhem’s division of the normal and abnormal (or pathological), a ‘special kind’
of difference which bears not division but rather a difference which manifests the
possibility of an enriched interior formulated by productive thresholds and bound-
aries.258 In the disciplinary society the treatment of the individualised ‘criminal’ is
isomorphic to that of the individualised ‘good citizen’ merely with redoubled effort,
and so the architecture of the prison reflects that of the school. There is no outside.
Specifically, the norm as that nexus of communication amongst communications
is ‘a measure’ through which the ‘common measure’ is produced. It allows for com-
parability since it is power, it is the centre. It is not the disciplines which target and
train bodies that characterise modernity, but the norm; confinement is not what
characterises modernity but, finally, ‘a space: interchangeable, without segregation,
indefinitely redundant and without exterior.’259
Ewald conceives of the disciplinary dispositif as a kind of internetwork which,
precisely because it interfaces everything without exception, precludes exteriority.
The only choice, then, is to play the game of capitalism, since any difference will be
assimilated by it. As Parisi might put it, there is a ‘fluctuating coexistence’. Again,
there is no escape from this internet.
This reading of the contemporary dispositif is distinct from Hardt and Negri’s
in that there is no Empire outside of the multitude, or rather, it conceptualises inter-
net from the situation of ‘Empire’ who cannot imagine an outside to itself because
‘multitude’ is already within it – whereas from the situation of multitude, as Hardt
and Negri depict it, Empire is a superfluous parasite. Where every conflict in Ewald’s
network is therefore internal to the subject of production (the norm), it is always
outside for Hardt and Negri’s subject of production (multitude). Ewald is as incapable
of conceiving of the kind of conflict through which an outside is constituted as Hardt
and Negri are unable to conceive of the myriadic heterarchical conflicts which take
place throughout the internet.
Cybernetics advances a single plane of consistency in which all conflicts, all produc-
tions can take place: the Internet. There may not be an outside to this ontology and
therefor, like Ewald, it may provide the single game that can be played, but – since
not all pieces are known to each player – there are real distinctions, real outsides, real
possibilities for conflicting networks and ruptures therein.
These can be instantiated through collective – and not only individual – embodi-
ment, while remaining a single network. The number of bodies or machines does
257. Ibid.
258. Ibid., 174.
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not matter. What matters is the unity of the dividual’s purposive determination. But
this is never just one purpose, as Hardt and Negri insist. Every network is overlapped
by a myriad of others, and to each, a degree of conflict. Networks always determine
internets as internets determine networks.
Writing of being ‘caught in the mesh of a circular net which reduces [men] to a
state of impotence’, Vernant, a communist and distinguished partisan, has something
to say about such traps.260 He objects: Men are not tuna. As the encircled Greek navy
depicted by Herodotus who suddenly surged forward into and through their Persian
trap, humans are capable of making decisive, bold action to escape their network
trap.261
260. Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, 299.
261. Ibid., 297.
Conclusion
The belief that society may be innately homeostatic remains concomitant all the way
into Hardt and Negri’s publications, but it has not been contemporary in the sense of
speaking to the operative image of the age since before the 1940s. Wiener’s concept
of homeostasis decisively breaks with Cannon’s, yet the image of human society as a
vast steam engine with all its organs working in general unison prevails. This forgets
that Wiener took a hammer to the old mirror, and our operative image is the pile of
shards which remain. Social homeostasis today operates through irreducible relations
of heterarchical agonism.
I have attempted to develop an account of the contemporary age opposed to any
based on Spinoza’s ontology, and instead on Wiener’s Leibniz, naming it internet.
According to this, immanence is not a quality shared across an entire internet but
only on the level of an dividual network since, as Leibniz says, immanence is a force
residing in every substance but not between it and another. An internet is ordered
by relations of equivocity, for want of a more agonistic term, not merely because of
differences in signification and the problem of translation but because the differences
that rule out univocity and the plane of immanence are differences of actualising
determinations, or ‘control’. That is, an internet is stratified according to the strategies,
both defensive and aggressive, of networks whose existence and liberty depends on
their holding a greater degree of determination than other networks do of them. Life
and freedom no longer necessarily correlate to truth, love, wisdom or the good, but
the strategic fact of control.
This is precisely the decoupling of right from wisdom which Leibniz feared in
Hobbes’ philosophy, where the sovereign, mortal or divine, ‘has the right to do
everything, because he is all powerful.’262 In its political modality the monadology
is an attempt to foreclose the coupling of right with the contingent fact of power
and bind it forever to the necessity of universal justice. ‘It is power which gives and
maintains law; and if this power lacks wisdom or good will, it can give and maintain
quite evil laws: but happily for the universe, the laws of God are always just, and he
is in a position to maintain them’.263 Unhappily, today harmony is ‘postestablished
262. Leibniz, ‘Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice’, Political Writings, 47.
263. Ibid., 50.
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locally’ on the field of battle, as Latour says.264 The ‘prodigious Leviathan’ is indeed
no joke, as Wiener says, for by means of his post-Leibnizian cybernetic ontology
actualised in the internet, the degrees of determination which a network can accrue
are in theory infinite, as are the degrees of indetermination in its opponents.
But the game is never settled – this is where the chess metaphor breaks down.
There is always a degree of indetermination to every power. As Burroughs says,
control is never complete. A network may tend towards becoming a mere homostatic
tool, but there is a limit to control. Indeed, there is always an infinity of further
indetermination possible – the network can always be further dividuated – just as
there is an infinity of determination to gain. This is not cause to be naive, but a call
to strategise.
264. Latour, The Pasteurization of France, 164.
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